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SUMMARY 
Under the traditional law of the sea, the sea was divided into the territorial sea and 
the high seas, and in each case different rules apply. In the fonner, the coastal state has full 
sovereignty subject to the right of innocent passage, while on the high seas all states enjoy 
the various uses of the sea subject, of course, to the reasonable use doctrine and to other 
limitations imposed by international law. This traditional dualism has recently come to an 
end as a result of the creation of the EEZ, whose specific regime is embodied, particularly 
in Part V of the LOS Convention 
The creation of the EEZ has occured through a combination of treaty fonnulation 
and state practice. Numerous states from both developing and developed worlds, including 
the United States, Canada, the members of the EEC established the"ir own 200 miles 
jurisdictional zone in the second half of the 1970s, simultaneous to the consensus 
reached in this respect during UNCLOS III negotiations. After the Convention was 
signed, the United States and the USSR restructured their 200 miles EFZs into the EEZ in 
1983 and 1984 respectively. On a worldwide basis states are currently implementing aspec~s 
of the new law relating to,the 200 miles EEZ, particularly those rules appertaining to 
fisheries, which emerged from UNCLOS III negotiations and are embodied in the LOS 
Convention, though it is a selective process of implementation. The new propositions are 
essentially being put into effect as customary law on the basis that they have received 
general recognition. 
Although the development of the EEZ has attracted the attention of international 
law publicists from both developing and developed states, the largest part of the ensuing 
literature in this field focuses on the evolutionary stages of the concept and its legal 
content as fonnulated at UNCLOS III. Some more recent few writtings have dealt also 
with the issue of implementation of the LOS Convention's EEZ provisions, but the results 
attained in this field do not coincide. Thus, though there is a general agreement that the 
most important evolution regarding the implementation of the principles of the LOS 
Convention is that a 200 mile EEZ is already an accepted rule of public international law , 
opinions diverge in tenns of exactly what this acceptance entails, what are the basic 
component of this new rule, and what specific rights and duties it encompasses. 
This thesis attempts to study, in a comprehensive manner, the EEZ rule in both 
the LOS Convention and in state practice. Its central aim is to try to establish with 
7 
exactitude the scope of the rule that has been taken into international custom. 
In this respect, after giving in chapter one a short expose on the prevailing rules of 
the law of the sea that had governed all maritime spaces before UNCLOS ill, serving as 
a background against which a better apprehension of the LOS Convention's EEZ 
provisions can be attained,an analysis of the rights of both coastal states and third states in 
the EEZ and their corresponding duties is provided in chapters two and three respectively. 
It has been asserted that, although a coastal state by claiming an EEZ would only enjoy 
specific functional rights, viz., the fields of activities they are connected with are 
explicitly defined, the vagueness often found in the wording of the Convention 
makes the situation not clear in all respect. While such a phenomenon may widen the 
functional limitations placed upon the general right of freedom of the high seas, it does 
not seem, however, to have any bearing on the high seas quality of the principal freedom 
of overflight, of laying cables and pipelines, and the freedom of navigation. 
Chapter foUr is a thorough examination and analysis of state practice as evidenced 
in EFZ and EEZ claims against the yardstick of LOS Convention. This is followed by a 
last chapter determining the scope of the rule that has been picked up in the new custom 
relating.to the EEZ. In this connection, it is asserted that state practice gives strong 
evidence that a general right to claim a jurisdictional maritime zone as defined in 
Articles 55 and 57 of the LOS Convention, viz., extending seaward up to 200 
miles from the baselines, is firmly established in international customary law. Moreover, 
state practice proves also that within the asserted zone the claimant state can invoke 
and claim all the general functional rights and jurisdictions described in Article 56. 
(1) (a) and (b) of the LOS Convention. But, if it chooses to assert only one of those 
basic rights, its action remains within the confines of internationa law, but other states 
retain the possibilities they have had, before the new customary rule came into being, 
because under both the LOS Convention and state practice the EEZ does not exist 
ipso facto as does the continental shelf, but has to be claimed. 
Furthermore, state practice suggets also that the basic rights of third states of 
freedom of overflight, of laying cables and pipelines and of navigation included in Article 
58 (1) of the LOS Convention have been received into the new international custom 
relating to the 200 miles EEZ, thus affirming the functional and sui generis nature of the 
zone agreed upon at UNCLOS Ill. Consequently, the fear of the eventual territorialization 
of the EEZ by means of state practice, which has been expressed in the aftermath of 
UNCLOS Ill, has proven unwarranted. 
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In addition, state practice indicates further that the conservation goals embodied in 
Article 61, and utilization principles included in Article 62, as well as the enforcement 
provisions enshrined in Article 73 have been also picked up into the new customary rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whatever role the UN has played since its establishment in 1945 in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and in other fields of international 
relations, its role in the codification and progressive development of international law, 
particularly the law of the sea, is of particular significance. Certainly, the most important 
work done under the auspices of the UN in the latter field is the convening of 
UNCWS 1111 which has resulted in a new law set out in the LOS Convention2. The most 
important aspect of this new law is that of the 200 miles EEZ3. 
From a historical perspective, the 200 miles EEZ has antecedents in the unilateral 
exc1usivedaims to offshore areas put forward by Latin American Sta.tes not.blessed with 
broad continental shelves in the 1940s, embracing not only the seabed but also the 
resources' of the water column as well4. But ~tsmore direct and immediate origins are ~o be 
found in.the various regional declarations, and in certain otherinstruments adopted in the 
very early seventies by Latin American and African States5; The basic structure and legal 
content of the concept was further developed at UNCLOS III and set forth in Articles. 
45-61 of the ISNT6 issued at the end of the Second Substantive Session of UNCLOS III 
which was held at Geneva from March 26 to May 10, 19757. These provisions were 
largely discussed and refined at the 1976 New York Sessions8 and embodied in the 
RSNT9. The principles relating to the EEZ, which were expressed in the RSNT, were in 
the main reproduced in the ICNTlO, the 1981 Draft Conventionll and the LOS 
C .. Ifl2 onventlOn ltse . 
In general terms, the EEZ concept as developed at UNCLOS ITI, entitles every 
coastal state to establish a maritime zone beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea 
extending seaward to 200 miles from the baselines (Le. 188 miles in width), and exercises 
therein sovereign rights regarding all the natural resources (e.g. fish, oil, gas, lobsters, 
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crabs etc.,) and other activities for the economic exploration and exploitation of the zone. 
The coastal state would also have, in the zone, jurisdictional rights relating to artificial 
islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research, and the preservation of the 
marine environment. On the other hand, third states would enjoy therein the classical 
rights of all states in the high seas of overflight, of laying cables and pipelines and, most 
importantly, the right of navigation and other activities related thereto13. 
The most important characteristic of the 200 miles EEZ concept is, possibly, that 
it was developed in state practice before UNCLOS III concluded its work in 1982. 
Whereas at the start of the Conference there was only a small number of states with 
fisheries jurisdictional claims extending beyond 12 miles limit, by 1978 there were more 
than 90, it:tcluding over forty states establishing an EEZI4. State legislative and treaty 
, -
practice' evolved on th~ basis of UNCLOS III negotiations, the rules agreed upon in the 
consecutive versions ofthertegotiating texts, and thereafter the Draft Conv~ntion. In this 
context one prominent lawyer has correctly said .that, lithe provisions of the Negotiating 
Texts and of the Draft Convention elaborated by the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea and the consensus which emerged at the Conference, have had ... a constitutive or 
generating legal effect, serving as the focal point for and the authoritative guide to a 
consistent and uniform practice of states ... "1S. 
The process of implementing the EEZ provisions elaborated at UNCLOS III has 
continued after the LOS Convention was signed in 1982. On a worldwide basis, states are 
currently implementing aspects of this new Lawl6, though it is a selective process of 
implementation. 
This thesis attempts to undertake a systematic and comprehensive research into 
the concept and the detailed regime of the EEZ under the LOS Convention and in the 
ongoing state practice. Others will possibly contend that the result of such an effort would 
be an exercise in the obvious since there is wide scholarly argreement that the right of 
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coastal states to establish a 200 miles EEZ is part and parcel of today's international legal 
order. However, in the author's opinion, such a view remains simplistic and vague. This 
is because, while it is true that an evaluation of opinions of international law publicists 
evidences a wide reasoning in favor of the emergence of a rule of customary law regarding 
the 200 miles EEZ, it is also true that big uncertainties still exist with regard to the legal 
content of the EEZ. In this context, Professor Juda has correctly observed that, "though 
there is general agreement that the EEZ is already or is fast becoming an accepted doctrine 
in international law there are differences in terms of exactly what this acceptance entails 
and what specific rights and duties it encompasses,,17. In the same line of thinking, 
Boczek has said, "while the institution of the EEZ ... has been universally recognized the 
exact'scope of the rights of the coastal and other states in the zone is far from settled,,18. 
Thus, the EEZ rule"needs more thorough examination and research in order to. establish the 
exact scope .of the rights a?d duties of every single group of states in ~he EEZ under 
curt~nt- international law of the sea. 
The precise aim of this thesis is to try to analyze the LOS Convention's EEZ 
provisions, particularly in the light of their evolution at UNCLOS III, and proceed, 
thereafter to evaluate the ongoing evolving state practice as evidenced in national 
proclamations and/or legislation and decrees, in order to identify which provisions, if there 
are any, are taken in state practice, and which provisions in claims have no counterpart in 
the illS Convention. The exact scope of the rule which has been taken into custom will be 
determined, thus enabling conclusions to be drawn as to what rights states non-parties to 
the LOS Convention are entitled after 16 November 1994, the date of entry into force of 
the LOS Convention. 
To assure a full coverage of the subject, the thesis is partitioned into five 
chapters. The first chapter presents a short review of the prevailing rules of international 
law regarding access to the living resources of the sea's water column prior to the 
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convening of the First Substantive Negotiating Session of UNCLOS III at Caracas in 
1974. It is intended to serve as a concise background against which a better apprehension 
of the EEZ regime developed at UNCLOS ITI and embodied in the LOS Convention may 
be attained. 
The second chapter centers on the examination of the nature and scope of the 
coastal state's rights and correlative duties within the EEZ under the LOS Convention. In 
the author's opinion, although the EEZ concept and its legal content received general 
acceptance relatively soon at UNCLOS lIT, the vagueness surrounding the wording of the 
LOS Convention and its long and complex negotiating history renders the situation not 
clear in all respects. Hence, an analysis of the Convention's EEZ provisions concerning 
the coastal state's rights and jurisdiction in the light of their evolution at UNCLOS III, 
appears to be useful. Due to the fact that the coastal state's rights in the EEZ hav~ been 
listedifl the LOS Convention under various juridical terms, this chapter is divided into two 
principal sections. The fitstone appertains to the coastal state's rights relating to economic 
uses of the EEZ, and the second section deals with the coastal state's rights and 
corresponding duties relating to non-economic uses of the EEZ. 
The third chapter is concerned with the rights and corresponding duties of third 
states users of the EEZ as they were hammered out at UNCLOS ITI and crystalized in the 
relevant provisions of Part V of the LOS Convention. These rights and duties are of two 
categories : those related to non-economic uses, and those related to access to the EEZ 
living resources. With regard to the first category of rights, both navigational rights and 
non-navigational military uses are subjected to a thorough examination in the light of 
UNCLOS III negotiations and the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention. The 
analysis of 'residual rights', that is rights which the LOS Convention does not attribute to 
either coastal or other states, constitutes the next crucial point of the discussion. With 
respect to the second category of rights, the controversial issue of whether or not the 
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provisions concerning access to the EEZ living resources give priority of access to any 
specific group of states forms the central point of the discussion contained in section II. 
Chapter four is a thorough examination and research into the process of states 
implementation of the EEZ provisions from 1975 to present. Here, the various 200 miles 
claims are identified, the prevailing trend in state practice as evidenced in claims to 
extended jurisdictional zones is also identified. Furthermore, the provisions in claims that 
have no counterpart in the LOS Convention will be determined. 
Chapter five is concerned with the evaluation of the present situation of the 
concept and the detailed regime of the EEZ in international customary law. Here, the 
prerequisities for the emergence of a rule of international custom are briefly reviewed and 
applied to the 200 miles EEZ; the precise scope of the customary right to an EEZ will be 
ascertained and compared with the scope of the conventional righ~, thus enabliI1g 
conclusions to be drawn aSl~, the provisions which can be invoked by and againsuhird 
stat~s. 
In treating the topic of the thesis, the author has generally employed an historical .. i 
legal and positivist approach. Legal developments relating to coastal states control over 
living resources of the adjacent sea's water column and certain other related activities have 
been followed in three principal stages, namely, the pre-UNCLOS III stage, the UNCLOS 
III negotiating stage, and the post-UNCLOS III stage, with special emphasis on the last 
two stages. In both periods, legal developments are followed in state practice, as well as in 
conventional law, especially in the context of UNCLOS III negotiations. The main 
purpose is to establish the exact scope of the rights that modem international law has 
accorded to coastal states in this field in response to the extensive jurisdictional claims 
made in the Post-World War II period. 
The positivist side in the author's approach means that states claims as evidence 
of state practice is essential. The relevant state practice19 has been, principally, found in 
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national legislation, executive decisions and practices, policy statements, press releases, 
and treaties. The principal area of difficulty has been the substance of the material, the 
broad variety of primary source materials to be examined, and the relative inaccessibility of 
much of this material. The disjuncture often encountered between the textual claim of 
jurisdiction and the actual activity of the state concerned has been another problem. The 
author's attempt as a partial resolution of this problem involves acceptance of the textual 
claim of jurisdiction as the primary datum. The position of Judge Read held in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951, has thus not been followed20. As Professor Charney 
has noted, analysis must often proceed on the basis of the textual claim as, "to the extent 
that actual practice is unknown by the international community it is difficult to give that 
practice a juridical ~ffect if it conflicts with publicized claims,,21. 
It must be made clear that the special emphasis on state practice in both chapter .. ! 
four and five does not mean that subsidiary sources of public international law have been 
ignored. Indeed, decisions of judicial tribunals and the teaching of international law 
publicists have been invoked in every convenient occasion. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ACCESS TO LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA 'S WATER 
COLUMN PRIOR TO THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE 
SESSION OF UNCLOS III, June 20, 1974. 
Introduction 
For a better apprehension of the manner in which access to fisheries beyond the 
territorial sea was governed in international law of the sea before the opening of the First 
Substantive Session of UNCLOS III, the author wouldftrst consider the high seas regime 
as it applies to the living resources of the sea's water column, then. proceeding to give a 
brief account of the evolution 9f extended national jurisdiction over fisheries, esp~iany 
from the Truman Proclamations of 1945 via the failures to agree on ftshery limits at the' 
Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960 to the. First Substantive Session of UNCLOS ill in 
Caracas in 1974. 
The aim of this first chapter is to serve as a concise background against which a 
full appreciation of the LOS Convention's EEZ provisions may be attained. 
Section I : Freedom of Access to Living Resources of the Sea's Water 
Column under the General Concept of Freedom of the Seas 
It is well know that the doctrine of the "freedom of the sea" was formulated by a 
Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, in his famous work, Mare Liberum, published in 1609 1. 
Mare Liberum was written by Grotius in an attempt to justify and defend the interests of 
his client, the Dutch East India Company, and to provide theoretical grounds for his 
country's right to navigate freely in the Indian Ocean and other oceans and seas over 
which Spain and Portugal asserted monopoly use as well as political dominion2. Yet 
fisheries were very much on Grotius mind and he argued for freedoms of navigation and 
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fishing on the ground that the oceans were very vast and un appropriable and their fishery 
resources where inexhaustible. In this context, he said: 
"The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a 
possession of anyone, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we 
consider it from the point of view of navigation or fishing"3. 
Despite the effect Grotius theory had on the early development of law the sea, his 
theory did not go unchallenged4. His assertion that there should be open and free fishing 
in the seas stood directly against the interests of several maritime states, especially 
England5. England and some other European countries were not prepared to accept the 
freedoms of the seas. The Dutch in those· days were excellent adversaries for whom the 
ever increasIng herring fishery al~ng the British coast was a principal source of riches and 
power. In order to protect the fisheries found in the seas surrounding the British Isles, 
England asserted sovereignty over the undefined English seas, and iq 1609 King James 
decided to severely limit and tax all alien fishing activities undertaken along the British and 
Irish coasts6. William Welwood, a Scottish lawyer responded to Grotius's theory, 
defending appropriation of fish resources by coastal nations. He maintained that a coastal 
nation had the duty to protect and conserve fisheries in the waters off its coasts and foreign 
fisherman should be precluded from fishing in those waters7. In support of his view, 
Wei wood relied mainly on the Bible and on an interpretation of Roman law8. With regard 
to the latter argument, he contended that Rome's treatment of the sea as being open to the 
free use of all applied only to Roman citizens and not to fishermen of other states9. He 
then cited with approval a 100 mile limit for coastal state sovereigntylO. 
Indeed, the most important reply to the theory of the freedom of the seas 
advocated by Grotius was advanced by John Selden, an English lawyer in his major work 
entitled Mare Clausum written in 1635 at the request of the English Crown 11. He claimed 
that the sea was decreed to be controlled by man12. In support of his theory he invoked 
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both the Bible and ancient customs. Quoting Genesis, Selden relied upon the following 
verse : "And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon .... all the fishes of the 
sea,,13. He interpreted the words "fear of you and dread of you" as being an expression of 
dominion 14. He found further backing for his Biblical argument in God's instruction to 
Adam and Eve : "Replenish the Eearth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of 
the sea, and over the fowl of the Air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the 
Earth" 15. 
With regard to the custom argument, unlike Grotius who relied on custom to 
disprove any appropriation of the seas, Selden invoked the customs of ancient and modern 
countries which appropriated portions of the sea 16 to justify acquisition of the sea 17. 
Wei wood and Selden, along with several other European scholars, argued and 
stood fmn againstthe freedom of the seas and carried the day. Indeed, for more than 200 
years, Selden's work remained the most authoritative work on maritime law jn England 
and the Continent and-the theory of the freedom of the seas remaine<! in limbo1S. It was 
only after the Napoleonic wars in the very early nineteenth century, after which England 
appeared as the supreme maritime power, that the freedom of the seas came to be accepted 
in Europel9. The doctrine was backed by the British navy. Europe adopted the doctrine of 
freedom of seas, especially of navigation, because it became necessary to do so in the 
wake of the industrial revolution. Moreover, by this time, the Dutch fisheries had, more or 
less, been ruined and England had rised as the strongest fishing country in the world20. 
Thus, by the early nineteenth century the freedom of the seas established itself as 
a fundamental principle of the law of the sea. 
In so far as fisheries of the sea outside a narrow belt of the territorial sea were 
concerned, as long as they were believed to be inexhaustible, no action of any form of any 
state which tends to restrict the freedom of the seas could be justified21 . Fishing as one of 
the freedoms of the seas, meant that no state could legally claim jurisdiction over fishing 
28 
activities taking place beyond the narrow limits of the territorial sea. Courts of many 
jurisdictions accepted the free use of the high seas regime as national as well as 
international law. The English Admiralty Court accepted this status. The Court correctly 
stated: 
"All nations being equal, all have an equal right to the unappropriated 
parts of the ocean for their navigation, in places where no local 
authority exists. Where the subject of all states meet upon a footing of 
entire equality and independence, no one state, or any of its subject, 
has a right to assume or exercise authority over the subject of 
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another . 
Fisheries resources beyond the territotial sea, were subject only to the law of 
possession23, viz., the title in them was vested in him who first reduced them to his· 
possession. This was the rule confirmed in the Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration in 
189324. The arbitration arose from attempts to enforce conservation measures on the high 
seas. British fishermen had taken cruel and wasteful actions against the fur seals of the 
Behring Sea, to which the USA had strongly objected. The Tribunal held that activities 
outside the territorial sea were a legitimate exercise of the freedom of the seas and therefore 
the USA had no right of property over the fur seals when they were outside the ordinary 
thr il ··al 25 ee m es temton sea . 
However, since the last quarter of the nineteenth century advances in fishing 
technology and fishing techniques have began to occur26. Such advances had developed, 
in the first half of the twentieth century, at a good pace27. The development of trawler 
fishing, increases in the number, size, speed, and storage capacity of trawling vessels, the 
use of sonar in fish locations, mechanization of net handling, new types of nets, and new 
freezing and processing techniques, as well as substitution of steam vessels for the sailing 
smacks, revolutionized the fishing industry28. 
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One of the most important effects of these developments was the emergence of 
intensive distant water fishing activities29. Fishermen, in particular those of developed 
maritime nations, became able to operate efficiently for extended periods of time in areas 
far away from their home ports30. Furthermore, fishermen of these states who were well 
equipped and manned invaded and exploited the traditional fishing grounds of many 
smaller coastal states31. This evolution had several consequences. It greatly increased the 
world catch. It has also led to that many stocks of fish have been seriously depleted32. 
The abovementioned facts have rendered the traditional assumption that the 
resources of the sea are inexhaustible not valid33. As a consequence, this traditional 
assumption have become, in the 20th century, especially since 1945, unable to justify fully 
unregulated freedom of fishing on the high seas. Thus, the ne.ed that this concept should 
be adapted to the s~ate of affairs created by lheemergence of these new techniques 'and 
technology in the use and exploitation of the sea's resources become very clear aQd 
pressing. How has the law of the sea responded to this new developments up to 1974? 
This question will be answered in the following' section. 
Section II : The Coastal States Exclusive Fishing Rights 
Indeed, the international law of the sea has not remained indifferent to the 
improvement of fishing techniques and technology that has brought with it not only the 
danger of depletion to the fishery resources but also the threat of deterioration of the 
fishing industries34. It has, in fact, limited the freedom of fishing on the high seas by 
subjecting this general principle to several limitations. Some of them are territorial in 
scope, while some others are non-territorial limitations. 
A.The Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea is commonly viewed as a belt of the sea adjacent to the coast 
of a state, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, over which the sovereignty of 
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the coastal state extends35. The justifying necessity for its establishment has been, 
mainly, the protection of the coastal states territory and its people36. 
Thus, the first important limitation on the freedom of fishing in the seas is a 
direct consequence of the fact that not all waters of the sea are covered by the regime of 
the high seas37. The high seas are commonly defined as all parts of the sea which are not 
included in the territorial sea or in the internal maritime waters of a state38. Accordingly, 
the freedom of fishing does not extend to the sea areas included in the territorial sea and in 
the internal maritime waters of coastal states. 
Although the establishment of the territorial sea has been, as mentioned above, 
derived from the need to restrict the freedom of navigation for security and defense 
.purposes, the issue of the coastal st~ltes exclusive jurisdiction over adjacent fisheries .has 
been closely .connected to the issue of the width of the territorial sea, Coastal states that 
had fought against a narrow territorial sea have always maintained that, if a narrow 
territorial sea is not supplemented by the recognition of the coastal state's jurisdiction in a . 
zone beyond the territorial sea for fisheries purposes, no useful purpose could be served 
by the establishment of a narrow limit for the territorial sea39. With regard to fisheries, a 
narrow territorial sea belt was viewed by those states as inadequate for the protection of 
local fishing activities. 
The notion of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction existing separately from the 
concept of the territorial sea had been energetically invoked after the First Codification 
Conference of 19304°. Indeed, the failure to reach an agreement at the conference on a 
maximum width of the territorial sea left the door wide open, in the post 1930 period, for 
the emergence of series of claims to adjacent resources of the high seas, either by 
extending the territorial sea itself or by extending the exclusive fishing rights or by means 
of other new concepts. 
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B.The Post - 1930 Period Claims to the Resources of the High Seas 
The expansion of national jurisdictional claims over large parts of the high seas 
started early in Latin America. These claims had emerged before the Second World War, 
but they were more concerned with defense purposes41 . Since the Second World War, 
claims to special rights of control by coastal states with regard to fishing in waters 
adjacent to the territorial sea have appeared, marking the start of the emergence of a major 
limitation on the traditional concept of freedom of fishing on the high seas. The post -
World War II period has been, in fact, characterized by a rapidly increasing trend towards 
extending coastal state jurisdiction over the waters adjacent to the territorial sea for the 
purpose of gaining full economic control for the exploitation of all resources, including 
the living resources, of such waters42. Two main motive forces ha.d lain behind those 
claims. They were, in the first place, .a concern to achieve the most effective regime for 
the conservation of the living resources of the sea; and in the second place, a concern to 
achieve maximum control over the primary economic resources by coastal states43. 
The wave of such unilateral extensions had its begining in the 1945 Truman 
Proclamations on the seabed and coastal fisheries44. A detailed consideration of the 
proclamations is beyond the scope of this thesis, as they have been extensively treated in 
legalliterature45. Suffice it to recall here that on September 28 1945, in order to protect 
the Alaskan salmon fisheries from exploitation by Japanese fisherman46, the United 
States decided by means of the Truman Proclamation Concerning the Policy of the United 
States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas that 
conservation zones contiguous to its coasts were to be established. Areas traditionally 
fished by nationals of the United States or expected to be fished only by nationals of the 
United States were to be subject to the control of the latter, while areas jointly exploited 
by nationals of different nations should be regulated by agreements between pertinent 
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states. These zones have, however, never been brought into existence47. 
In a twin proclamation on the same day, the United States asserted jurisdiction 
and control over the natural resources of the subsoil and the sea bed of the continental 
shelf contiguous to its coasts 48 primarily to assure a stable investment climate for 
American oil companies49. The Proclamation stressed that the status of the waters above 
the shelf would not be affected. They would remain open for the exercise of freedom of 
navigation by all states. Furthermore, while no outer boundary was specified, an 
accompaning White House Press Release indicated 100 - fathoms50 as a maximum outer 
limit51. 
Thus, it is very evident that what was asserted by means of the latter 
Proclamation was not sovereignty over the area itself, but only over the natural resources 
-of the ,continental shelf2. 
Since no state at that time considered its interests violated by the Proelamation, 
no protests' were raised against this claim. In fact, instead of protesting, numerous other 
states rapidly started making the same type of claim53; thus was born the concept of 
coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf. 
Several other coastal states, however, particularly from the Latin American 
Continent, asserted wider jurisdictions involving not only the continental shelf but also 
the waters above it54. Thus, one month after the Truman Proclamation on the Continental 
Shelf, Mexico declared that the continental shelf adjacent to its coasts was to be 
considered as incorporated in its national territory 55 , and Panama made a similar claim in 
March 194656. These first two Latin American proclamations, unlike the Truman 
Proclamation, extended the coastal state's sovereignty to include not only the resources of 
the continental shelf, but the whole shelf as such. President Peron of Argentina 
proclaimed in October 1946 that not only the continental shelf adjacent to Argentine 
territory, but also the so-called "epicontinental sea" covering the shelf, was under 
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Argentine sovereignty. 
On June 23, 1947, Chile, having virtually no continental shelf along its coasts, 
not only declared its sovereignty over the continental shelf and its resources, but also 
confmned and proclaimed, "its national sovereignty over the seas adjacent to its coasts 
whatever may be their depths, and within those limits necessary in order to reserve, 
protect, preserve and exploit the natural resources ... found on, within and bellow the said 
seas,,58. The area of the seas concerned was fixed at 200 miles. In addition, the 
Declaration, specifically provided that the free navigation for third states would not·be 
affected 59. Chile based its claim partly on the international precedent of Oct.ober 1939, 
Declaration of Panama60, and on the principle of unilateralism of the Truman 
Proclamations61 . The fact that the objectives of establishing the zone were the protection 
and preservation as well .as the exploitation of the zone's resources would seem to 
suggest that the Chilean Declaration aimed at the establishment of a maritime zone of 
limited functional sovereignty rather than a full territorial sea. 
Peru, interested in developing its fishmeal industry based on its anchovy 
resources, established in 1947 Peruvian sovereignty and jurisdiction over the adjacent sea 
to a distance of 200 miles. But it expressely accorded freedom of navigation to vessels of 
all nations within the zone62. The Peruvian continental shelf is even narrower than that of 
Chile 63. This fact seems to be the main reason for Peru's rejection of the depth criterion 
in favour of a distance of 200 mile criterion. 
The fact that the Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 781 contained a provision 
preserving the freedom of navigation, which is incompatible with the traditional concept 
of the territorial sea as expressed in the 1958 Convention, combined with the preambular 
considerations in the decree, appear to suggest that the claim was one of a maritime zone 
of limited functional sovereignty rather than a claim to a full territorial sea. 
The legislation64 enacted by Costa Rica in 1949 made the continental shelf 
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subject to the national sovereignty "at whatever depth it is found". But as regards 
fisheries jurisdiction in the superjacent waters, only the inadequately defined "rights and 
interests of Costa Rica" were proclaimed thereover, according to which "maritime fishing 
and hunting carried on in said areas shall be under the surveillance of the government of 
Coasta Rica,,65. Consequently, that state extended its protection over a zone of 200 miles 
in which the rights of free navigation on the high seas were, however, to subsist. 
Ecuador has a continental shelf, but a rather narrow one, and has rich fishing 
waters off its coasts as well. It asserted in a declaration in 1950 that the continental shelf 
up to the 200 - meter isobath pertained to Ecuador, and that Ecuador likewise had the 
right to exert necessary control over that part of the shelf as well as over corresponding 
fishing areas66. 
The Constitution of El Salvador of 17 Septem:ber 195067, which -became 
eff~ctive' in. the same year, described the territory of the Republic to include "~e. adjacent 
seas to a distance of 200 miles from the low water line and the corresponding airspace, 
subsoil and continental shelf,68. Freedom of navigation was maintained but not freedom 
of overflight. 
This Constitution made the 200 miles area, including the subsoil, the sea, and 
the airspace above it part of the territory of El Salvador. Such a description is a feature of 
the territorial sea. Moreover, though freedom of navigation was maintained, reference to 
it was made not to cover freedom of overflight. Exclusion of overflight within the zone is 
also one of the essential elements of the regime of the territorial sea. Therefore, this claim 
appears to be a claim to a territorial sea in a strict sense. 
On March 7, 1950, Honduras passed Legislative Decree No. 102, which 
regarded the continental shelf and "the waters which cover it, in both the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, at whatever depth it may be found and whatever its extent may be" to 
fonn a part of the national territory69. It claimed "full", and "inalienable", and 
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"imprescriptible" dominion over all the resources which were found in the area70. 
Moreover, Congressional Decree No. 104 of 7 March 1950, had amended 
Article 621 of the Civil Code of Honduras to read as follows : 
" ... The sovereignty of the state shall extend to submarine platform, as 
continental and insular shelf and the overlaying waters, at whatever may be its 
extent, without prejudice to the right of free navigation in accordance with 
internationallaw,,71. 
The words used in describing the authority of this state with respect to the 
asserted maritime area are "part of national territory", "dominion", "sovereignty". As we 
have already explained, in international law, this terminology is, usually, employed to 
describe the authority of a state over its.own territory as well as the territorial sea and not 
the high seas. Therefore, it would seem that this· was a claim to a territorial sea. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the Congressionnal Deree No. 21 of 19 
December 1957 had provided that the sea and the airspace above the shelf belong to the 
State of Honduras and are subject to its jurisdiction and control72. 
At a tripartite Conference held, in August 1952 at Santiago, the capital of Chile, 
Peru and Ecuador established a policy of a "200 miles maritime zone", by means of the 
well known sub-regional Declaration of Santiago 73, the ftrst multilateral agreement on the 
200 miles zone policy. Asserting that their goverments were "bound to ensure for their 
peoples access to necessary food supplies and to furnish them with the means of 
developing their economy", they proclaimed that: 
"As a principle of their international maritime policy... each of them 
possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of the sea 
adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not less than 
200 nautical miles from the said coast,,74. 
Two aspects of the declaration, in particular, must be stressed. The ftrst is its 
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underlying economic and social rationale, expressed in tenns of economic development 
and the conservation and protection of natural resources 75. The second aspect, which is 
the most important from a legal point of view, is that the declaration is concerned with a 
maritime zone for specific objectives rather than the territorial sea stricto sensu 76. This is 
because, while it is true that the declaration has used the tenns "sovereignly" and 
"jurisdiction", it is also true that it has refrained from attaching the label "territorial sea" to 
the asserted area. Furthennore, while the declaration has spoken of sovereignty, it 
impliedly recognized the freedom of navigation 77. 
The declaration rapidly filtered through the Inter-American system, drawing 
support from regional organs and conferences, such as the Inter'-American Congress of 
International Law and the Tenth Inter-American Conference 78. 
The. above analysis shows. that early Latin American states claims to .the 
resources of the sea beyond ,the territorial sea were not unifonn in fonn and content,. In 
this context, Garcia Amador has correctly said: "it would be inappropriate to refer to a 
unified Latin American position on the law of the sea regarding the exploitation and 
conservation of the natural resources of the sea,,79. 
As long as these Latin American claims were confined to the continental shelf 
they have never been the subject of any objection from other states. However, those 
claims which were aimed at extending the coastal state exclusive rights not only to the 
resources of the shelf but also to the living resources of the waters above the shelf, were 
rapidly and repeatedly challenged and met by consistent protests from several maritime 
states, on the ground that they breached the principle of the freedom of the seas, in 
general, and the freedom of fishing, in particular 80. 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969, the ICJ insisted that, to become 
a rule of general customary law, "state practice, including that of states whose interests 
are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform8l. 
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Furthennore, in several other occasions, the Court made it clear that a state objection to a 
rule in the process of formation can prevent it from becoming binding upon it82. It 
follows that Latin American states claims were not valid83 and, consequently, they 
violated the prevailing rules of the law of the sea around the 1950s. 
C. The Question of Exclusive Fishing Rights at UNCLOS I 
(1958) and UNCLOS II (1960)84 
Attempting to bring some order into the confusing situation which prevailed in 
the 1940s and 1950s, the United Nations convened in 1958 the First Conference on the 
Law of the Sea at Geneva to develop and codify the law of the sea in a systematic 
manner. As a basis for discussion, the Conference had draft conventions produced by the 
ILC and statements by Governments on various law of the sea issues. Four 
Conventions85 wer~ concluded which, on the whole, reasserted the traditional freedoms 
of the sea, including freedom of fishing. 
UNCLOS I dealt with the question of fisheries in two ways: first, in connection 
with the high seas regime, and secondly, in connection with the issue of the breadth of 
the territorial sea. 
In so far as the first way is concerned, the debates centered on the issue of 
which state may exercise conservation control over fishing in waters remaining part of the 
high seas. The results of discussions were enshrined in the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas86. This Convention was adopted 
to ensure sufficient protection of the living resources of the high seas against abusive 
exploitation as well as to put an end to coastal states assertions to exclusive fishing rights 
or privileges in adjacent high seas areas87. It was thought that, since the Convention 
assures coastal states of necessary conservation measures, they would possibly abandon 
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their extensive claims, or at least such concessions would lead to their containment88. 
The Convention did not attempt to delineate specific conservation measures to be 
implemented by coastal states, such as permissible types of fishing gear, types of fishing 
nets, closed fishing seasons and minimum size of fish that may be fished. What the 
Convention did, in fact, was to specify which state may enact or apply such conservation 
measures and to indicate the circumstances and conditions under which such measures 
may be applied to foreign fishing vessels in areas of the high seas. Article 6 has 
confmned the principle of the freedom of fishing on the high seas. However, conceding 
the need for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, the Convention 
placed upon all states the duty to adopt or cooperate with other states in adopting 
conservation measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary89. It defined 
"conservation" to mean "the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum 
sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and 
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other marine products" . 
What is perhaps important, and this is from the point of view of coastal states, is 
that the exercise of the freedom of fishing by other states has been made subject to the 
interests and rights of the coastal states as provided for in the Convention91. 
The interests and rights accorded to coastal states beyond the territorial sea are 
enshrined in Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 para. 1 recognized explicitly the coastal state's 
special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of 
the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, and the right to initiate unilateral measures of 
conservation. The legal meaning of this special interest has been defined in Article 7. 
It states that regulation of fisheries was to be by mutual agreement with other interested 
fishing states but, when this could not be secured, any coastal state may adopt unilateral 
measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish in any area of the high seas 
adjacent to its territorial sea. However, such measures would be valid as to other states 
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only in the circumstances included in Article 7 (2), namely: 
a) Where there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures in the 
light of existing knowledge of the fishery; 
b) If the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific fmdings; 
c) If they do not discriminate in form or in fact against foreign fishermen. Still, 
if such measures are not accepted by the other states concerned, anyone of 
them may invoke the compulsory arbitration procedure outlined in Articles 
9_1292. 
This Convention did not recognize any preferential or exclusive right for the 
coastal state to fisheries in waters beyond its territorial sea, for any conservation measures 
were to be applied without discrimination, and with the aim of securing a maximum 
supply of food and other marine products, Moreover, it did not disturb the established 
rule .()f the freedom of the high seas under which vessels need observe only the law of 
their own flag state. Although a coastal state is empowered to adopt conservation 
measures applicable to offshore fisheries in the circumstances indicated above, it is not 
entitled to extend its control direcly over nationals of other states, but fishing states would 
be obliged to apply the measures adopted unilaterally by a coastal state to their own 
nationals. From the point of view of those states that had by that time already declared a 
200 mile zone, the unsatisfactory side in this approach to the concept of the special 
interest of the coastal state was that the coastal state's special interest was so hedged about 
with conditions as to be illusory93. 
In so far as the treatment of the question of fisheries in connection with the 
breadth of the territorial sea is concerned, the main issue was whether coastal states 
should be granted exclusive fishing rights in the high seas adjacent to and beyond the 
territorial sea. It was then thought that, if the best means available to the coastal state to 
secure recognition of its right to exclusive fishing outside the territorial sea was to expand 
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the territorial sea itself, the recognition of this right in a contiguous zone would secure a 
narrow territorial sea and would therefore halt the desire to extend the territorial 
jurisdiction94. It was in this line of thinking that the USA proposed to establish a 3 mile 
territorial sea and a further 6 mile for exclusive fishing, with the proviso that traditional 
fishing rights would not be excluded within a 10 years period95. The ten years period 
was reduced to 5 years only in a revised version. In the same direction, Canada proposed 
the setting of 3 mile territorial sea and the recognition to the coastal state of exclusive 
fishing rights in a contiguous zone of a distance up to 12 miles96. This proposal was later 
brought in line withcthe American proposal and co-sponsored with Mexico and India97. 
Whilst this compromise attracted the greatest support, it failed to obtain the 
necessary two-thirds majority. Other proposals, although less ambitious in scope, 
suffered the same fate when put to the vote. vane which is worth mentioning is the 
Icelandic proposal that sought to grant the coastal state preferential rights where a people 
is "overwhelmingly" dependant upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood or economic 
development, and where the "coastal population depends primarily on coastal 
fisheries,,98. Nonetheless, this "dependence on fisheries" did not convince the conferees 
as conferring any preferential rights upon coastal states. The final outcome of the 
Conference was the rejection of all the proposals regarding the territorial sea limit and the 
extent of the coastal state's exclusive fishing rights. On these two issues, the Conference 
had to content itself with the convening of UNCLOS II. 
Thus, another attempt was made two years later at UNCLOS II held in 1960 for 
further consideration of the questions concerning the breadth of the territorial sea and the 
fisheries delimitation. Although the United States/Canada sponsored "six plus six" 
formula was allowed at this Conference to include an amendment sponsored by some 
Latin American States, whereby the coastal state would have preferential fishing rights in 
any area of the high seas beyond the exclusive fishing zone when certain conditions are 
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met99, the proposal failed to be adopted by a single vote 100. No agreement was reached 
with regard to a convention. However, it was clearly stated that the extent of the territorial 
sea was closely linked to fishing, and that one of the main reasons why many coastal 
states were claiming territorial sea extensions was their desire to be entitiled to exclusive 
fishing or at least to preferential rights over the living resources of the expanded zones. 
D. The Geographical Scope of the Coastal States's Exclusive Fishing 
Rights in the Post - Geneva Conferences Period. 
The failure of UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II to achieve agreement on the issue of 
the territorial sea breadth and to recognize to the coastal state any special right of exclusive 
access to fisheries in adjacent seas beyond the territorial sea had a fundamental influence 
on the conduct of coastal states of the post-Geneva Conferences period. It left the door 
wide open for coastal states to decide for themselves. Thus, the period between 1960 and 
1974 witnessed the biggest wave of claimes to exclusive fishery zones not only in one 
particular region but, in fact, in various parts of the globe. 
Generally speaking, two main trends had emerged during this period. The first 
one was particularly led by Western European and Scandinavian stateslOl . These states 
asserted exclusive fishing zones to a distance of 12 miles, seemingly aiming at developing 
the law of the sea more or less along the line of the general consensus and near agreement 
revealed at UNCLOS 11102. That is to restrict the geographical scope of the coastal state's 
exclusive fishing rights to a maximum distance that should not exceed twelve mile and, at 
the same time, limit the breadth of the territorial sea at a lesser distance. 
In order to realize these goals, these states resorted to concerted action on both 
bilateral and multilateral levels. On the bilateral level, numerous agreements were 
concluded between various Western European and Scandinavian States and other states 
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containing the twelve mile exclusive fishing zone 103. These bilateral agreements have 
accorded mutual recognition to the rights of the respective parties to establish such zones 
and were particularly concerned with working out arrangements between the parties for the 
continuance of the fishing rights for the parties other than the coastal state in the twelve 
miles zones which were established104. Most of these agreements made provisions for 
phasing out periods after which foreign fishing would cease to exist. In this connection 
Straburzynski has correctly said: 
"The temporary right of foreign fishermen to continue to fish in the 
fishery zone of a given coastal state is almost universally recognized in 
the contemporary international practice" 105. 
The purpos.e of "traditional" or "historic" fishing rights is to protect fishermen of 
non.-coastal states as well as. those of certain distant waters fishing states against being 
excluded from. their traditional fishing areas in an abrupt manner. An exclusion of foreign 
fishermen would be performed gradually, i.e. by ~ay of "phasing out", allowing them 
time to adapt to cease fishing in the coastal state's fishery zone and to move away to new 
fi h· . h . . h d h' 106 IS mg areas wIt out excessIve economIc ar s Ip . 
As regard the multilateral level, concerted action for the development of the 
twelve miles exclusive fishing zone materialized in the conclusion of the European 
Fisheries Convention in 1964107 which resulted from the European Fisheries Conference 
held in London from December 1963 to March 1964. The EFC was the first international 
C · . I' fi h . 108 F h" I . h onventlon to recogmze exc uSIve IS enes zones . rom a Istona perspectIve, t e 
significance of the Convention lies in the fact that it was established by a group of states 
that had traditionally stood against all attempts made by other states to expand their 
fisheries jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. 
Under the EFC each party could establish a fishery zone. This zone is, according 
to the principles provided by the Convention, divided into two sections [two 6 - miles 
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belts], under different regimes. Within the first section extending 6 miles from the 
baselines, the coastal state was accorded the exclusive right to fish and exclusive 
juridiction in fishery matters (Art. 2). The second section formed a belt between 6 and 12 
mile limits from the baselines. In this latter section, the right to fish is to be exercised 
exclusively by the coastal state together with such other contracting parties the vessels of 
which have habitually fished in that belt between 1 January 1953 and 31 December 
1962109. These states were, however, prohibited to direct their fishing efforts towards 
fish stocks different from those they habitually fished. 
Several states non-signatories to the EFC recognized the right to set up such 
zone. Shortly after the conclusion ofEFC, the United Kingdom enacted an Act by means 
of which a 12 mile fishery zone was establishedl1O. The British claim was, in part, 
. \ 
determined by the interests of British coastal fishermen being anxious about the growing 
competition of Belgian, French, Polish and the Soviet fishing vessels in the waters around 
the United Kingdom's coast111 . This fishery zone was recognized by Poland, a state 
which at that time did not claim any exclusive fishing rights beyond the 3 - mile territorial 
sea1l2. This recognition was pursuant to the agreement of 26 September 1964 that allowed 
Polish fishermen the temporary right (up to December 31, 1967) to fish for herring in 
certain areas within 6 and 12 miles, and permitted use of the British fishery zone "outside 
the territorial sea for purposes ancillary to fishing" but not fishing in the belt between 3 
and 6 mile from the baselines of the United Kingdom's territorial sea 113. 
The former Soviet Union recognized the right of the coastal state to establish a 12 
miles fishery zone by means of the Exchange of Notes of 30 September 1964 with the 
United Kingdom 114. Furthermore, the German Democtatic Republic, Japan, the US, New 
Zealand and the South Korean Republic all recognized this zone as part of the general 
principle of the right of a coastal state to extend its sovereign right up to a limit of twelve 
miles, a principle against which they did not protestl15, and the recognition of which they 
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subsequently confirmed by the conclusion of bilateral agreements on fishing in the 
exclusive fisheries zones of other states116. 
In addition, Finland recognized the twelve miles fishery zone by voting for 
adoption of the Canadian -American proposal on the exclusive fisheries zones of 6 miles 
adjacent to the 6 miles territorial sea at UNCLOS 1117. 
The second trend was mainly led by Latin American, African and Asian States. 
These states embarked too in the 1960s and the very early 1970s on concerted action at 
regional as well as international levels to attract political support for their 200 miles 
exclusive fishing or full economic zones. 
Thus, having asserted in 1969 its sovereignty over a 200 mile maritime zone, 
including; the airspace and the corresponding seabed and subsoill18, Uruguay invited in 
March 1970 Latin Americ,an' 200 miles claimants to a meeting with the purpose of 
exchanging views and coordinating their positions and defending their maritime policy 11 8. 
These states eventually met at a conference held in Montevideo in May 1970 and adopted 
unanimously a joint statement entitled "The Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the 
Sea,,120. 
The Montevideo Conference appears to have resulted from two events which 
prompted the 200 miles states to make such a joint statement. These are, first, the attempts 
of the Soviet Union and the United States to convene an international conference whose 
task would be mainly to resolve the issue of the limit of the territorial seal21; and, 
secondly, the United Nations Resolution requesting the views of member state's as to the 
desirability of a new conference on the law of the sea 122. 
In the preamble, mention was made of the ties of a geographic, economic, and 
social nature binding the sea, the land, and man who inhabits it, which give the coastal 
state a "legitimate priority" to benefit from the natural resources that are found in the 
adjacent seas. Relying on these ties, the Declaration recognized the coastal state's rights to 
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exercise control over the marine resources adjacent to their coasts and of the seabed and 
subsoil thereof "in order to achieve the maximum development of their economy and to 
raise the living standards of their peoples,,123. The limit of this control was to be "in 
accordance with their geographical and geological characteristics and with factors 
governing the existence of marine resources and the need for their national utilization,,124. 
Taking into consideration the fact that only the 200 miles states were invited to 
the Montevideo Conference, it seems odd that the spatial limit of the 200 miles was not 
established in the operative part of the Declaration, but was mentioned only in the 
preamble. Possibly this was a tactical position in order not to deter the other non-200 miles 
Latin American States from supporting the declaration. 
The Declaration also provided that the right to adopt measures in areas under 
maiitimesovereignty and jurisdiction ~hould be exercised "without prejudiee to frt?edom of 
navigation by ships and overflight by aircraft of an'y flag,,125. Bearing in mind that the 
freedom accorded to third states in the asserted maritime zone is the essential feature of the' 
regime of the high seas, one could argue that the established zone was created for specific 
jurisdictional purposes only. However, a close reading of the statements attached to the 
Declaration by several delegates of the participating states would reveal a significant 
divergence in the approach to the 200 miles zone 126. For instance, the statements of 
Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Nicaragua all equated the freedom of navigation with 
innocent passage. Such cryptic statements seem to give a restrictive interpretation. 
Among the points agreed upon at the Montevideo Conference was the idea of 
calling another conference on aspects of the law of the sea, to be held at Lima, the capital 
of Peru 127. It was to embrace all the states of the Latin American and Caribbean Regions 
with the aim of co-ordinating a common position and adopt a common declaration on 
coastal states rights in adjacent seas128• In all, twenty states attended this Conference held 
from 4 to 8 August 1970129. In the hope of securing broad recognition, observers were 
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invited from Canada, India, Iceland, Egypt, Senegal, the Republic of Korea, Yugoslavia 
and the UN 130. The Conference adopted the Declaration of the Latin American States on 
the Law of the Sea 131. 
The common principles contained in this Declaration were substantially similar to 
those enunciated three months earlier in the Montevideo Declaration132. However, no 
mention was made to the 200 miles limit criterion. The limit of the claimed maritime zone 
was left to be decided by each contracting state in accordance with reasonable criteria, 
having regard to its geographical, geological, and biological characteristics, and the need 
to make rational use of its resources 133. As was the case with the Montevideo Declaration, 
most states signing it made statements to the effect that principle 3, which preserved 
expressly the freedom ·of navigation and overflight, did not apply to them 134. Such an 
attitude, added to the fact that no less than six states refused to sign the Declaration, 
though each one for its particular reasons 135, seems to confIrm the lack of a unifIed L~tin 
American conception.on the legal regime which would govern the various uses oftne 200 
miles zone, at least up to the issuance of the Lima Declaration. 
Two years later, a Specialized Conference of the Caribbean States on Problems 
of the Sea was held at Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. It aimed at 
discussing problems common to their region and harmonizing their positions on the 
fundamental issues of the law of the sea, including the question of the coastal state's 
exclusive fIshing rights beyond the territorial seal36. Fifteen states from the sub-region 
attended this Conference as full members137. All other American States were invited to it 
as observers 138. 
The Conference produced the Declaration of Santo Domingo139 which not only 
sets out certain principles on the law of the sea agreed upon by the participating states, but 
enunciated also the principle of the patrimonial sea. The Subsection in which the 
patrimonial sea is defIned provides a basis for a new zone sui generis to be called the 
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patrimonial sea. It says : 
"1 - The coastal state has sovereign rights over the renewable and non-renewable 
natural resources, which are found in the waters, sea-bed and in the subsoil 
of an area adjacent the territorial sea called the patrimonial sea,,140. 
The coastal state would have the right to promote and regulate scientific research 
and control pollution in the new zone 141. And while the breadth of the zone was to be the 
subject of international agreements within the framework of the UN Charter, the whole of 
the area encompassed by the territorial sea and the patrimorial sea should not exceed a 
maximum of 200 miles in breadth 142. Delimitation of the zone between two or more states 
should be effected in accordance with the peaceful procedures stipulated in the 
UN Charterl43. It was also explicitly stated that freedom of navigation and overflight 
would be preserved in and over the. patrimonial seal44 . 
. It is, therefore, clear that the patrimonial sea concept cotrespends closely to the 
zone of maritime sovereignty included in the Montevideo and Lima Declarations in giving 
the coastal state the right to all resources in the adjacent sea and sea bed, without control 
over navigation and overflight beyond the territorial sea. However, certain novelties have 
been brought by it. Perhaps the most evident ones were the explicit proposal of 12 mile 
territorial sea and the emphasis put on coastal state's jurisdiction for economic purposes, 
rather than on the extension of juridiction for all purposes, including, security and 
defense. Such an attitude made a clear distinction between the territorial sea and the 
proposed functional zone called the patrimonial seal45. It must be recalled that certain 
participating states abstained or did not participate in the signing ceremony. EI Salvador 
and Panama, which had earlier extended their respective territorial seas to 200 milesl46, 
were among the abstaining states l47. The reasons of their abstensions were not disclosed. 
Possibly their dissent was due to the fact that they viewed the 200 miles zone differently. 
In so far as African States are concerned, these states were, before the conclusion 
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of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, very few l48. Moreover, the territorial sea limit and the 
fishery limits that were enforceable, in most of those independent states, were those 
observed by the metropolitan powers. 
In the period between UNCLOS I and the start of UNCLOS III, African practice 
on fishing limits shows that no regional limit was observed. In this post-Geneva era 
fifteen African States asserted a territorial sea of 12 miles without making any other 
independent claims to fishing limitsl49. Amongst these were Algeria, Benin, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Togo, Somalia, Sudan, and Sierra-LeoneI50 . For 
instance, the Kenyan Proclamation of June 6, 1969151 fixed the breadth of the territorial 
sea at 12 miles. The Proclamation remained silent on the question of fisheries as a whole. 
Similarly, the Malgash Decree No. 66.007 issued on July 5, 1966152 fixed the breadth of 
the territorial sea at 12 miles. Article 5 of this Decree: stated that within this limit, "la peche 
et reservee ,aux ilavires Malgash et sous reserve de recipr~ite aux navires des autr~s Etat~. 
ayant conclu avec la Republic Malgash des .accords particuliers". It follows that ,the 
fisheries limits of these states corresponded with the territorial sea limits. 
Some African States had opted for a territorial sea less than twelve miles with a 
fishery zone of 12 miles l53. Typical of this is the claim oflvory Coast of 1967. This state 
fixed the limit of the territorial sea at six miles by means of a Decree issued on August 1, 
1967154. The same Decree established a contiguous zone of six miles making the fishery 
limits of the country extend up to twelve miles. Within this additional fishery zone, fishing 
was also reserved for nationals of the Ivory Coast, and no provision was made to the 
rights of other states whose nationals had habitually fished therein. 
Certain other African States fixed their territorial seas at twelve miles with a 
contiguous fishing zone extending beyond this limit. Typical of these claims was the 
Moroccan claim made by means of the law relating to the territorial sea and fishery limits 
of 1973155. This law stated in Article 1 that, "les eaux territoriales Marocaines s'etendent 
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jusqu'a une limite fixee a douze milles marins a partir des lignes de base". Article 4 stated 
further that, "une zone de peche exclusive Marocaine est instituee sur une etendue de 70 
miles marins a partir des !ignes de base definie dans l'article premier". 
At the regional level, the African States had shown at the end of the 1960s, 
strong determination to advance the development of the law of the sea more or less along 
the lines of the early Latin American functional claims. That is to say, to extend the 
geographical scope of the coastal state exclusive fishing rights to a maximum distance of 
200 miles 156. Several factors were behind such move. Amongst them were, first, more 
than forty African States emerged as independent members of the international community 
after UNCLOS I, and did not participate in the making of the 1958 Geneva Conventions. 
They viewed these Conventions which reiterated the principle of the freedom of the seas as 
being shaped in a way to protect the interest of the maritimestates l57. They favo~red a 
new law that would reflect their interests, particularly a law whichwoulda~celerate t~eir 
social and economic develppment, and reduce the inequ~lities betwee.n the developed and 
developing countries158. Secondly, the significant advance in fishing technology increased 
the capacity of a few technologically advanced states to indulge in massive overfishing on 
the high seas and thus threatened the fishery resources near the coasts of other states. 
Some big maritime states, especially Japan and the Soviet Union, developed and expanded 
their worldwide fishing fleets to include hundreds of "factory ships" which were 
"complete mass production that can catch, clean, fillet and can or freeze great quantities of 
fish without entering the ports of the adjacent coastal states,,158a. Such fleets operated to 
the detriment of small native coastal fishing vessel, and the new states of Africa like some 
other small coastal states, became alarmed at the actual or possible effect of such large 
scale operations of foreign origin in high seas areas off their coasts 159. To achieve their 
objective, African States, like European States, resorted to concerted action. Thus, in 1971 
the OAU Council of Ministers adopted two important Resolutions, one on fisheries and 
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the other on the permanent sovereignty of the African States over their natural 
resources.
l60 By means of the former, African States "confirmed the inalienable rights of 
the African Countries over the fishery resources of the continental shelf surroumding 
Africa" 161. The African States reaffirmed by virtue of the latter that the exploitation of 
natural resources in each country shall be conducted in accordance with its national laws 
and regulations 162. The two resolutions were, therefore, complementary. 
Moreover, a group of African Countries composed of sixteen states held a 
seminar at Yaounde, the capital of Cameroon, from 20 to 30 June 1972 to discuss issues 
of the law of the sea. The Seminar adopted various recommendations 163. On the question 
of the natural resources, it recommended that the African states had the right to establish 
beyond the territorial sea an economic zone. The African States would enjoy in the zone 
, 
. "exclusive jurisdiction for th~ purpose of control, regulation and national exploitation of 
the resources of the sea and their reservation for the primary benefit of their peoples and 
their respective economies"J64. The other reason given for the establisht:nent of .the EEZ 
was to. prevent and control pollution in the area165. It was, however, expressly stated that 
the zone's establishment would not affect the non-economic high seas freedoms, namely 
freedom of navigation, overflight and freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines 166. 
On the question of the external limits of the zone, no maximum limit was 
suggested, though it was stated that such a limit should be fixed in nautical miles. It was 
stated further that the determination of such limits should be effected, 
n ••• in accordance with regional considerations, taking duly into account the 
resources of the region and the rights and interests of the land-locked states 
without prejudice to limits already adopted by some states within the regionnl67. 
Recommendation II stated, however, that the economic zone should include at 
least the continental shelf, which meant in practice that the zone could extend, in certain 
instances, hundreds of miles from the coast. 
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With respect to the participation of LLSs in the resources of the EEZ, the Seminar 
recommended that exploitation of the living resources, "should be open to all African 
States, both land-locked and near land-locked ... ,,168. The only limitation placed on such 
participation was that the enterprises to be operated by land-locked states should be 
"effectively controlled by African capital and personnel" 169. The latter proposal 
concerning effective control of the enterprises seems to suggest joint venture arrangements 
between the LLSs and the coastal states of Africa in that capital to be used in the 
exploration and exploitation of the resources of the EEZ was to be entirely African. 
The establishment of such a zone was also being debated in other forums. It was 
discussed within the Asian-African Legal Consultative Commitee170 meetings held at 
Colombo 1971, Lagos 1972, and New Delhi 1973171 . At the 1972 Lagos SessIon, the 
representative of Kenya took the initiative and presented a working paper on the 
"Exclusive Economic Zone Concept". It descnbedthe zon~'s purpose as to saf~g~ardsthe 
coastal state's economic interests. In. Article 2 dealt with the right of all states to establish 
an economic zone beyond the territorial sea extending out to 200 miles, in which they 
would exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting them. All other states would, however, exercise, in the zone the traditional 
freedoms of the sea with the exception of the freedom of fishing. Article 6 was concerned 
with the rights of LLSs. It provided for the coastal state to permit a neighbouring 
developing LLS to exploit the living resources in its economic zone. Similar to the 
conclusions of the Regional Seminar held at Yaounde, the Kenyan proposal sought to 
restrict the participation of LLSs in the resources of the EEZ by providing that the 
enterprises of those states be effectively controlled by their national capital and 
personnel 173 . This proposal was, of course, even more restrictive in nature given the fact 
that developing LLSs may lack both the capital and the trained personnel to run an 
enterprise. The effect of the proposal would therefore amount to a de facto exclusion of 
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these states in the exploitation of the resources of the EEZ. 
The question of the establishment of the EEZ was again discussed at a regional 
level in 1973 as well as in 1974 at the Twenty First and Twenty Third Ordinary Sessions 
of the OAU. The Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the 
Law of the Sea174 which was a result of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session recognized 
that each African State had the right to establish an EEZ of not more than 200 miles175. 
The regime of the zone as described in the Declaration was substantially similar to that 
which had been proposed one year earlier by the delegate of Kenya to the AALCC. It 
included references to : permanent sovereignty of the coastal state over all the mineral and 
biological resources in. the zonel76; exclusive jurisdiction of the coast(\l states for the 
purposes of pollution prevention and control; safeguards against undue interference with 
the legitimate uses of ·the areal77; the recognition. of the right of LLSs and other 
geographically disadvantaged states to share in the exploitation of living resources of 
neighbourin:g economiczone~ on an eql,lal bases with nationals of coastal states l78. This 
entitlement was saId to be derived from the concept of African sOlidarityl79. 
Further support was given to the EEZ concept at the Fourth Summit Conference 
of Non-Aligned Countries Meeting in Algeirs (Algeria), from 5 to 9 September 197318°. 
Thus, it seems that by the early seventies most developing countries had given 
their accord to the idea of the establishment of the 200 miles for economic purposes. 
The objective sought by developing coastal states to establish such a zone was 
the protection of the resources of their adjacent seas from exploitation by other states, 
particulary the developed distant water fishing statesl81 . It may be recalled at this juncture 
that this was a time of intense feeling of the developing states seeking to cteate a new 
international economic orderl82. One of the many ways it was thought this new 
international economic order could be recognized was through exclusive appropriation and 
utilization of the resources of the sea adjacent to the territorial sea. This area of the sea had 
53 
also been shown to possess most of the fisheries resources l83. 
On the basis of the above analysis the author may conclude that African, Asian 
and Latin American states have been very active in advancing the law of the sea towards 
recognition of the 200 miles exclusive fishing or full exclusive economic zone. But it must 
be stressed that, while in the early seventies these states resorted to concerted actions at 
both regional and international levels seeking political support for the 200 miles zone, until 
that time the 200 miles resources zone remained principally a phenomenon of Latin 
American and African practice in the law of the sea. Indeed, the majority of states 
restricted their fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles. In this connection, taking into 
consideration the data included in the lists drawn up by the FAO and by Professor 
Alexanderl84 by the end of the 1970s, the numerical ratio of states asserting exclusive 
fisheries·rignts within ,twelve miles to those asserting to exercise this rights in wid.er . 
maritime areas was 91 to 18'185. 
Moreover, these excessive claims were far from being uniform in content or in 
form. There was wide variation in the scope and the nature of the rights claimed within the 
asserted maritime zones. In this respect, three types of claims may be distinguished. The 
first is that of some Latin American and African States which asserted extension of 
sovereignty over adjacent high seas waters and the natural resources therein under 
extended territorial seas of varying breadths ranging between 30 and 200 milesl86. The 
second is that of claims promoted under the pretext of conservation of the living resources 
within the asserted maritime areas. Examples of these claims are to be found in the Indian 
claim of 1956187 and the claim of 1957188. In the author's opinion, these latter claims 
differ, substantially, from the former ones. The reason is that, in the case of conservation 
zones, foreign fishing activities within these zones would not be eliminated totally but 
would be limited only for the sake of preserving the living resources within the zone. In 
this context, Straburzynski has correctly said that it should be : 
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"Pointed out that we ought to differentiate claims to exclusive fishery 
zones from claims to conservation zones, since the latter does not 
deprive foreigners of the right of fishing but only limits that right in 
order to preserve the living resources of the sea. In other words, the 
conservation zone does not exclude the application of the freedom of 
fishing but only limits it, firstly but not exclusively, in the interest of 
the coastal state, but at any rate the establishment of such a zone also 
indirectly serves the interest of all states in the maintenance of the 
productivity of living resources of the sea,,189. 
The third type is that of exclusive fishery or economic zones made for the 
purpose of fisheries jurisdiction and control. 
Moreover, the general picture of state practice around the very early seventies· 
shows, as indicated above, that the numerical ratio of states .limiting the breadth of the belt 
in which they reserved exclusive rights of fishing for nationals up to twelve miles to those 
asserting similar rights in wider areas was 91 to 18. Furthermore, states subscribing to a 
12 miles exlusive fishing zone come from all parts of the globe. Such a practice appears, 
therefore, sufficiently large enough to be called general, and consequently, in the author's 
judgment, the ICJ was absolutly right in deciding in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,1974, 
that the extension of the fishery zone up to 12 miles from the baselines "appears to be 
generally accepted" 191. 
As to the question of whether or not customary international law permitted at that 
time coastal states to extend their exclusive fishing rights beyond the twelve mile limits, a 
plausible answer seems to be in a negative. This is because, first, as has been mentioned 
above, by 1974 there were only few coastal developing states which had made actual 
claims to exclusive fishing rights beyond the twelve miles limit. Secondly, UNCLOS I 
granted"sovereign rights" to the coastal state for resources of the continental shelf, but 
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only "preferential rights" with respect to coastal fisheries l92. In short, preference did not 
give coastal states exclusive regulation of their coastal fisheries, but only preference in 
fishing the waters l93. Thirdly, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the ICJ stated 
that, "two concepts have crystalized as customary law in recent years arising out of the 
general consensus revealed at [the 1960] Conference. The first is the concept of the fishery 
zone ... the second is the concept of preferential rights of fishing in adjacent waters in 
f f h I . . . f . I d d . al f· h . ,,194 avour 0 t e coasta state m a sItuatIOn 0 specla epen ence on ItS coast IS enes . 
On the latter concept, the ICI stated further that: 
"State practice on the subject of fisheries reveals an increasing and 
widespread acceptance of the concept of preferential rights for coastal 
states, particulary in favour of countries or territories in a situation of 
special dependance on. coastal fisheries... A!ter these conferences, the 
preferential rights of the coastal state were recog-nized in various 
bilateral and multil~teral international agreements,,195. 
This statement of the ICJ implies that the waters beyond twelve miles remained 
parts of the high seas and not the tertum genus of an exclusive fishing zone, for 
preferential rights must ipso facto exclude the right to an exclusive fishing zone. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EEZ - COASTAL STATES 
Introduction 
One of the most important features of the EEZ concept viewed from the angle of 
the classical conception of the law of the sea is that its approach to the notion of functional 
competence in the new 200 miles EEZ differs significantly from that which was adopted, 
in the past, with regard to other functional zones, viz., the contiguous zone and the 
continental shelf!. With regard to these zones, the traditional approach has been to attribute 
well-defined rights and competences to the coastal state with all other residual rights 
vesting with the international community. 
The EEZ concept as shown in the LOS Convention2 took another approach. In 
the EEZ; there are not only the rights and duties 'of the coastal state that ar~ spelled out, but 
also the rights of third states in general and the rights of some specific states. , 
A wide range of rights has been accorded to the coastal state within.its EEZ, with 
certain duties. Its rights over all economic activities carrierd out in the zone have been 
described in terms of "sovereign rights" as opposed to "sovereignty", while the rest of 
rights have been couched in terms of "jurisdiction,,3. In the author's opinion, this 
differentiation underlines that the rights conferred upon the coastal state are not of the 
same plenitude, and hence an investigation in the exact nature and scope of these rights 
appears to be useful. For the purpose of the analysis, each set of the above mentioned 
rights will be dealt with separately. 
Section I : The Coastal State's Economic Rights in the EEZ 
In this section, the author's aim is to attempt to establish, first, the scope of the 
coastal state's general rights over the EEZ's economic activities; secondly, to identify the 
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content of the coastal state's jurisdiction over living resources of the superjacent waters of 
the EEZ; thirdly, to determine the nature of the coastal states rights over the EEZ's non-
living resources; and lastly, to establish the extent of the coastal states jurisdiction over all 
other economic activities that may be carried out within the EEZ. This will be done 
essentially by analysing the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention. 
A. The Scope of the Coastal State's General Rights Over the EEZ'S 
Economic Activities 
Part V of the LOS Convention sets out the negotiated understanding of 
UNCLOS Illwith respect to the EEZ concept. 
The most important principle enshrined in Part V is that every coastal state by 
_ virtue of Article 56 has, within its EEZ, 'sovereignrights with regard to the purposes 
specified in ~e article, viz.. explQration, exploitation, con~ervation and management of the 
natural resources of thesupeIjacent waters, the seabed and subsoil, and all other activities 
relating to the economic exploitation and exploration of the EEZ. .- -,-
During negotiations at UNCLOS IIImost of the EEZ proposals emanating from 
the developing states of Africa and the patrimonial sea from the States of Latin America 
described the coastal state's rights over the EEZ's natural resources in terms of "sovereign 
rights'.4. This term found its place in the first negotiating text ofUNCLOS Ill, 19755, and 
has not been changed since. 
"Sovereign rights" denotes, in general, the rights which are owned or which only 
a sovereign has or can exercise6. In the case of the EEZ, Article 56 (1) (a) grants to the 
coastal state "sovereign rights" for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the seabed and subsoil 
and the superjacent waters. The utiliz.ed formulation of "sovereign rights" tied to specific 
purposes is the same approach as was used in the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
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Shelf7. The phrase "for the purpose of' in Article 56 qualified "sovereign right" and 
therefore necessarily limits and restricts it to economic activities. Thus, what the above-
mentioned provision vests in the coastal state is not full sovereignty as on its land territory 
or in the territorial sea, but only particular sovereign rights to enable it to achieve specific 
and defined economic objectives. It is clear from the phraseology that the sovereign rights 
of the coastal state pertain only to the resources of the zone rather than to the zone itself. In 
this context, Professor Fleischer has correctly said: 
"The term [s.overeign rights], c.onveys the idea .of a functi.onal 
appr.oach : The c.oastal state d.oes n.ot have full s.overeignty as .on its 
land .or in its territ.orial sea but a right .of jurisdicti.on that is related t.o 
certain pur,p.oses. Bey.ond the jurisdicti.on s.o defined, ther.e is n.o 
speCial ba~is for c.oastal state rights, and the traditional rules 
devel.opedf.or the' high seas \(Viii c.ontinue to apply"g. 
This inteipretation i~ in accord whlnhe vast majority of the proposals submitted 
to the UN Seabed Committee9. Therationale of this limitaion is that any acknowledgement 
of rights over the sea bed and superjacent waters themselves might serve as a basis for 
subsequent extensions of the powers of a coastal state which might jeopardize the 
freed f .. d . . 10 oms 0 commumcatIon an navIgatIon . 
The issue of whether the coastal stae's sovereign rights within the EEZ exist ipso 
facto is, however, relevant to the question of how one distinguishes the continental shelf 
and the EEZ in the LOS Convention. It must be recalled that part VI on the Continental 
Shelf incorporates Article 2 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Article 77 (2) states 
that, if the coastal state does not exercise its sovereign rights over the continental shelf, no 
other state may unilaterally exercise them. Furthermore, paragraph three of the same article 
clearly indicates that the rights over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation or 
any declaration or other express pronouncement11. 
74 
In s.o far as the EEZ is c.oncerned, the language empl.oyed in Part V, particularly 
Article 55 and 56, seems t.o suggest that the EEZ rights exist ipso facto in a manner 
similar t.o the c.ontinental shelf rights. Article 55 defines the EEZ "as an area bey.ond and 
adjacent t.o the territ.orial sea, subject t.o the specific legal regime established in this part II , 
which is Part V. Article 56 then states that "in the exclusive ec.on.omic z.one, the c.oastal 
state has ... ". It d.oes n.ot say that the c.oastal state may establish an EEZ, but rather the 
c.oastal state "has" certain rights in the maritime area described as the EEZ. Thus, reading 
the tw.o articles t.ogether .one may draw the c.onclusi.on that the C.onventi.on either supp.oses 
that every coastal state bec.oming a party t.o it will eventually claim an EEZ Dr that the 
C.onventi.on places upon ~very co~stal state an obligation to claim an EEZ. However, both 
interpretations would, seem, unreasonahle for the following reasons. First, there is no 
reas.on for the Convention to cast an obligation upon the coastal state t.o establish an EEZ if 
that state does not desire to have .one12. Secondly, Article 57 states that lh~ EEZ shall not 
extend bey.ond 200 miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. 
This provison appears to indicate that the decision on the actual breadth .of the zone rests 
with the coastal state. Consequently, the decision of whether a state sh.ould have a zone of 
its .own.or not remains within the hands of that state itself13. Thirdly, while in the case .of 
the c.ontinental shelf, the LOS Convention explicitly states that the coastal state's rights d.o 
not depend .on occupation or proclamation, there is no such provision in Part V on 
exclusive economic zone. Thus, it may be inferred from the absence of any express 
provisi.on that the drafters had no intention to apply the same characteristics t.o the EEZ. 
Therefore, in the author's .opinion, it does not seem that an EEZ accrues to a 
coastal state ipso facto, but must be specifically claimed, making the EEZ a concessive 
rather than a peremptory wne 14. Neither does it seem compulsory that the full permissible 
breadth .of 200 mile should be so designatedl5, geography limiting the claim in some 
16 II ·f· h· 17 R k . h f·· h cases ,as we as specI IC c Olce . oc s wIt out a means 0 sustammg uman 
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habitation or economic life of their own can generate neither a continental shelf nor an 
EEZ, but islands canl8. In this context, in the Greenland/Jan Mayen Case (Denmark v. 
Norway), the Court was prepared to accept that the island of Jan Mayen, with its polar 
climate and population consisting entirely of 25 scientific station personnel, was entitled to 
generate an EEZ under Article 121 para. 3 of the LOS Conventionl8a. 
B. The Content of the Coastal State's Jurisdiction over the Living 
Resources of the EEZ Water Column 
Fishing rights are the centerpiece of the rights comprised by the EEZ conceptl9. 
Coastal State's rights and duties relating to the EEZ fisheries are set out in broad terms in 
Article 56. 1 (a), and amplified later in Articles 61 and 62. Consistent always with the 
concept of sovereign rights enshrined in Articles 56, Articles 61 and 62 provide the 
cO"l!stal state with extensive powers related mainly to the EEZ fisheries. These. powers 
related mainly to four areas: first, the allocation of the EEZ fisheries; secondly, the 
prescription or promulgation of laws and regulations for fishing in" the EEZ; thirdly, the' 
enforcement of fisheries laws and regulation within the EEZ and; fourthly, the special 
provisions for specific species. For the purpose of clarity, these powers are considered, 
hereunder, in turn. 
1- The Coastal State's Powers With Regard to Allocation of EEZ Fisheries 
According to the provisions of the LOS Convention, the coastal state enjoys, in 
its EEZ, extensive powers with regard to allocation of fisheries. The basic principles on 
allocation of the EEZ fisheries are contained in the following provisions : "The coastal 
state shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic 
zone" (Art. 61 para. 1), and "the coastal state shall determine its capacity to harvest the 
living resources of its economic zone" (Art. 62 para. 2), and it "shall ... give other states 
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access to the surplus of the allowable catch" (Art. 62 para. 2)20. 
1. 1 The Power to Determine the Allowable Catch21 
The idea of empowering the coastal state to detennine the AC of living resources 
in the EEZ appeared in the Six Eastern European Nation's Proposal of August 5, 197422, 
which stated that except for highly migratory species, the annual AC should be detennined 
for each species of fish or other living marine resources23. The first draft prepared by 
UNCLOS III in 197524 dropped the specification "for each species"; at the same time, 
more complex provisions were added so that the provisions as retained in the LOS 
Convention read "the coastal state shall detennine the allowable catch of the living 
resources in its economi<;: zone and shall ensure through proper conservation' and 
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive 
economic zone is not endangered by over exploitation,,25. 
Thus, by virtue of the above provisions, detennination of the AC has been ·made 
the right and responsibility of the coastal state. What this tenn "allowable catch" refers to 
is nowhere defined in the LOS Convention, yet it is upon the detennination of AC that the 
issue of allocation and access of third states to the surplus resources will probably depend. 
AC is, however, a tenn that has received much attention in international fisheries 
management literature. It has been defined by the Department of Fisheries of the F AO as 
"that catch which, if taken in anyone year, will best enable the objectives of fisheries 
management (e.g. the optimum long tenn yield) to be achieved,,26. 
According to Article 61 (2), the process of detennining the AC must be based on 
the "best scientific evidence" to ensure that the EEZ living resources are not endangered by 
over-exploitation 27. 
In the author's opinion, the detennination of the AC seems to be a discretionary 
decision, not to the extent as to whether it can be made, but as to how it can be made by 
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the coastal state. While the LOS Convention goes to great lengths to define the process, it 
also includes numerous qualifications that allow the coastal state to make the detennination 
at its own discretion. 
The first of these qualifications is to be found in Article 61 (2) which requires the 
coastal state to employ the "best scientific" evidence available to it. The problems here are 
twofold. First, "best" implies that the coastal state is not required to find the most accurate 
scientific infonnation and data but only the best that it can manage to gather from its own 
sources, as obtained from foreign fleets in pursuance of their obligation to provide catch 
statistics, as well as from other coastal states in the region28. This interpretation is 
reinforced by .the latter part of the phrase "available to it", which again suggests that the 
. , 
coastal state is not put under a duty to actively conduct scientific investigations in order to 
obtain the best scientific evidenc.e necessary for taking the required measures, but can take 
these measures on tl1e bas~s of the scientific infonnatiori it has access t029. 
Moreover, like most international fisheries conventions30, the LOS Convention 
has adopted the maximum sustainable yield31 as one of the fisheries conservation 
objectives to be achieved by the coastal state when exercising its fisherie's rights in the 
EEZ. Article 61 (2) states that the coastal state "shall ensure through proper conservation 
and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources is not endangered 
by overexploitation". The same article goes on saying in para. 3 that "such measures shall 
be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors, including the economic needs of the coastal fishing communities and the 
special requirement of developing countries". 
However, the concept of MSY is now regarded by fishery scientists as 
unsatisfactory32. Its combination here with even more indetenninate qualifiers, such as the 
relevant "environnemental and economic" factors, suggests that the coastal state may use 
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any number of references to qualify its determination of the MSY. This interpretation is 
supported by the wide range of factors that are listed subsequently. They are the economic 
needs of coastal fishing communities and special requirements of developing states, and 
taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks. Thus, if the particular 
fishing community is entirely dependent on fishing for its livelihhood, the coastal state 
may adjust its MSY accordingly. The implication which can be drawn from the wordings 
of the LOS Convention is, therefore, significant. It is that MSY is, to some extent, 
a discretionary meas~re. 
1. 2 The Power to Determine its Harvesting Capacity 
In compliance with the ~oncept of sovereign rights enjoyed by the coastal s~te in 
its EEZ, Article 62 (2) further empowers the coastal state to determine its harvesting 
capacity33, in some other words, to decide the part ·of.the AC which it will reserve for 
itself. If it happens that the He of the coastal state is higher or equal to the AC, only the 
coastal state can fish in its EEZ. Of course, a coastal state is free to allow other states to .i 
fish even if its HC is equal to the AC if it believes it appropriate to do so. Nevertheless, 
for other states willing to take part in fishing activities in the EEZ of a coastal state, the 
determination by that state of its HC amounts to a determination of whether or not it will 
give the access to the fisheries resources of its EEZ. Yet the sole obligation placed upon 
the coastal state in this regard is to establish a HC which is loosely defined. 
It has been suggested by Professor Burke and certain other authors that the 
provision in Article 62 (2) means the domestic harvesting capacity of the coastal state34. It 
seems, however, difficult to agree with this restrictive interpretation to the coastal state's 
harvesting capacity. In the author's opinion, the HC of the coastal state should be given a 
broad sense. In other words, it includes not only the capacity of the coastal state's fishing 
fleet, but also the use of foreign capital and fishing vessels35. This is because, first, there 
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is no provision in the LOS Convention compelling the coastal state to harvest the catch 
only through its own nationals and with its own means. Secondly, the concept of the EEZ 
was advanced by developing countries for economic reasons. Many of these states do not 
have the proper fishing technology to enable them to satisfy the demands of their 
populations and the needs of their small fishing industries. A restriction of their harvesting 
capacity to that of their domestic fishing fleets would, therefore, mean a reduction in the 
economic benefit to be gained from those resources; and, consequently, the economic 
improvement awaited by these states from the establishment of the EEZ would not be 
realized. 
Thus, the fact that the LOS Convention does not lay down any guidelines as to 
how the HC is to be made seems to have made the determination of the He of the coastal 
slate within its own discretion. This is all the more so because, like the coastal state power 
to detennine the AC, its power to decide its harvesting capacity is excluded from the 
compulsory dispute settlement procedure of Part XV, Section 2, Article 297 (3) (a) .. 
1.3. The Power to Determine the Surplus Catch and to Allow Access to 
Third States 
Under Article 62 (1) the coastal state is put under an obligation to promote the 
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in its EEZ. To this end, it is 
required to determine two levels of exploitation before the surplus can be determined. The 
first level is that of the AC of fish within its EEZ, and the second is its HC36. If it happens 
that the two levels are the same, there is no obligation upon the coastal state to allow 
access to foreign fishing vessels. But, should there be a surplus, it should allow access to 
this surplus to other states through agreements or other arrangements37. Rather than leave 
the surplus unfished, this method would encourage optimum utilization. If a surplus is 
declared, it would seem that a comparatively weak obligation to grant access follows. That 
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an obligation of some sort exists is evidenced by Article 297 (3) (b) (iii) which states that 
compulsory recourse to conciliation may be sought where a coastal state has "arbitrarily 
refused to allocate to any state ... the whole or part of the surplus it has declared to exist". 
However, exclusion of this area from compulsory dispute settlement suggests that this is a 
weak obligation. Moreover, it is not an obligation to allow automatic access38, but one to 
enter into agreement only, and then only in accordance with terms and conditions, some 
of which may make access an uneconomic proposition. The requirement in Article 62 (2) 
relating to access of third states is, therefore, reduced to nothing. To borrow the words of 
Professor Burke, it "places no meaningful obligation upon the coastal state,,39. 
Despite its centrality in the process of allowing for access to the EEZ living 
resources, the surplus concept is a "slippery,,40 one, the determination of which IS "the 
culmination of very complex operations,,4i 90robining both scientific and n~nscientific 
considerations. 
Even in cases where a coastal state has limited HC, there are often biologically 
justifiable situations in which a surplus does not exist, or in which the declaration of the 
surplus would be prejudicial to the interests of the coastal state 42. Thus, the issue of 
whether there is an obligation on the part of the coastal state to declare a surplus is 
important, because the answer determines the strength of third stateS access rights 
accorded by the LOS Convention. 
In practical terms, the procedures available to the coastal state allow it to set its 
HC at a level equal to the level of the AC, or to decide an AC below its HC. The question 
is whether this is legally permissible. 
Foreign states are given the right to invoke compulsory conciliation when a 
coastal state has arbitrarily refused to determine, at their request, the allowable catch of the 
living resources within its EEZ and its capacity to harvest living resources with respect to 
stocks that foreign state are interested in fishing42a. In that sense, there is a basis for 
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challenging the coastal state's act. However, in the author's opinion, it is not a strong 
basis in view of two issues: first, the big difficulty of establishing whether such an act has 
been taken arbitrarily; and secondly, the fact that it is compulsory conciliation, rather than 
compulsory settlement, that is available, the former being subject to rejection by the coastal 
state43. 
Another approach is to consider whether the failure of the coastal state to declare 
an AC or a surplus could be challenged on the basis of the principle of abuse of rights 44. It 
is true that this principle makes an attack on unreasonable, arbitrary and abusive use of 
lawful authority. But, in the author's opini'on, it does not seem to be of great pratical 
importance to third states which have been denied access. If these states invoke the 
principle of abuse of rights, they would find it much more dificult to prove such an abuse 
, of rights than the coastal state w()uld in its plea of having exercised its rights in good faith. 
For, as the InternationalLaw Association has observed :' 
"[I]t may be accepted that the principl~ of good faith is a universally 
recognized 'principle of law, but its logical counterpart ... the doctrine 
of abuse of rights... is an invalidating ground likely to be invoked 
only with great reluctance by an International Tribunal, and in very 
flagrant cases. Where, as in the situation presently under study, the 
contest is likely to be between two states arguing about a delicate 
balance of rights and duties affecting vital aspects of national 
sovereignty, the issue is unlikely to be presented in terms such as to 
invite application of the doctrine of abuse rights,,45. 
Thus, on the basis of the above analysis, the author is inclined to say that at the 
very best there is an obligation to allocate a suplus when one has already been declared and 
a fishing state has specifically so requested. 
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2. The Coastal State's Powers with Regard to Prescription of Laws and 
Regulations for Fishing in its EEZ 
Article 62 (4) expressly empowers the coastal state to legislate and issue 
regulations for fishery activities exercised in its EEZ. This provision seems, however, to 
be more concerned with the types of regulatory powers of the coastal state with regard to 
foreign fishing activities. The reason is that, as far as the coastal state nationals are 
concerned, it would in any case exercise unlimited legislative and administrative 
jurisdiction either on the basis of personal or quasi-territorial jurisdiction 46. 
Thus, with regard to its nationals, the coastal state is, in principle, free to issue 
laws .and regulations that suit its national interests such as the increase of employment, the 
increase of food supply or the preservation of economic efficiency of its fishing industry. 
Neverthless, in exercising such jurisdiction, it should satisfy the requirement enshrined in 
Article 61 relating to .conservation of the EEZ'sliving resources. 
Article 62 (4) provides a list of area~ to which the coastal state's regulatory 
powers may relate. The range of these areas is not, however, limited by the LOS 
Convention. This is because of the presence of the expression 'inter alia' before the start of 
the listing. In this context, Professor Arbour has corectly saId: 
"Ce qu'on do it necessairement souligner avec force ici, c'est que cette 
enumeration des pouvoirs reglementaires de l'Etats cotier n'est aucunement 
exhaustive puisque Ie mot 'notament' indique clairement que I'enumeration qui 
suit constitut tout au plus des exemples d'application des pouvoirs generaux,.47. 
Thus, the list is meant to be illustrative, possibly to reflect the importance attached by 
numerous developing coastal states at UNCLOS III to their competence to impose terms 
and conditions on the rights of foreigners to fish in their EEZs 48. 
Two sets of regulatory powers are contemplated by Article 62 (4). The first set 
relates to the enactment of conservation and management measures that will be applied to 
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all fishennen, including nationals. Sub-paragraphs (b) (c) (d) (e) and (0 pertain to this 
first set. Under the provisions of these sub-paragraphs, the coastal state is entitled to issue 
laws and measures in respect of, inter alia, fishing quotas, fishing seasons and fishing 
areas, sizes and number of fishing vessels, and the size and age of fish that may be 
caught.The second set concerns the tenns and conditions regarding fisheries access. Sub-
paragraphs (a) (g) (h) (i)(j) relate to this set.Tenns and conditions found in these sub-
paragraphs include those that would be expected in fishing laws and regulations, including 
licenses, fees, place of landings, training, technology transfer and joint ventures. Thus, 
the coastal state is provided with an enonnous range of details in the tenns and conditions 
that the coastal state is authorized to impose. The coastal state's authority to vary these 
conditions underscores the state's total control over access. 
In exercising its regulatory powers, the coastal state is put under a specific 
restaint that its laws and regulations "shall be consistent with the Co.nvention"49. 
However, given that Article 297 (3) (a) of Part XV (settlement of disputes), provides that 
the coastal state "shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any 
disputes relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the EEZ or 
their exercise, including its discretionary powers for... the terms and conditions 
established in its conservation and management laws and regulations", it seems that this 
competence of the coastal state is exclusive. 
3. The Coastal State's Powers with Regard to Enforcement of 
Conservation and Management Measures 
In general, the term "enforcement" denotes "the process designed to compel 
obedience to the rules"So. In the sphere of fisheries, it means the process by means of 
which compliance by fishennen with fisheries legislations enacted by coastal states or 
competent international fisheries organizations is ensured. 
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The coastal state is empowered under the LOS Convention to take enforcement 
procedures to protect its fisheries within the EEZ. Article 73 of the LOS Convention dealt 
with this maUer. Its provisions have not changed since they first appeared in the ISNT in 
197551 . 
These fisheries enforcement provisions, effectively amalgamate proposals made 
by a group of African coastal states52, and the United States53. Other proposals made by 
the EEC54, the territorialist states55 and the USSR56 found no place in the LOS 
Convention. 
Article 73 of the LOS Convention recognizes the right of the coastal state to take 
enforcement ineasures as may be necessary to ensure compliance with its fisheries laws 
and regulations in its EEZ. This process involve's two types of activity. First, preventive 
activities which include surveill~nce, stopping, boarding and inspection57. Surveillanc,e 
., , 
·refers· to the observation of fishing operatio~ or other activities be~ng carried out by fishing 
vessels in the ~EZ. Stopping and boarding are activities undertaken to confirm suspected 
violations detected by surveillance or in order to perform inspection. This latter refers to 
activities carried out by appointed officials on board fishing vessels to ascertain that 
suspected vessels have or have not complied with fisheries regulations. 
The second type of activities refers to the means available to punish violations. 
They include arrest or detention of vessels and their crews before the trial and penalties 
after the vessel has been found guilty at the trial 58. Thus, any person whether a national or 
a foreigner charged with a violation of the coastal state fisheries regulations and laws may 
be arrested by the police of the coastal state and may be punished if found guilty by the 
courts of that state59. 
It is also interesting to note that, although Article 73 is entitled "enforcement of 
laws and regulations of the coastal state", it relates only to measures taken against acts 
violating the regulations and laws enacted by the coastal state to protect its rights over the 
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living resources of the EEZ. This is made evident in paras. I and 3 that are only concerned 
with fisheries laws and regulations. Nonetheless, it appears that such measures may be 
applied to any vessels and not only fishing vessels found guilty of violations of coastal 
state fisheries laws and regulations. The reason is that, while it is true that Article 73 (1) 
and (3) are explicitly concerned with fisheries laws and regulations, it is also true that 
paras. 2 and 4 of the same article are not concerned only with fishing vessels, but with 
every vessel. Therefore, a research vessel taking a sample of fish in violation of fisheries 
laws for research puposes might find itself subject to the coastal state's enforcement 
powers contained in Article 73. 
Article 73 imposes some limitations on the coastal state's enforcement powers. 
These are, mainly, the limitations· on the kind of punishment and that of the prompt release 
of arrested· vessels and their crews on posting of reasonable bond or ot~er security60. 
With resp~ctto the first limitation, Article 73 (3) states that a, "coastal state penalties ... 
may not include imprisonmept in the absence.of agreements to the contrary by the states' 
concerned,,61. Accordingly, in its judicial proceedings against the arrested vessel and 
crew, the coastal state is required to impose financial penalties only. However, to the 
author's knowledge, there is no international standard for such financial penalties. It 
seems, therefore that the degree of these penalties would fall exclusively within the 
domestic jurisdiction of each coastal state. 
As far as the second limitation is concerned, Article 73 (2) provides that arrested 
vessels and their crews "shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or 
other security". However, no indication is given in the LOS Convention as to what is 
"reasonable bond or other security". The bond or other security can never be determined 
from an objective point of view62. Thus, the amount of the bond or other security would 
be a discretionary decision of the coastal state. 
However, if the release of arrested vessels and crews is unduly delayed, and if 
86 
the states concerned are parties to the LOS Convention, an appeal may be made to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea62a. 
4. Special Provisions for Specific Species 
As it has been already explained, Article 56 "is an establishment clause, a 
substantive description of the rights of the coastal state,,63 in its EEZ. In it, the rights of 
the coastal state with regard to the EEZ living resource are described in terms of sovereign 
rights. The authority of the coastal state with regard to the EEZ's living resources is 
further detailed in certain subsequent articles, particularly in Article 61 and 62. But, the 
same part of the LOS Convention that is Part V contains several specific provisions that 
are.to be applied to certai~ categories of fish; The issue which is therefore discussed, is 
that of the relation· of the regimes contained in these specific provisons with the sovereign 
rights of the coastal state. 
4.1. The Regime for Resources Located in More than one Zone 
The law of the sea recognizes the reality that fish do not respect national 
boundaries, but instead migrate across boundaries separating the EEZs or EFZs of 
neighbouring states, and across boundaries separating the EEZs or EFZs of states and 
areas of the high seas. Accordingly, the new law of the sea requires states to cooperate in 
the conservation and exploitation of trans boundary stocks. In this connection, Article 63 
of the LOS Convention casts an obligation on coastal states to cooperate, directly or 
through an international organization, with other states that fish for the so-called shared or 
straddling stocks associated with their zones in enacting appropriate conservation and 
management measures. As regards shared stocks (Le. stock or stocks occuring within the 
EEZs of two or more coastal states), Article 63 (1) places an obligation on coastal states 
concerned to "seek to agree" either directly or through existing regional or subregional 
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organizations or through similar arrangements that can be established for that purpose, 
upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development 
of such stocks64. In this connection, certain international law publicists65 have asserted 
that the obligation contained in this provision is one obliging the coastal states concerned 
to agree upon the necessary measures for conserving and developing shared living 
resources. However, in the author's opinion, such a view seems to be incorrect. This is 
because the stated objective is to seek to agree. Thus, the obligation is only to enter into 
negotiations and to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to concluding 
agreements66. 
Moreover, it must be made very-c1ear that the measures to be agreed upon by the 
c.oastal stales concerned are without prejudice to the other provisions of Part V of the LOS 
Convention, which is thep;ut on the EEZ. This means that the provisions enshrined in 
Article 63 (1) do not displace the more general provisions of Part V pf the LOS 
Convention, but complement them. Accordingly, each coastal state continues to enjoy the 
sovereign rights, given to it by means of Article 56 (1) (a) over that part of the shared 
stock of species found in its EEZ, but is bound by the conservation and utilization 
obligations contained in Article 61 and 62 of the LOS Convention. 
4. 2. Resources Straddling the High Seas and the EEZ 
Straddling fish stocks are stocks located within the EEZ and in the area of the 
high seas adjacent to it, as set out in Article 63 (2) of the LOS Convention67. Among the 
best known straddling fish stocks in the Pacific Ocean are found pollok, fished mainly in 
two areas on the high seas, the "Donut Hole" in the Bering sea, and the "Peanut Hole" in 
the Okhotsk Sea; giant squid extending from California to the south end of Latin America; 
orange roughy, found in the Challenger Plateau of New Zealand; and jack mackerel, that 
spawns along the coasts of Chile and Peru and migrates westward over long distances68. 
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In the Northeast Atlantic are found blue whiting, redfishes, cod, haddocks, and 
halibut from Greenland, as well as Norwegian herring69. In the Northwest Atlantic, there 
are important stocks of northern cod, American plaice, yellowtail, and redfish, which are 
found in the EEZs of Canada, Greeland, and member states of the EEC70. Such stocks 
are exploited by the coastal states within their EEZs, and by vessels from other states 
fishing on the adjacent high seas. 
In the southwest Atlantic are found squid, hake, southern blue whiting, and 
. di 71 patagoman grana er . 
Straddling fish stocks provide one important case where there is a very close 
interaction between the high seas and the EEZ.The LOS Convention clearly recognizes 
this reality itt Article 63 (3), This article states that where the same stock or stocks of 
associated species are located both within the EEZ and in an area beyond and adjacent to 
the zone, the coastal state and the states fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area "shall 
seek,either directly or thro~gh appropri~t~subregional or regional organization, to agree 
upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area". 
This provision has made it very clear that where the same stock of species occurs in an 
EEZ and an adjacent area of the high seas frequented by foreign fishermen, the states 
concerned are obliged to seek to agree on the conservation and management measures for 
the stock as a whole, including that part of it that lies in the high seas. However, this 
obligation appears to be a weak one as the states concerned are not put under a duty to 
establish joint measures or to concert conservation actions, but only to "seek to agree" on 
such measures. Should this search fail, the coastal state would be entitled to adopt 
conservation and management measures which are to be applied only to that portion that 
lies in its EEZ. Beyond 200 miles the coastal state would be, as a matter of international 
law, virtually powerless to unilaterally deal with non-national fishing activity even where 
the activity creates detrimental effects on the living resources which are found within its 
EEZ72. 
In fact, since the adoption of the LOS Convention, a number of new problems 
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have emerged in relation to the conservation and management of straddling stocks 73. 
Many important fish stocks are accessible outside the 200 miles EEZ and, in recent years, 
foreign fishing beyond the EEZ outer limit has been growing in intensity74. Since the 
harvested species occur within the same ecosystem as that of the EEZ and conservation 
measures are not unified, signs of overexploitation have begun to show 75. Some coastal 
states regard that as a threat to the stocks of species which lie within their EEZs as well as 
to the fisheries management regimes that have been established since the introduction of 
the 200 miles EEZ76. Various countries concerned expressed their concern over this issue 
at the Conference on Conservation and Management of High Seas Living Resources held 
in St. John, Newfoundland, in 199077. On this occasion, the adoption of measures to 
avoid adverse effects of high seas fisheries on living resources found in the EEZ was 
'emphasized,together with the idea that conservation and management of straddling stocks 
in the high. seas shall be consistent with those applied by the coastal state in the EEZ. The 
issue was also discussed in the context of the work of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 199278, which 
recommended the convening of a United Nations conference on HMSs and straddling 
fish stocks 79. 
In accordance with the recommendation made at the UNCED80, the General 
Assembly convened, between 1993 and 1995, an intergovernmental conference bearing 
the title of "The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks,,81, with a view towards promoting effective implementation of 
some provisions of the LOS Convention. The conference was to identify and assess 
existing issues related to the conservation and management of such fish stocks and search 
for means of improving cooperation on fisheries among states. Moreover, the work and 
the results of the conference were to be consistent with the provisions of the LOS 
Convention, in particular the rights and duties of coastal states and states fishing on the 
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high seas82. 
The conference held five substantive sessions83. At the Fifth Substantive 
Session which was held in New York from 24 July to 4 August 1995, the conference 
ended its work by concluding the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks84. This Agreement has made it very clear that the biological unity of the straddling 
fish stocks requires compatibility between the conservation and management measures 
adopted on the high seas and in areas within the national jurisdiction of the parties85. The 
instrument would apply to straddling stocks on th~ high seas, and, consistent with the 
LOS ConventiQn,thecoastal states are responsible for the conservation and management 
of such fish stocks within the areas of the sea falling under their jurisdiction86: 
In order to achieve compatibility between the measures adopted on the high seas 
and in areas within national jurisdiction, and in line with Article 63 (2) of the LOS 
Convention, the relevant coastal states and the states whose nationals fish for such stocks 
in the adjacent high seas areas have been placed under a duty to cooperate. In determining 
compatible conservation and management measures, the states concerned are required to 
take into account, amongst other things, (a) the conservation measures adopted and 
applied in accordance with Article 61 of the LOS Convention in respect of the same 
stocks by coastal states within areas under national jurisdiction; (b) previously agreed 
measures established and applied for the high seas in accordance with the LOS 
Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal states and states fishing on 
the high seas; (c) previously agreed measures established and applied in respect of the 
same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries management organization; (d) the 
biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks; and (e) the respective 
dependence of the coastal states and the states fishing on the high seas on the fish stocks 
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concerned87. 
The Agreement has also established general principles regarding, for instance, 
the nature and objectives of the conservation and managment measures, precautionary 
measures, and the consistency of such measures which must be applied by the coastal 
state in its EEZ and by the coastal state and other states concerned in the sea areas beyond 
the EEZ outer limit88. Moreover, the coastal state and all other states concerned have been 
put under a duty to make every effort to agree on compatible conservation measures 
within a reasonable period of time89. Pending agreement on such measures, the states 
concerned are required to enter into provisional arrangements90. When cooperative efforts 
are unsuccessful in reaching an agreement within a reasonable period of time, any of the 
states concerned may invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in 
Part VIII of the Agreement91 . 
An important part of the Agreement deals' with compliance and enforcement of 
the conservation and management measures and imposes a duty on states to cooperate in 
order to ensure compliance with and enforcement of conservation and management 
measures for straddling fish stocks92. In this context, where there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that a vessel on the high seas has been engaged in unauthorized fishing 
within a sea area under the coastal state's jurisdiction, the flag state of that vessel, at the 
request of the coastal state concerned, must immediately investigate the matter93. 
Moreover, the flag state of that vessel must cooperate with the coastal state in whose 
waters the violation occured in taking appropriate enforcement action in such cases and 
may authorize the relevant authorities of that coastal state to board and inspect the vessel 
on the high seas94. 
Furthermore, the agreement empowers any state party that is a member of a 
subregional or regional fisheries organization to board and inspect vessels flying the flag 
of other states when they are found in any high seas areas covered by that organization95. 
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Where, following boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for believing that a 
vessel has violated the conservation and management measures, the inspecting state must 
secure evidence and promptly notify the flag state of the alleged violation96. The latter 
shall immediately and fully investigate the matter and, if evidence so warrants, take 
enforcement action with respect to the vessel and shall promptly inform the inspecting 
state of the results of the investigation and of any subsequent enforcement action taken97. 
In addition, port states may inspect documents, fishing gear and catch on board 
fishing vessels when such vessels are voluntarily in their ports or at their offshore 
. al 98 termm s . 
They are also empowered to enact legislation to prohibit landings and trans-
shipments when the catch is the result of fishing activities undermining the effectiveness 
f 
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o . conservatlon measures . 
With regard to the resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation or '" 
application of the agreement, Article 27 contains a provision which is more or less similar 
. to the provision enshrined in Article 33 (1), of the United Nations Charter. It puts an ,~ 
obligation upon the parties to any dispute to seek a solution by a variety of specified 
peaceful means. This involves negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements. It has also made it very 
clear that they are able to choose peaceful methods other than those specified in the 
agreement 100. 
4.3. Regulation of Highly Migratory SpecieslOl 
The term "Highly Migratory Species" is not defined in the LOS Convention. 
However, it refers to some species of fish that traverse very wide distances and spend a 
considerable portion of their life cycle outside the 200 miles limit102. They are listed by 
species designations in Annex I of the LOS Convention. The list includes 9 tuna species, 
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12 marlin species, 2 species similar to tuna, 4 saury species, pomfrets, common 
dolphinfish, several kinds of oceanic sharks, and cetaceans. All these species are 
characterized by their great mobility; they travel thousands of kilometers, thus creating a 
wide geographical distribution both within and outside the limits of the EEZ. In the North 
Pacific, bluefin tuna and albacore may cross the Pacific Ocean in a very few months. 
They may be exploited first in the American continent's coastal waters, then a year later or 
less than that in the coastal waters of JapanlO3. Southern bluefin tuna found only in the 
Southern Hemisphere migrate from spawning areas around Australia to areas throughout 
the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Indian Ocean 104. At present, the scientific accuracy of the 
LOS Convention's list concerning HMSs is questionable because it has included some 
small species of tropical tuna with limited regional migrations105• 
From a commercial sta~dpoint, the different varieties of tuna .are the most 
important fish species among HMSs, and the majority of the international agreeme~ts 
dal 'h h 106 e tWIt l em . 
In the LOS Convention, special provisions are made in Article 64 concerning. 
HMSs. The provisions contained in the first paragraph of this article calls for cooperation 
between the coastal state and other states whose nationals fish for HMSs either directly or 
through appropriate international organizations, with a view toward ensuring 
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species 
throughout the region both within and beyond the EEZ. In fact, this provisions appeared 
first in the ISNT107 and has suffered no substantial change throughout the whole 
subsequent texts of UNCLOS III. However, it must be noted that these provisions are set 
out in the part dealing with the EEZ. Moreover, these provisions are to apply "in addition 
to other provisions" of Part V of the LOS Convention 108. Therefore, the coastal state has 
sovereign rights over HMSs in its EEZ under Article 56 of the LOS Convention. Thus, 
the effect of the provisions included in paragraph 1 of Article 64 is, to borrow the words 
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of Professor Brown, "to place limitations upon the exercise of these sovereign rights by 
requiring the coastal state to co-operate with other states in the region,,109. 
In the begining, the United States did not recognize the jurisdiction of the coastal 
state over tuna On the contrary, it had until very recently held the view that Article 64 of 
the LOS Convention confirmed a rule of customary law under which tuna, but not other 
HMSs, did not come under the general coastal state authority when present in its EEZ. 
Rather, the freedom of fishing on the high seas extended in the case of such fish species, 
and their conservation, management and optimum utilization could be effected only 
through international arrangements among the coastal state and other fishing states in the 
region 110. The United States position received some backing from Costa Rica, 
. Panamalll and the Bahamas1l2. 
However, the US view remained isolated. Most eminent international law 
publicists who have dealt with the subject tooka ,different view113. Using ail. argument 
from within the LOS Convention itself, they have argued that Article 64 (2) states 
expressly that the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of Article 64 will be applied "in 
addition to the other provisions" of Part V. In their view, this provision represents a 
reaffmnation of Article 56 and, consequently, highly migratory tuna also fall under the 
sovereign rights of the coastal state114• Moreover, all other distant water fishing states 
rejected the US view115. In this connection, Australia, for instance, has expressly stated 
that the United States juridical position is "inconsistent with international law,,116. In 
addition, the overwhelming state practice recognizes coastal state jurisdiction over highly 
migratory tuna throughout the EEZll7. The combination of all these factors has in 1992 
prompted the United States to abandon the view indicated above, and asserted by 
amendment of the Magnuson Act jurisdiction over highly migratory tuna within its EEZ, 
thus rendering its practice consistent with the overwhelming state practice subsequent to 
the adoption of the LOS Convention118. 
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Thus, HMSs provide a second important situation in which there is a very close 
interaction between the EEZ and the high seas. The LOS Convention clearly recognizes 
this reality in Article 64, which calls for arrangements on cooperation. Moreover, 
recognition of such reality is further confirmed in the United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks119• Article 3 applies the provision of the 
Agreement discussed above in relation to straddling stocks to HMSs. 
4. 4. Conservation and Protection of Marine Mammals 
The main species falling under the denomination "Marine Mammals'i are whales, 
seals and other cetaceans; such as porpoises 120. When these species are presentin the 
EEZ, they are subject to .the sovereign rights ofthe coastal state under Article 56 of the ',: 
LOS Convention. In addition, however, some marihe mammals, such as dolphins, are 
listed in Annex I as HMSs and are therefore governed by Article 64 of the LOS 
Convention. .. 
Marine mammals do not reproduce themselves on a large scale and can therefore 
be depleted within a relatively short time. The LOS Convention appears to have responded 
positively to the biological character of these species. Indeed, a specific provision relating 
to them is contained in Article 65. Under it, the coastal state or an appropriate international 
organization is entitled to limit or prohibit the exploitation of these resources more strictly 
than other resources. This specific provision is, entirely, compatible with the sovereign 
rights of the coastal state121 . Some lawyers122 have maintained that there is no duty to 
establish an allowable catch for these species or ensure their optimum utilization as a 
resource to be harvested. States are to cooperate in conserving the various species, 
particularly cetaceans, and must work through the appropriate international organization, 
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principally the International Whaling Commission (IWC), for their conservation, 
management and study. Article 120 of the LOS Convention mandates the same duties for 
the high seas. 
In the author's opinion, however, the interpretation which would exclude 
optimum utilization is not self - evident, for the simple reason that cetaceans and dolphins 
are enshrined in Annex I of the LOS Convention as HMSs, and are, therefore, subject to 
th · ·1·· . 123 e optunum uU IzaUon requIrement . 
4. 5. Conservation of Anadromous Species 
The term "Anadromous Species" refers to those fish species that spawn in fresh 
. d h . 1· . 1 124 . F waters or estuanne waters an t en mIgrate to oceans to Ive 10 sa t waters . rom a 
·al . f· 1 . h· dr· 125 commercl pomt 0 VIew, sa mon IS t .e most Important amongst ana omous speCIes 
and the majority of the international agreements concluded have dealt with it 126. 
Special provisions also have been included in Article 66 of the LOS Convention 
with regard to anadro01ous fish species. The central principle enshrined in the latter article 
is that the state of origin of anadromous stocks, i.e. the state in whose rivers they 
originate, has "primary interest and responsibility for such stocks,,127. Like most of the 
EEZ provisions, this principle was inserted in the first negotiating text of UNCLIS lll128 
and suffered no change since then. 
The direct consequence of the principle mentioned above is that, as a general 
rule, anadromous species, such as salmon, can be fished only in the jurisdictional waters 
of the state in whose rivers they originate129. This means, from a legal standpoint, that 
they are equally subject to the sovereign rights of the state of origin. 
An exception to the general rule mentioned earlier is, however, included in 
Article 66 (1) (a). According to this provision, fisheries for anadromous stocks might be 
conducted on the high seas when the limitation of fishing for such stocks to the 
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jurisdictional waters of the state of origin would result in economic dislocation for a state 
other than the state of origin. If a situation of this kind arises, consultations between the 
states concerned should be conducted in order to determine the measures and 
. ffi h' 130 CIrcumstances 0 IS mg . 
Moreover, as a result of its responsibility for such stocks, the state of origin can, 
according to Article 66 (2) , establish a total allowable catch for stocks originating in its 
rivers, but this is conditioned by the duty of prior consultation with the other states 
fishing these stocks. The duty of consultation applies to establishing a total allowable 
catch not only for anadromous species that are to be fished beyond the outer limits of the 
EEZ 131, but also for anadromous species which migrate into or through the EEZ s of 
states .other than the state of origin 132. The established total allowable catch must be' 
obs~rved in the high seas as wen as in the EEZs of other states133. This position 
represents .~heuniversalization of the primary intereSt and responsibi!ityof the state of 
origin and its rights. 
4. 6. Management of Catadromous Species 
The term "Catadromous Species" refers to certain fish species which spend most 
of their life cycle in fresh waters then migrate to the sea to spawn in salt waters,,134. 
Examples of these species are eel and mullet. Unlike Article 66 on anadromous species, 
Article 67 concerning catadromous species contained only general provisions on these 
species. Possibly this is due to the fact that states are not as interested in them as they are 
. dr k 135 In ana omous stoc s . 
In short, the provisions of Article 67 on catadromous species are similar to those 
of Article 66 on anadromous species. The central principle is that the state in whose waters 
catadromous species spend the greater part of their life cycle has the primary interest in and 
responsibility for the management of these speciesl36. Here again, the direct consequence 
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of this principle is that these species will be fished solely in the sea areas that lie landward 
of the outer limits of the EEZ137. Fishing for catadromous species on the high seas is 
prohibited. 
Moreover, in the event of catadromous species migrating through the EEZ of a 
state other than the state in whose waters these species spend the greater part of their life 
cycle, these two states should cooperate with a view to enact management measures by 
agreement138. The agreement must ensure the rational management of the species and take 
into account the responsibilities of the management state for the maintenance of the 
species 139. Thus, although they may have some interest in the same species, other coastal 
fishing states are not fully free to control these species in their zones. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that, un~er the 
EEZ fisheries regime contained in Part V of the LOS Convention, the coastal state enjoys 
extensive rights with respect to the management-and use of the EE~ fisheries. In 
exercising these rights the coastal state is placed under certain obligations, the most 
important of which are : first, the coastal state should use proper conservation and 
management measures to protect the EEZ's living resources; secondly, that it should 
promote the objective of optimum utilization of the EEZ s living resources, including the 
provision of access to foreign fishermen. Nevertheless, much flexibility is provided to the 
coastal state in setting the allowable catch and the capacity of the coastal state in harvesting 
the resources. A decision concerning access of foreign states may take into account the 
economy of the coastal state and other national interests. Furthermore, the dispute 
settlement system established by the LOS Convention in Article 297 (3) (a) precludes 
effective review of the coastal state's decisions on these questions. This means that the 
LOS Convention essentially provides the coastal state with exclusive decision-making 
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based on its interests with regard to what gets fished, how much gets fished how it gets 
fished and who fishes in its EEZ. 
C. The Nature of the Coastal Stale's Rights over Sedentary Species and 
the Non-Living Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of the EEZ 
This subsection is concerned with sedentary species and the non-living resources 
of the seabed and its subsoil within the EEZ. The two subjects fall under the sovereign 
rights of the coastal state by virtue of Article 56 of Part V of the LOS Convention 140. But 
the coastal state's authority over them is articulated in Part VI of the LOS Convention, 
under two cross-referenees from Article 68 in the EEZ part with respect to the former and 
Article 56 (3) with regard to the latter. These two cross-references are not without legal 
consequences. This subsection investigates these legal consequences. 
1. Sedentary Species 
The background to the subject is to be found in the framing of the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions. The ILC included sedentary species in its definition of natural resources in 
its meeting in 1953141. The final definition adopted in the 1958 Geneva Conference after 
an extensive debate was a compromise solution between states which wanted to exclude 
living resources altogether and others which wanted to include bottom fishl42. The 
definition of sedentary species adopted in the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf143 has been retained unchanged in the ICNT and its revisions. These are living 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, are either immobile on or under the sea floor or 
which are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea floor or 
subsoil 144. They include such creatures as sponges, corals, oysters, lobsters, mussels 
and possibly crabs l45. 
This definition lacks precision, it has been said 146. This view seems to be 
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correct, for there has been no unifonn list of sedentary species. The fishing states have, in 
practice, adopted different lists based on their appreciation of how their fishery interests 
would be served by inclusion or otherwise of a particular species l47. Thus, the decision 
of whether or not a particular species falls within the content of the category sedentary 
species remains to some extent a subjective one. 
As indicated earlier, Article 68 of Part V expressly excludes sedentary species 
from the application of this part. Article 77 (1) of Part VI, "Continental Shelf' states, in 
part, that the coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources. Natural resources are defined to 
include amongst others the living organisms belonging to sedentary species. The rights 
accorded to coastal states under the latter provision are, therefore, the same rights that 
coastal statesenj~y under both the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf148 and 
customary law 149. These rights do not depend on occupation or any express proclamation. 
They are exclusive, in the sense that if the coastal ,state does not exploit its resources no 
one may do so without the express consent of the coastal state 150. The coastal state will be 
free to give its consent or withhold it without giving any reason. This separate treatment of 
sedentary species from ordinary fish resources of the EEZ implies that a coastal state is 
under no obligation to take any management or conservation measures, nor to 
accommodate foreign fishennen l51 . In Article 77 the sovereign rights are for the purpose 
of exploring and exploiting, thus omitting the tenns conserving and managing. When this 
omission is linked with the injunction at Article 68 that no provisions in Part V are to apply 
to sedentary species as defined in Article 77 (4), it is clear that the already-discussed 
conserving and managing obligation to the international community is not required from 
the coastal state. The other provisions on declaring and providing access to a surplus, 
safeguarding associated and/or dependent species, arrangements for economically 
dislocated, geographically disadvantaged, or land-locked states would also be excluded, 
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as would the requirements to Article 73 regarding imprisonment, release on bond and 
related matters 152. 
2. The Non-Living Resources of the EEZ 
One element of the EEZ regime is that the coastal state has sovereign rights for 
the purpose of the exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of non-
living resources of the seabed and subsoil of the EEZI53. With the exception of the 
provisions relating to "conserving and managing" and "superjacent waters", the rights 
granted to the coastal state, in this field, are exactly the same rights already enjoyed in 
respect of seabed resources under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and in 
customaryintemationallawl54. All states which could gain by exercising jurisdiction over 
their continental shelves have done so155. In this respect, it has been correctly observed 
that, since what are involved are, principally, non-living resources, the purpose of such 
rights are related particularly with their exploration and exploitation and not with. their 
conservation and management; the latter are concepts which refer appropriately to the case 
of living resources of the water column 156. 
Because the continental shelf overlaps within the 200 miles limit with the EEZ in 
respect of these particular resources, one of the basic issues that faced UNCLOS III 
negotiations was that of which one of these two regimes should prevail. In this 
connection, two main trends emerged when discussing this issue at UNCLOS III. The 
fIrst trend appeared in the early stages of UNCLOS III. It was for the continental shelf 
regime to be absorbed within the 200 miles limit of the EEZI57. This trend was led by 
many African and Latin American states as well as by some LLSs12o. These states 
advanced several arguments in support of their position. Some of these arguments were 
summarized in the statement made by Mr. Kalondji, the representative of Zaire at the 
Caracas Session, 1974. He said: 
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"The principle of the common heritage of mankind was of great 
importance to his delegation. Any application of the exploit ability 
criterion would leave for the common heritage merely those areas 
that were unexploitable and therefore of little value. The only criterion 
should be that of distance. It was logical for the limits of the continental 
shelf and the economic zone to coincide. Consequently, the shelf as a 
separate entity would disappear. Those states that claimed acquired 
rights over the continental shelf were doing so under the 1958 
Convention that was now being reviewed,,159. 
However, for the broad-shelf states, such as the United States, Australia, 
Canada, the Soviet Union, and Argentina160, the arguments advanced were not 
convincing, particularly because they ignored the fact that broad-:shelf states already enjoy 
sovereign rights beyond the proposed 200 miles limits under the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf161. In their view, the absorption of the continental shelf regime within 
the 200 miles limits of the EEZ would, therefore, damage these established rights162~ 
The broad-shelf states were on the minority side at UNCLOS III. Nevertheless, 
the fact that their position was, essentially, based on valid arguments, viz. the wording of 
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the principle of the "natural 
prolongation,,163 of the land mass, had made it necessary that the demands of these states 
should not be ignored. UNCLOS III had, therefore, to resort to a compromise solution on 
this issue. This compromise is reflected in Articles 76,82 and 56 of the LOS Convention. 
This last now allows a coastal state to extend its continental shelf beyond the 200 miles 
limit as far as 350 milel64. This position has assured consistency with existing 
international law and has brought satisfaction to broad margin states. On the other hand, a 
percentage of the products resulting from the exploitation of the continental shelf mineral 
resources found beyond 200 miles was made payable to the international seabed authority 
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which would distribute it between the states parties to the LOS Convention 165. This was a 
concession made for those states adhering to the first trend. 
More importantly, under Article 56 (1) and 57 of Part V entitled "Exclusive 
Economic Zone" the coastal state enjoys sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
expoiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil up to 
200 miles. The same rights have been granted to the coastal state by virtue of Article 77 
(1) of Part VI on the Continental Shelf. Moreover, under a cross reference from Article 56 
(3), the coastal state's sovereign rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil resources, 
are m~de exercisable in accordance with the Continental Shelf Part. This cross reference 
raises· the issue of whether or not the EEZ regime merges with, that of the continental shelf. 
In the author's opinion, the provision enshrined in Article 56 (3) seems to . 
recognize the autonomy of b?th institutions .. This interpretation finds support in the 
existence of parallel provisions in Part V.and Part VI on sev~ral matters such as the. 
sovereign. rights with respect.to the resources of the s~abed and subsoil: ' se~ent~ species 
and artificial islands l66. In both parts, two related but separate and independent regimes 
are set up. It is not, thus, difficult to agree with Judge Gros who pointed out, in the 
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) Case, 1984, that "comparison of 
Articles 56-62 and 73-74 (Zone) with Articles 76,77,78,81 and 83 (Continental Shelf) 
seems to leave only this alternative: either two legal regimes or chaos" 167. 
This parallel system of EEZ and continental shelf, however, creates a difficult 
problem with regard to delimitation especially between states with opposite coasts. If the 
distance between two states with opposite coasts exceeds 400 miles and there exists a 
continental shelf between them, then the delimitation issue can be resolved by resorting to 
h .. I . d' A . I 83 (1)168 . 169. . h t e pnncIp es contaIne In rUc e ,VIZ. agreement ,consIstency wIt 
international law 170, and equitable solution 171. If the distance between these states is less 
than 400 miles, however, then the situation becomes more complex. If the two states have 
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asserted an EEZ, and both consented to ignore the continental shelf between them, then the 
issue may not be difficult to resolve. But assuming that the continental shelf of one of 
them goes beyond the median line of the two opposite coasts, can that state still exercise 
sovereign rights over that part of the continental shelf as stated in Article 77 (1) of the LOS 
Convention? 
Due to the fact that the regime of the continental shelf appeared earlier than that of 
the EEZ, and given the fact that, under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and 
the LOS Convention, the rights of the coastal state do not depend on occupation or any 
express proclamation, it seems that it is unlikely that a coastal state would abandon its 
chum to its continental shelf beyond the median line of the two states with opposite coasts. 
On the other hand, by virtue of Article 56 (l),a cO,astal state enjoys, within its EEZ, 
sovereign· rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the n'on.,.living resources of 
.the 'seabed~nd subsoil. It seems, thus,. that it is unlikely that a state would allpw'.an 
opposite state to assert th,e continental shelf underlying its EEZ. 
One possible method to solve this problem appears to be that of absorbing the 
continental shelf regime within 200 miles into the EEZ. Thus, if the distance between two 
states with opposite coasts is less than 400 miles, then the EEZ should be delimited 
regardless of the continental shelf between these states. Professor Oda appears to favor 
h· . 172 t IS VIew . 
On the other hand, a state with a broad shelf vis a vis an opposite state is likely 
to reject this view. Under such circumstances, it is possible for this latter state not to assert 
an EEZ and base its claim on the continental shelf theory. Furthermore, even if a state 
claims an EEZ, it can assert its rights on a continental shelf based on customary rules of 
international law. For example, the Statement of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam made in 
May 1977 on the economic zone provides that the EEZ of the Republic extends to 200 
miles from the baselines 173. It further stated that: "The continental shelf of the Socialist 
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Republic of Vietnam comprises the seabed an subsoil of the submarine areas that extend 
beyond the Vienamese Territorial Sea throughout the natural prolongation of the 
Vietnamese land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin" 174. 
Another solution is to have different maritime boundary lines for the EEZ and the 
continental shelf. For instance, in the hearing on the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya) Case on October 9, 1981, Libya took the following view : 
"Libya considers that, as between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, 
the delimitation of their respective continental shelf areas and of 
their economic zones ought not, in the majority of cases, to be different. 
Nevertheless, there may be factors relevant to fishing, such as established 
practices, which have no relevance to shelf resources; and conversely, there 
maybe factors relevant to shelf resources such as geological features 
controlling the extent of a natural prolongation - of no relevance to fishing: 
It therefore follows that the two boundaries need not necessarily 
coincide,,175. 
In actual cases of delimitation, not all states have utilized a maritime boundary 
line for delimiting the two zones. However, a large number of coastal states have already 
used the concept of the single maritime boundary that serves for the purpose of delimiting 
both the EEZ and the continental shelf in several regions of the globe l76. On the other 
hand, only very few states have agreed to have two different maritime boundary lines for 
different purposes. For example, in the Agreement between Australia and France relating 
to maritime boundaries separating the Heard and Kerguelon Islands in the South Indian 
Ocean and the Australian mainland and New Caledonia concluded on 4 January 1982, the 
two states agreed to have two different maritime boundary lines for different purposel77. 
Similarly, in the Agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea concluded on 18 
December 1978, the fisheries jurisdiction boundary line does not correspond to the 
continental shelf boundary line 178. 
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The sum of the above discussion is that the rights of the coastal state over the 
EEZ non-living resources of the seabed and its subsoil are, in reality, governed by the law 
of the continental shelf. This substantial prevalence of the continental shelf regime results 
from the cross reference contained in Article 56 (3) to Part VI on the Continental Shelf. It 
ensues from such a prevalence that the nature of the coastal states rights over the EEZ 
seabed and subsoil is identical to that of the coastal state rights over the resources of the 
continental shelf. These tights have a functional character. In other words, their purposes, 
and the field of activity they are connected with, are explicitly defined. But, what is still 
more important is that, as a consequence of the prevalence of the continental shelf regime, 
these rights are exclusive. Nonetheless, the EEZ and the continental shelf remain legally 
autonomous even though within the 200 miles limit they operate with respect to the same 
area and similar non-living resources. They are concepts that have dissimilar structure and 
origin179, which can, occasionaHy,justify the drawing oftwo different boundaries. 
D. The Coastal State Rights over Other Economic Resources of the EEZ 
Article 56 (1) (a) provides that the sovereign rights of the coastal state also apply 
to "other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds". 
Under the RSNT Part II Article 44 (1) (c), the coastal state was given "exclusive 
jurisdiction" with regard to other activities for the economic exploration and exploitation of 
the EEZ. This means that the coastal state alone was empowered to legislate and to take the 
fi ' th 'th th' ,. 180 necessary en orcement measures In e zone WI respect to ese actIVItIes . 
The words "exclusive jurisdiction" were, however, replaced later in the ICNT of 
1977 by the words "sovereign rights" in the context of the changes made to the EEZ 
provisions to stress the economic nature of the EEZ 181, 
In the above provision, three types of activities relating to other economic uses of 
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the EEZ have been specifically mentioned. They are activities concerning the production of 
energy from, first, water; second, currents; and lastly winds. In the author's opinion, the 
listing of these activities is only illustrative. This is because, first, the comprehensive 
nature of the expression "other activities for economic exploitation and exploration of the 
zone" seems to suggest that the management and control of all other economically-oriented 
activities in the EEZ are vested in the coastal state; secondly, the use of the words "such 
as" denotes that the few activities mentioned in that provision are meant to be illustrative 
and not conclusive. 
Thus, the rights of the coastal state over the economic uses of the EEZ are not 
confined to those activities that are related to the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds, but extend to include all other economically-oriented activities which 
wiHbe made· accessible either by present or future technological devolepemel)t . It is 
interesting to.note that,prior to the convening of UCLOS III,neither customary nor 
conventional international law had conferred these rights upon the coastal state. Although 
the regime of the territorial sea, included coastal state jurisdiction over all activities directed 
to the economic exploitation and exploration of the territorial sea area, by virtue of its 
. . 182 f h . f h· hi· fi h· sovereIgnty over It , none 0 t e regImes 0 t e contIguous zone, t e exc uSIve IS 109 
zone and the continental shelf were concerned with such activities. Under each one of 
these last three regimes, third states retained the right to make such uses of the sea as a 
reasonable use of the high seas. 
Section II : The Coastal State's Non-Economic Rights in the EEZ 
The other coastal state's rights in the EEZ relate to artificial islands, installations 
and structures, marine scientific reseach and preservation of the EEZ's marine 
environment. In this connection, Article 56 (1) (b) stipulates that in the EEZ the coastal 
state has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention 
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with regard to : 
(I) The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(II) Marine scientific research; 
(III) The protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
Unlike the coastal state's economic rights which are couched in tenns of 
"sovereign rights", the rights enumerated in this provision are described in terms of 
"jurisdiction". Although this tenn is often associated with the power of courts to hear and 
adjudicate controversies, it has a broader meaning in international law. Jurisdiction is the 
capacity of a state under international law to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law 183 . Thus, 
jurisdiction involves a state's right to exercise certain of its powers. Jurisdiction is 
necessary for the validity of legislation, the most striking assertion of jurisdiction, and for 
th~ judicial actions of a state. As Beale correctly observed, "the sovereign can :not confer 
jurisdictiOrion his courts or his legislature when he has no such jurisdiction according to 
the principles of international law" 184. Jurisdiction may be plenary or limited in. scope. I~ 
other words, a state may assert jurisdiction over all persons in a given geographical area 
and for all purposes, or it may limit the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by type of 
person, area, or purpose 185. 
The other EEZ competences set out in Article 56 (1) (b) relate to certain specific 
topics. Moreover, these competences are to be exercised in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of LOS Convention. This section attempts to establish the precise extent of 
these competences. For the sake of analysis, the author will deal with these competences, 
separately. 
A. The Competence of the Coastal State with Regard to Artificial Islands, 
Installations and Structures 
As has already been mentioned, Article 56 (1) (b) gives the coastal state, with 
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respect to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, only 
jurisdiction. In the first text186 of UNCLOS III, the words exclusive rights and 
jurisdiction were employed in this regard, which were later changed in the manner shown 
in Article 56 (1) (b). In the author's opinion, this change in terminology does not seem to 
have, in reality, any significant importance. This is because Article 60 of the LOS 
Convention, which elaborates further on these rights envisages, on the one hand, that the 
coastal state shall have the exclusive right to construct and authorize and regulate the 
construction, operation and use of such objects, and from the other hand, it states that the 
coastal state shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the same objects. 
It is important to note that Article 60 of the LOS Convention addressing the issue 
of artificial islands, installations and structures in the EEZ, establishes a distinction 
.between artificial iSlands, on the one hand, and installations and structures on the other, 
. but none of these terms has been defined in the LOS Convention 187. Article ·60 {I) (a) 
grants th~ coastal state exclusive jurisdiction to construct and authorize and regulate th.e 
construction, operation, and use of artificial islands regardless of their purposes. This 
means that third states are not allowed to build or operate such islands for military or any 
other purpose without the coastal state's consent. 
On the other hand, as far as installations and structures are concerned, Article 60 
(1) (b) (c) gives the coastal state exclusive jurisdiction and the right to construct and 
authorize and regulate the construction, operation, and use of such objects only if they are 
for resources, marine scientific research, environmental and other economic purposes, or 
which could interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal state in the EEZ.This 
provision represents a compromise between two different approaches which emerged at 
UNCLOS III. According to the first approach, all artificial islands, structures, and 
installation should fall under the jurisdiction of the coastal state; according to a second 
approach supported by the big maritime powers, it should only embrace artificial islands, 
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d · 11· h· h . 188 structures, an msta anons w IC serve economIC purposes . 
The latter provision means, at least in the interpretation of the maritime powers, 
that third states have the right to place, within the EEZ, installations and structures that do 
not have an economic purpose, except when they interfere in the exercise of the coastal 
state's rights in the EEZ. The distinction between artificial islands for any purposes on the 
one hand and structures and installations for limited purposes on the other hand is not 
clearl89, but since the LOS Convention does name these three categories of objects, they 
are presumed not to overlap 190. However, the coastal state's position appears to be 
strengthened by the fact that it can always claim that a foreign installation or structure 
interferes with the exercise of its right in the EEZ, an assertion that would be difficult to 
challenge. 
The .rights of the coastal state in respect of emplacement of such objects are 
subject to certain limitations. Thus, the coastal state must give due notice of their 
construction; provide warning of their presence; and. remove them when they are no longer 
used.191 These objects should not be constructed where they may .,Interfere with 
" . d 1 ·al·· 1 . . ,,192 recogmze sea anes essenn to mternanona navIganon . 
In sum, the rights enjoyed by the coastal state in respect of artificial islands, 
installations and structures in its EEZ are similar to the rights enjoyed by coastal states 
under Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf193 in respect of structures 
relating to the exploitation of the shelf resources. But the scope of the rights has been 
considerably broadened as they may be exercised for a broader range of purposes. 
B. The Coastal State Competence with Respect to Marine Research 
in the EEZ 
Prior to UNCLOS I, there were no established international provisions covering 
marine research. Therefore, ocean scientists enjoyed full freedom to conduct marine 
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rarely requested and when recquired was often given informallyl96. 
At UNCLOS I, new provisions related to the conduct of MSR beyond the 
territorial sea were adopted. Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas states that 
the high seas are open to all states and "no state may validly purport to subject any part of 
them to its sovereignty". It further states that this freedom includes, inter alia, freedom of 
navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom of 
overflight and others which are recognized by the general pinciples of international law. 
Some have argued that, since the freedom to conduct MSR on the high seas is not 
explicitely mentioned in this article, this activity was not regarded as a freedom of the high 
seasl97. In the author's opinion, however, this view does not seem to be correct for two 
reaons. First, the inclusion of the expressions "inter alia" and "others which are 
recognized by lbe general principles of international law" clearly Indicate thatthe list ofthe 
freedoms listed in Article 2 is not exhaustive; secondly, such a view has no support in the 
drafting history of this provision. In fact, the ILC had expressly stated, in its commentary 
on Article 27 of its Draft Articles concerning the law of the sea prepared in 1956, that the 
carrying out of MSR on the high seas is one of the freedoms of the high seas l98. Thus, 
under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, the right to conduct MSR, at least 
in the water column of the sea beyond the territorial sea, appears to be a freedom of the 
high seas not subject to prior consent. 
The relevant provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
are contained in Article 5. Article 5 (1) enjoins noninterference "with fundamental 
oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open 
publication", but stipulates in a subsequent paragraph that the "consent of the coastal state 
shall be obtained in respect of any research concerning the continental shelf and 
undertaken there". Nevertheless, the coastal state shall not normally withhold its consent if 
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the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research 
into the physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso 
that the coastal state shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be represented 
in the research, and that in any event the result shall be published. These provisions are 
somewhat vague. The lack of distinction between "pure scientific research" and 
exploration 199 provided the coastal state with a good basis for the denial of the right to 
undertake research. Thus, this Convention helped to establish the precedent for coastal 
state jurisdiction over research in an area outside the territorial sea and for the coastal 
state's right to place conditions on the research, such as coastal state participation and 
representation in the investigation and mandatory publication of results. 
The issue of the scope of coastal state authority over research in areas beyond the 
territorial sea was one of intense controversy in the Third Committee of UNCLOS III200. 
The consent regime evolved as a compromise solution between two major opposing 
interests, those of industrialized researching' states advocating the complete freedom to 
conduct research in all nonterritorial waters,' and those of developing states seeking 
protection against economic exploitation and threats to their national securitl01. Initial 
proposals submiltted for negotiation ranged from that of researching states, a requirement 
only to notify a coastal state in advance and comply with internationally agreed upon 
conditions202, to that of developing states, an absolute coastal state consent regime. 
An important innovation, submitted at the Second Substantive Session of 
UNCLOS III in 1975, proposed that research related to natural resource exploration and 
exploitation be subject to an absolute consent regime, while other (i.e. fundamental 
scientific) research be subject only to notification of the coastal state and certain other 
specified obligations203. Criticism by developing states of the proposed latitude 
afforded fundamental research204, eventually, led to the development of a regime in 
which consent is required for all research in the EEZ, but should be granted if specified 
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conditions are met. 
In accordance with Article 56 of the LOS Convention, the coastal state has 
"jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention" with regard to 
MSR. The relevant provisons are set out in Part XIII of the LOS Convention, especially 
Articles 246-254 . 
Article 246 (1) stipulates that the coastal state has the right to "regulate, authorize 
and conduct marine scientific research" in the EEZ. The same article further stipulates in 
paragraph 2 that "marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone ... shall be 
conducted with the consent of the coastal state." This means that any research without 
consent would violate the coastal state's jurisdiction.The coatal state is, however, put 
under an obligation to grant consent for all other marine scientific research activities in 
"normal circumstances,,20S. Yet the delineation of what specifically constitutes nonnal 
circmstances remains undefined, and is thereby left, essentially, to the discretion .of the 
coastalst(tte206. 
Given that nonnal circumstances exist, a coastal state may still withhold its 
consent under certain specific situations, one of which is if the project "is of direct 
significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources,,207, arguably true of 
much fundamental MSR208• The coastal state may also suspend or stop research activities 
if they are not being conducted according to agreement or a major change is effected after 
consent has been granted209. 
Coastal state consent need not necessarily be given expressly. It may be implied 
in two situations: (1) when the coastal state has not reacted within four months to the 
communication infonning it of the intention to conduct the research (i. e., the request for 
consent)21O, or (2) when the reesearch project is to be carried out by or under the auspices 
of an international organization of which the coastal state is a member and the research in 
question was approved by the coastal state when the decision was taken by the 
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organization to carry out the project, and the coastal state has not expressed any objection 
within a period of time of four months of notification of the project by the organization211 . 
Any state intending to carry out MSR in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of a 
coastal state must provide the latter state with certain, specified information at least six 
months before the expected starting date of the research work; this is to be regarded as the 
request for coastal state consent212. The researching state is required to comply with a 
number of specified conditions. The most important of these are giving the coastal state an 
opportunity to participate or to be represented in the research, providing it with the results 
of the research and with access to the data and samples collected, and assisting in 
assessing or interpreting the data, samples, and research results, and the remov~l of 
. tall· d· b I . 213 InS . atIons an, eqUlpements su sequent to comp etlon . 
Finally, any dispute related to the exercise' by the coastal state of its rights to 
withhold consent (or MSR or to order its suspension or cessation are exerilptedfrom.the 
, ' 
compulsory binding dispute settlement system214. However, these disputes remain subj~ct 
to the LOS Convention's compulsory conciliation procedures215. All other disputes 
concerning MSR are to be settled in accordance with the procedures entailing binding 
d .. 216 eClSlons . 
In sum, the LOS Convention's provisions concerning the conduct of MSR in the 
EEZ have extended the consent regime of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf to 
the water column above the shelf. This is clearly seen in the fact that these provisions 
establish the coastal state's consent as a prerequisite for foreign access to MSR in the EEZ. 
Though the coastal state has been placed under an obligation to give its consent to pure 
research to be conducted by third states in its EEZ in "normal circumstances", this 
obligation is imprecise and does not therefore constitute a tangible obligation upon the 
coastal state. Moreover, even if normal circumstances exist, access to MSR in the EEZ is 
made subject to certain conditions enumerated in Article 246 (5). The inclusion of 
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imprecise terms in these conditions gives a coastal state wide prerogatives to withhold its 
consent. Coas~al state prerogatives appear to be underlined by the fact that the decision to 
prohibit foreign scientific research in its EEZ is explicitly exempted from compulsory 
binding third-party dispute settlement under the terms of the LOS Convention217 . 
C. The Coastal State Competence with Regard to the Protection and 
Preservation of the EEZ Marine Environment 
From the start, the proponents of the EEZ concept suggested that the regime of 
the EEZ should include the competence of the coastal state to protect and preserve the EEZ 
marine environment.218 During the course of negotiations at UNCLOS III, the sponsors 
of the concept of the EEZ emphasized the close link that exists between resource 
jurisdiction and jurisdic.tion with regard to the protection of these resources from the 
harmful effects of marine pollution. The statement made on July 16, 1974, by the delegate 
of Canada in the Third Committee at the Caracas Session of UNCLOS ill emphasized this 
particular link. The Canadian delegate said that : 
"What had to be emphasized was that the economic zone was not simply a 
contiguous resource zone ... but involved the function and inter-relationship 
between resource jurisdiction and the prevention of pollution,,219. 
However, to what degree a state would be able to exercise this competence was a 
matter of great controvery at UNCLOS llI220. The maritime states had argued that any 
exercise of jurisdiction in this regard should be within internationally-agreed pollution 
controls, for if coastal states were allowed to impose their own rules as to shipping design 
and construction, freedom of navigation could be impeded. The compromise adopted by 
UNCLOS III is set out in Articles 56 (1) (b) (iii), 208, 210, 211, 214, 216, and 220 of 
the LOS Convention. 
In general terms, all states parties are obliged by the LOS Convention to "protect 
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and prevent the marine environment ,,221 and are to take all measures, consistent with the 
treaty, to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from whatever 
source 222 
Specifically, as to the EEZ, Article 56 (1) (b) (iii) states that in the EEZ the 
coastal state has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of the LOS 
Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The 
relevant provisions are contained in Articles 210 and 216 dealing with the dumping of 
wastes; Articles 208 and 214, on pollution from seabed activities; and Articles 211, 220 
and 234 on pollution from vessels. 
1. ~umpingin the EEZ 
The. term "dumping" refers to. any deliberate disposal of wastes from vessels, 
aircraft, platforms, as well to any.deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or 
other man -made structures at sea223. 
Article 210 (5) of the LOS Convention provides that dumping within the 
territorial sea or the EEZ, or onto the continental shelf, "shall not be carried out without 
the express prior approval of the coastal state". This provision has, thus, made it very 
clear that the freedom of states to dump is limited by informed consent requirements when 
states desire to dump into the EEZs of other nations224. 
Moreover, under the same paragraph, the coastal state is given the right to enact 
laws and regulations concerning dumping within its EEZ "after due consideration of the 
matter with other states which by reason of their geographical situation may be adversely 
affected thereby". This prescriptive competence is, however, not a discretionary one, for 
the coastal state is placed under a duty to legislate in accordance with the applicable 
international rules and standards established through competent international organizatoins 
or diplomatic conferences. 
117 
In so far as enforcement is concerned, Article 216 (1) (a) stipulates that the laws 
and regulations issued in accordance with the LOS Convention and applicable international 
rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of dumping shall be enforced 
"by the coastal state with regard to dumping within its ... exclusive economic zone". This 
means that enforcement of laws and regulation aiming at preventing and reducing dumping 
in the EEZ is the sole competence of the coastal state. This prerogative of the coastal state 
is new in international law . In this connection, Douay has correctly said: 
"Le domaine de I'imme.rsion marque .... une extension de la juridiction nationale en 
matiere de preservation du milieu marin aux fins d'assurer la protection des resources 
surlesquelles l'Etat cotier exerce des droits souverains,,225. 
2. Pollution from Seabed Activities 
The LOS Convention vests the relevant environmental powers and duties in those 
" . 
states that have jurisdiction" over the activity in question. In this connection, Article 208 
states that "coastal states shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with sea bed activities 
subject to their jurisdiction". Thus, within the zones placed under its jurisdiction, that is to 
say, its internal waters, its territorial waters, its EEZ and its continental shelf, the fight 
against pollution caused by activities relating to the sea bed falls within the competence of 
the coastal state. The competence assigned to the coastal state, in this regard, appears to be 
broadly similar to the powers that a coastal state has hitherto enjoyed under the continental 
shelf regime226. It includes both the enactment of laws and regulations and their 
enforcement227. As regards the former, the coastal state is entitled to establish national 
laws and regulations aiming at preventing, reducing, and controlling pollution from the 
seabed activities within national juridiction228. Such laws and regulations and measures" 
shall be no less effective than international rules, standards and recommended 
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practices,,229. This means that coastal states are left free to establish more effective and 
stringent laws and regulations than internationally agreed ones. 
Regarding enforcement, Article 214 provides that "states shall enforce their laws 
and regulations adopted in accordance with Article 208 and shall adopt laws and 
regulations and take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules 
and standards" for the protection of the marine environment from pollution arising from 
seabed activities under their jurisdiction. It follows that the coastal state is the only state 
enjoying the competence of enforcing norms aiming at preventing and reducing pollution 
from the seabed activities undertaken in the EEZ. 
3. Pollution from Vessels 
With respect to pollution from vessels230 in the EEZ, the approach of the LOS 
Convention is dissimilar to that adopted in respect of pollution by dumping and seabed 
activities. It recognizes the jurisdiction of the coastal stale concerning the marine 
environment in this case, but taking into account the interest of other states in 
navigation ,,231. It follows that the laws and regulations pertaining to pollution from 
vessels established for that zone must, according to Article 211 (5), conform and give 
effect to "generally accepted international rules and standards established through the 
. . I .. I d' I . C ,,232 Th' . competent mternatlOna orgamzatlon or genera Ip omatIc conlerence . IS IS 
particularly important for maritime states because a universal 200 miles economic zone 
would embrace some of the worlds most important shipping routes233. 
Exceptionally, where such international rules and standards are deemed 
inadequate to meet special circumstances in clearly defined areas of a state's EEZ 234, the 
. . I . . .. bl th IM0235 . bid competent mternatIona mantIme orgamsatIon, presuma y e , IS to e consu te 
and within 12 months, if that international organisation agrees, the coastal state may for 
that area: 
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"Adopt laws and regulations for the prevention reduction and control 
of pollution from vessels implementing such international rules and 
standards or navigational practices as are made applicable, through the 
organisation, for special areas,,236. 
Furthennore, the LOS Convention states further in Article 211 (6) (c) that: 
"If the coastal states intend to adopt additional laws and regulations 
for the same area for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
from vessels, they shall when submitting the aforesaid 
communication, at the same time notify the organization thereof. Such 
additional laws and regulations may relate to discharge or navigational 
practices but shall not require foreign vessels to observe des.ign, 
construction, manning or equipment standards other than gener;ally 
accepted international· rules and standards; They shall become 
applicable to foreign vessels 15 months after the submission of the 
communication to the organization, provided that the organization 
agrees within 12 months after the submission of the communication". 
These provisions empower a coastal state to enact additional rules for certain 
areas of the EEZ and for the prevention and reduction and control of pollution from ships. 
However, in exercisng this additional enactment competence, a coastal state is required to 
satisfy specific conditions that are, first of all, such competence can be exercised only 
when it is based on technical reasons linked to the oceanographic and ecological 
characteristics of the zone, to its utilization and to the particular nature of the character of 
the traffic, and all scientific and technical justifications should be provided by the coastal 
state itself; secondly, it is not the coastal state which detennines whether or not an area of 
the EEZ has particular circumstances, but this would be the decision of the competent 
international organization, which in fact means, in most cases, the IMO; and lastly, and 
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most importantly, the regulation thus issued by the coastal state cannot enter into force and 
be binding on other states until it has received the official consent of IMO. Moreover, such 
consent can be given only upon the expiry of 12 months after the submission of the 
communication to the organization. Three months later the regulation may be applied to 
foreign vessels. 
The purpose of the above precautions is, certainly, to avoid any unjustified 
interference with navigation in certain parts of the EEZ, and their effect is to subordonate 
the exercise of the competence to IMO monitoring of the motives and content of the 
national regulation. IMO will make sure that they are in conformity with the provisions it 
will itself have adopted in connection with areas that might be placed under special 
protection. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the ,coastal state has no discretion in this field, but 
. - , . ~ 
itscomptence is internationally controlled. 
With respect to enforcement of the relevant international rules and standards or,' 
the international legislative and regulatory, provisions adopted in conformity with them, 
jurisdiction is shared by the flag state, the port state, and the coastal state when violations 
are committed in the EEZ237. In this domain, authority is, generally, denied to the coastal 
238 E . al h' . h 'd d . .. Th fi state . xceptIon aut onty IS, owever, proVI e 10 two SItuatIons. ese are, Irst, 
enforcement action could be taken when the vessel accused of having committed in the 
EEZ a violation of the internal and international rules in force is voluntarily within a port 
or at an offshore terminal of the coastal state, which is therefore regarded in this case the 
port state239; secondly, action could be taken when there is manifest proof that, by reason 
of the violation committed by the foreign vessel in the EEZ, there have occured discharge 
causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related intersts of the 
coastal state or to the resources of the EEZ240. 
Furthermore, even in cases where a coastal state has a clear objective evidence 
121 
that a vessel navigating in its EEZ or its territorial sea has committed a violation of 
applicable rules for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from vessels, its 
enforcement action is limited in two ways. They are, first, the proceedings instituted 
against the offending vessel should be suspended upon the taking of proceedings to 
impose penalties in respect of corresponding charges by the flag state within six months of 
the date on which proceedings were first instituted241 ; secondly, only monetary penalties 
may be imposed upon foreign vessels for such violations242. 
In sum, the coastal state's competence regarding the marine environment has 
greatly increased as a consequence of the EEZ. The coastal state's competence for the 
protection and preservation of the marine -environment predominates in all matters related 
to the EEZ and continental shelf resources. But, while the coastal state has, in the EEZ, 
jurisdiction with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, and 
the jurisdiction in question may apply to foreign vessels navigating within its EEZ, it is -;-
not an exclusive but 'rather a shared jurisdiction. -
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Introduction 
CHAPTER THREE 
EEZ - THIRD STATES 
Under both customary law and the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea, the high seas started at the point of the termination of the territorial seal . The high 
seas were open to all states, and no state may validly subject any part of them to its 
sovereigntl. Moreover, according to Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, the 
freedom of the high seas comprises, inter alia, freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; 
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; freedom of overflight; and other freedoms 
that are recognized by the general principles of international law. 
The situation that exists now, as a consequence of the LOS Convention, is that· 
the .high seas stricto sensu begins only at the outer limit of .the EEZ3. This new concept 
has given coastal states sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing all natural resources found in the water column, seabed and its 
subsoil up to 200 miles from the baselines 4. It has also granted coastal states jurisdictional 
rights as provided in the LOS Convention with regard to the establishement and use of 
artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and the protection 
of the marine environmentS. On the other hand, third states have also certain rights in the 
EEZ. These rights are of two categories, rights related to non-economic uses, and rights 
related to access to the EEZ living resources. As far as the former category is concerned, 
Article 58 (1) states that in the EEZ all states "enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of 
this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87, [the article setting forth high seas 
freedoms], of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines and other internationally uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those 
associated with operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and 
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cQmpatible with the Qther provisiQns" Qf the LOS CQnventiQn. The issue that arises here is 
that are the freedQms accorded to. third states, in the EEZ, Qf the same sCQpe as the 
traditiQnal high seas freedoms? This question is discussed in section I. 
Regarding the second category of rights, two specific provisions Qf Article 62 
cQncern which states will be granted access to. the EEZ fisheries. Paragraph 2 provides for 
the basic cQastal state QbligatiQn, such as it is, to. grant access, and alSo. singles Qut LL and 
GDSs fQr "Particular regard". Paragraph 3 requires the cQastal state to "take into aCCQunt 
all relevant factors" and then emphasizes four different categories Qf states: first, the 
cQastal state; secQndly, LL6 and GDSs7; thirdly, develQping states in the region Qr 
subregiQn; <and lastly, states which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification Qf fish stocks. In the the author's opinion, these provisiQns on access are nQt 
clearS. Their vagueness is partly due to the fact that the LOS CQnvention does nQt s.tate 
whether QrnQt the relevant fadors referred to. in paragraph 3 are to be taken intQacc.Ount in 
. . 
the Qrder in which they are listed. Section II examines the LOS Convention prQvisions in 
relation to. the latter three categories of states. The rights of each category of states will be 
cQnsidered in the CQntext of CQastal states authority over EEZ access. 
Section I The Rights of Third States Related to Non - Economic Uses of 
The EEZ 
As has already been noted, under both customary law and the Law of the Sea 
CQnventiQns adopted in 1958, in the high seas freedQms Qf navigatiQn, fishing, 
overflight, the laying Qf submarine cables and pipelines and other freedQms recQgnized by 
the general principles of international law were available to ships and planes Qf all states. 
These freedQms were subject only to the criteria of "reasQnable use" and consideration for 
the legitimate rights of Qthers9. 
The need to safeguard the right of free communication within practicable limits 
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was a constant theme during the evolutionary stages of the concept of the EEZ. Specific 
reference to the preservation of the freedom of navigation within the asserted zones was 
made in the pre-UNCLOS III Latin American and African StateS extensive claims over 
large areas of the high seatO. Moreover, later during the debates at UNCLOS III, 
especially at the 1974 Caracas Session, the need to preserve the freedoms of navigation, 
overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipeline in the EEZ was repeatedly 
emphasized. In this connection, at that Session, the Chilean delegate said : 
"The economic zone could be defined legally as a 
jurisdictional zone over which the coastal state exercised 
sovereign rights of a primary economic nature, without 
prejudice to .the freedoms of navigation and overflight, up to 
200 miles"l1. 
Asa result, all the negotiating text~ of UNCLOS III contained a provision 
preserving ·the.se freedoms in the EEZ, and eventually they h.ave be~n enshrined in 
Article 58. (1), together with other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms and compatible with the other privisions of the LOS Convention. Accordingly, 
the non-economic rights pertaining to third states, in the EEZ, could be classified under 
two categories : first, freedoms of navigation, overflight and of laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines; secondly, other internationally uses of the sea related to the rights 
included in the first category. For the sake of analysis, the two categories are treated 
separately. 
A. Freedoms of Navigation, Overflight and of the Laying of Submarine 
Cables and Pipelines 
All these freedoms are essentially concerned with international communications. 
However, each freedom has its own peculiarities and thus are discussed hereunder in turn. 
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1. Freedom of Navigation 
In the Behring Sea Fur Seal Arbitration (Great Britain v. United States), 1893, 
Britain defined the freedom of navigation as "the right to come and go on the high seas 
without let or hindrance" 12. In the same line, Gidel observed that: 
"L'idee essentiellement contenue dans Ie principe de liberte de la haute mer est 
I'idee d'interdiction d'interference de tout pavilion dans la navigation en temps 
de paix de tout autre pavillon,,13. 
Thus, one of the basic freedoms emanating from the general principle of the 
freedom of the high seas is that ships of all states, including warshipsl4, enjoy the right to 
navigate freely on the high seas. This freedom entails as a general rule that each subject of 
intemationallaw exercise, in time of peace, exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas over all 
ships that are entitled t~ fly its own flag, but not.over others l5:Freedorn of navigation has 
not, however, been regarded as absolute in scope. In this connection, in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Ca~e (United Kingdom v. Iceland), the ICJ noted that in the exercise of the. 
freedoms of the high seas all states must have "reasonable regard to the interests of other 
states" 16. Other restraints on the exercise of freedom of navigation, both of customary and 
conventional nature, are also in existence. Amongst others, the prohibition of states from 
allowing ships flying their flag to engage in piracy or transportation of slaves; hot pursuit; 
right of approach of warships; and fisheries conservation 17. The LOS Convention adds to 
the list of prohibited activities in the high seas, unauthorized broadcasting and engaging in 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances contrary to international 
. 18 
conventIons . 
Now and as a direct consequence of UNCOS III negotiations, specific functional 
rights have been accorded to coastal states in the EEZ which extends seaward to 188 miles 
from the outer limit of the territorial sea, and which was traditionally regarded as part of 
the high seas. On the other hand, third states, irrespective of their geographical location, 
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enjoy the freedom of navigation referred to in Article 87 which sets forth the freedoms of 
the high seas. But the exercise of navigation is made subject to the relevant provisions of 
the LOS Convention. Certain observers have questioned whether navigation in the EEZ is 
sufficiently protected against coastal state encroachment. In this connection Congressman 
John Breaux, for instance, has said that the LOS Convention fails "to offer clear 
protection for navigation rights in the new 200 miles exclusive economic zone,,19. 
In the present author's opinion, this view appears to be not sufficiently founded. 
In fact, the basic provisions of the LOS Convention and the specific regime of the EEZ 
show a constant concern for duly safeguarding the freedoom of navigation in the EEZ. 
'This is perfectly natural since, as already explained, it is the most traditional of the 
freedoms of the sea and forms an integral part of the rules of customary and conventional 
. . al'l . 'th 1 f h 20 mternatlon ' , aw governmg. eaw 0 t e sea . 
Precisely, Article 58 (1) of the LOS Conv~ntion provides th~lt in the EEZ all 
states enjoy "the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines". This cross-reference to Article 87, which lIsts 
the major freedoms of the high seas, has made it abundantly clear that the freedom of 
navigation accorded to third states in the EEZ is identical to that enjoyed in the high seas. 
In this context, Bernard Oxman a member of the U.S delegation to the UNCLOS III, 
explaining the existence of such identity, has correctly observed: 
"As to the qualitative nature of the 'freedom' of navigation, overflight, and laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines, the adjectival clause "referred to in article 87" 
inserted after "freedoms"establishes the qualitative identity of these freedoms 
with those beyond the economic zone, as Article 87 is the basic Article 
enumerating high seas freedoms ... ,,21. 
Moreover, in the context of UNCLOS III, the generalized opinion has reaffirmed 
this basic freedom22, which has not been the subject of disagreement save in some isolated 
situations. 
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However, the application of the regime of freedom of navigation to the EEZ 
proved to be a difficult task, not because the territorialization of the EEZ was intended, but 
because this regime had to be harmonized with the interests recognized therein for coastal 
states. 
As Professor Riphagen has rightly observed, "la conclusion semble s'imposer 
qu'en matiere de navigation lata sensu Ie nouveau droit de la mer ne s'ecarte pas pour 
l'essentiel des principes de l'ancien,,23. What has occured in the EEZ, as has been further 
explained, is the substitution of the traditional dichotomy between the regime of the high 
seas and the regime of the territorial sea by a new dichotomy of a functional nature that 
entails the interest in navigation and the interest in the exploitation of natural resources24. 
This new functionality explains the limitations which the freedom of navigation may face 
in the EEZ25. 
It is interesting to recall that the freedom of navigation accorded to third states in 
the EEZ is subject to the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention26. Some of these 
relevant povisions are contained in Part V on the EEZ, while certain others are scattered in 
several other parts of the LOS Convention. In several cases, these relevant provisions 
place certain limitations on the exercise of freedom of navigation within the EEZ. The fIrst 
explicit limitation is the general principle of due regard27 to the interests of other states in 
the exercise of the high seas freedoms, as stipulated by Article 87 (2), which is cross 
referenced in Article 58 (3). "Other" states must also include the coastal state to whose 
rights in the EEZ other states must in any case have due regard under Article 58 (3)28. 
Secondly, freedom of navigation in the EEZ is subject to Articles 88 to 115 of the LOS 
Convention dealing with navigation on the high seas "in so far as they are not 
incompatible" with the provisions contained in the EEZ Part29. This means that other 
limitations on absolute freedom of navigation on the high seas, such as the nationality of 
h· 30 h h'b' . f f I 31. 32 d h . h f h . 33 S lp ,t e pro I IHon 0 transport 0 saves ,pIracy ,an t e ng toot pursmt are 
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applicable in the EEZ as they are universally reco.gnized34. 
Mo.re impo.rtant is that Article 60 (4) pro.vides that: 
"The coastal state may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones 
around artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take 
appropriate measures to ensure the safety of navigation and of the artificial 
islands, installations and structures". 
This provisio.n, like that co.ntained in Article 5 (2) o.f the 1958 Co.nventio.n o.n the 
Co.ntinental Shelf, explicitly empo.wers the co.astal state to. regulate navigatio.n o.f third 
states in so.me parts o.f its EEZ35. The absence o.f specific guidelines as to. the co.ntent o.f 
the words "appropriate measures" gives a co.astal state a wide discretio.n with respect to. the 
measures to. be taken in the established safety zo.nes. 
Ho.wever, Article 60 (7) prohibits the establishment o.f ~afety zo.nes "where 
interference may be caused to. the use.o.f reco.gnized sea lanes essential to. internatio.nal 
.' . 
navigatio.n". Mo.reo.ver, paragraph 5 o.f the same article stipulates that the size o.r the safety 
zo.nes sho.uld be limited to. 500 metres aro.und the established islands, installatio.ns and 
structures, save when autho.rized by generally accepted internatio.nal standards o.r 
reco.mmended by the co.mpetent internatio.nal o.rganizatio.n. These provisio.ns have been 
taken almo.st verbatim fro.m Article 5 (3) o.f the Co.nventio.n o.n the Co.ntinental Shelf. They 
co.ntain impo.rtant limitatio.ns o.n the siting o.f safety zo.nes as well as o.n their size and, 
co.nsequently, o.n the sphere o.f the co.astal state's unilataral regulato.ry co.mpetence 
explained abo.ve. With these limitatio.ns o.n the discretio.n o.f the co.astal state, it seems that 
it is unlikely that the siting o.f artificial islands and installatio.n o.r rules go.verning 
navigatio.n in the surro.unding safety zo.nes Wo.uld have any appreciable impact o.n the 
freedo.m o.f navigatio.n in the EEZ. No.netheless, with the reco.gnitio.n to. the co.astal state o.f 
exclusive right to. co.nstruct artificial islands and installatio.ns and structures fo.r the purpo.se 
o.f the eco.no.mic uses o.f the EEZ, it is no.t Po.ssible to. say co.nclusively that the exercise o.f 
navigatio.n in the EEZ will no.t be limited at all. This is because, altho.ugh such o.bjects may 
no.t be established where interference may be caused to. the use o.f reco.gnized sea lanes 
149 
essential to international navigation, they could be strategically placed in a way that allows 
the coastal state to monitor foreign submarines and thus limit the use of the EEZ by the 
. f h' d 36 navIes 0 t If states . 
The second provision in the EEZ Part of the LOS Convention which grants 
coastal states certain powers which would adversly affect the freedom of navigation in the 
EEZ is Article 73 (i) dealing with the enforcement powers of the coastal state concerning 
fishing in the EEZ3 7. This provision provides : 
"The coastal state may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take 
such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, 
as may be neces'sary to ensure compliance with the laws ~nd regulations 
adopted by it in conformity with the Convention". 
The,coastal state competence to adopt enforc~ment measures affecting navigation 
by foreign vessels in the EE~ is a very controversial issue. One vi~w hasgive:'n it a' 
natrow:interpretation38; In a commentary offering detailed examination of the:proble~ of 
" 
accommodation of coas.tal state resources tights' with rights of third states in the EEZ; . 
Professor Bernard Oxman, one adherent to this view, has observed that : 
"The sovereign rights of the coastal state with respect to fishing do not deprive a 
fishing vessel of freedom of navigation. Absent specific evidence, it would be 
manifestly unjustifiable to stop and board a freighter or oil tanker navigating 
through the zone to ensure that it is not fishing, but it would also be manifestly 
imprudent to expect the coastal state to refrain from inquiry regarding a large 
fishing fleet moving slowly with gear in readiness and with no apparent 
destination through a rich fishing ground far from any known navigation 
route,,39. 
This statement restricts the coastal states regulatory and enforcement competences 
over foreign vessels passing through the EEZ to very narrow limits. It seems that it 
suggests that the coastal state would only be allowed to board and inspect vessels which 
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are actually engaged in fishing4o. Other measures would be prohibited even if reasonable 
in regard to coastal and flag state interests. 
A very different view of the balance in the LOS Convention is that the right of 
freedom of navigation is subject to the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention and 
that, therefore, this right is subordinate to the coastal competences in the EEZ. Under this 
broad view, any foreign vessel passing through the EEZ could be subject to being stopped 
and inspected to ensure that it was not violating the coastal state's laws and regulations 
adopted in accordance with the LOS Convention 41. 
However, in the author's opinion, some middle ground appears to be the correct 
position. The circumstances of the presence of a foreign vessel in the EEZ should 
detennine.the reasonableness of the coastal state's enforcement action. Thus, if the vessel 
involved is a freighter or oil tanker, the fact that it follows its rou.te slowly does not entitle 
the coastal state to take any enforcement action against it. Moreover, the mere fact that 
crewmen may have streamed a few fishing lines astern would not warrant boarding and 
inspecting. On the other hand, if the foreign unit involved is a fleet of fishing trawlers not 
adhering to recognized sea lanes while in transit, or is accompanied by a factory ship, it 
does not seem unreasonable that a coastal state would take enforcement measures to ensure 
that vessels appearing to be merely passing through the EEZ are not actually fishing in it. 
Furthermore, the coastal state is empowered under certain provisions of Part XII 
of the LOS Convention 42 to take certain measures with respect to vessels navigating in its 
EEZ, to enforce environmental laws on vessel-source pollution that conform to generally 
accepted international rules and standards, and for enforcing its own regulations on 
dumping of wastes. This competence of the coastal state, of course, constitutes a further 
limitation43. But, as has been observed by one author, this limitation does not affect the 
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"rights" specified in Article 58, but only the "manner" in which those rights are to be 
. ed44 exerClS . 
2. Freedom of Overflight 
Under both customary and conventional international law, the coastal state's 
sovereignty extends to its territorial sea and the airspace above it45. While alien vessels, 
with the exception of warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea 46, 
such a right is denied to foreign aircraft through the airspace above it47. 
In the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone48, the sole 
article on the contiguous zone, which is Article 24, refers to control ,by the coastal state "in 
a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea" for defined purposes only. By 
virtue of this article, a coast~l state may, int wishes to do ~o,exercise certain preventive 
and punitive powers in relation to custom, fiscal, immigration or sanitary matters49. 
Moreover, Article 1 of the Convention 0n the High Seas50 defines the 'high seas' as "aU 
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
state". It follows that the rights of the coastal state in such a zone do not amount to 
sovereignty, and thus other states have therein the rights exercisable in the high seas 
including the right of overflight. 
Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1, the coastal state 
, 
has also sovereign rights over the shelf, but only for the exploration and exploitation of 
the natural resources of the continental shelf2. The Convention expressly states that the 
rights of the coastal state do not affect the status of the superjacent waters as high seas or 
that of the airspace above the waters53. Finally, in exclusive fishing zones, generally 
recognized more recently, the coastal state enjoys exclusive rights in relation to all fishery 
matters54. It must be emphasized, however, that in all the above-mentioned zones, the 
residual status remains that of the high seas and the rights of the coastal state, being 
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simply limitations upon the predominant principle of the freedom of the high seas, must be 
restrictively interpreted in case of conflict with rights underlying the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas55. Thus, like the freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight 
beyond the territorial sea remained available to all states, subject of course to the criteria of 
"reasonable use" and consideration for the legitimate rights of other states in those sea 
areas. 
What does the LOS Convention state in relation to overflight over the EEZ? 
Article 58 (1) provides that all states enjoy within the EEZ the freedoms referred to in 
Article 87 of navigation and overflight. The cross-reference to Article 87 of the LOS 
. Convention, which lists the major freedoms of the high seas, is important. It makes it 
evident that the freedom of overflight accorded to the generality of states above the EEZ is 
qualitatively the same as that enjoyed over the high seas56. However; this is not the end of 
the story. In fact, the same paragraph adds that the enjoyment of freedom of overflight in 
. the EEZ is subject to the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention. Moreover, 
paragraph 3 of the same article provides that, "in exercising their rights and performing 
their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, states shall have due 
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and 
regulations adopted by the coastal State". This means that this freedom is not unlimited, 
for its exercise is to be compatible with the provisions of the LOS Convention. 
This freedom, like the freedom of navigation in the EEZ, is subject to two 
explicit limitations, namely due regard for other states and Articles 88-115 of the LOS 
Convention dealing with navigation on the high seas and other rules of international law 
compatible with the EEZ provisions5 7. In addition, the freedom of overflight in the EEZ is 
implicitly subject to two further possible limitations. First, the EEZ regime, for instance, 
grants a coastal state sovereign rights with regard to activities for the exploration and 
exploitation of the zone, such as the production of energy from, inter alia, winds. This 
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could involve the presence of wind-energy exploitation devices at heights nonnally used 
by aircraft, which would prevent low flying in the vicinity of such devices58. Secondly, 
aircraft are subject to the coastal state's competence to regulate the dumping of waste59. 
3. Freedom of Laying Submarine Cables and Pipelines 
The general principle of freedom to lay cables and pipelines under the ocean has 
long been accepted in international law without any question60. This right, enjoyed by all 
states, remained protected under the law of the continental shelf contained in the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf 1. 
The LOS Convention has, in fact, confinned the old position. Article 58 ensures 
this freedom in the same tenns as the freedoms of navigation and overflight, that is by 
means of cross-reference to Article 87, with the requirement that its enjoyment is subject 
.~; . 
to the explicit limitations of due consideration for the interests of other states and Articles 
88-115 of the LOS Convention. While many of these Articles do not apply to cables and 
pipelines, Articles 112-15 are specifically concerned with them62.These are designed to 
prevent injury to cables and pipelines, and to compensate ships for sacrificing gear for this 
purpose. The 1958 High Seas Convention contains similar povisions63. 
Moreover, there exists a further limitation included in Article 79. Despite the fact 
that this latter article is found in Part VI on the continental shelf, it also applies to the 
EEZ, since the seabed of the EEZ is cotenninous with the continental shelf4. Unlike the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,65 Article 79 (3) provides that "the delineation 
of the course for the laying of such pipelines" is subject to the consent of the coastal state. 
An interesting problem arises in this respect. Article 58 (1) recognizes that all states are to 
enjoy the freedom of laying of pipelines within the EEZ. Thus, one may argue that the 
coastal state's consent is only required with regard to the shelf that lies beyond the EEZ. 
On the other hand, the same Article does provide that the enjoyment of the said freedom is 
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"subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention". It seems therefore reasonable to 
apply the consent requirement contained in Article 79 (3) even within the EEZ66. 
Furthermore, Article 79 (4) gives the coastal state the power to set conditions for 
cables and pipelines which enter its territorial sea, and enables it to exercise its jurisdiction 
over cables and pipelines that are constructed or which are used in connection with the 
exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its natural resources. This appears to 
be logical since a coastal state enjoys under both customary and conventional international 
law sovereignty over its territorial sea and sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting the shelfs resources •. But, to what extent the provision enshrined in 
Article 79 (3) is compatible with a freedom to lay pipelines may be questioned. In fact, as 
.. Churc}1i1l has correctly, observed,· the use of the, "term freedom here is perhaps 
• 1· di ,,67 
mlS ea· ng ., .. 
B. Other International Uses of the Sea Related to ~avigation, Overflight, 
and the Laying of Cables .and Pipelines 
Article 58 (1) provides also that the rights of third states in the EEZ extends to 
"other internationally lawful uses of the sea "related to the freedoms of movement and 
communication that have already been discussed, "such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the 
other provisions" of the LOS Convention. This formulation first appeared in Article 46 
(1) of the RSNT68. Its textual predecessor, though with some minor modification, was 
Article 2 (2) of the Convention on the High Seas69. The latter states that the freedoms of 
navigation, fishing, overflight and the laying of cables and pipelines referred to in 
paragraph 1 of Article 2 "and others which are recognized by the general principles of 
international law , shall be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the interests of 
other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas". The inclusion of such a 
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provision in the Convention on the High Seas was designed to emphasize two points. The 
fIrst one is that the listing of the freedoms in paragraph 1 is not exhaustive 70, and the 
second point is that military uses are accepted in the regime of freedoms of the high 
71 
seas. 
What seems certain is that the insertion in Article 58 (1) of the LOS Convention 
of the fonnulation "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related" to the basic 
freedoms was designed to make it clear that, while coastal states are entitled to any 
unspecifIed residual rights in connection with resource exploitation, third states can 
exercise in the EEZ any unspecified rights associated with the basic freedoms specifIed72. 
Nevertheless, the words employed in this fonnulation for the purpose of expressing the 
scope of the saYd uses are vague, open to different interpretations, and lacking the required 
precision, as had been pointed out by the delegat~ of Peru73~ No convincing explanation 
was given to elucidate the significance 9f such uses; on the contrary, their precise meaning 
and scope was questioned both in the Consultative Group and in Infonnal Negotiating 
Group No. 174. This ambiguity has led certain promoters of the coastal state's jurisdiction 
to claim that certain foreign military activities in their respective EEZs could not be 
regarded as related to the freedoms of navigation, overflight and the laying of cables and 
pipelines; and could not also be accommodated under Article 58 of the LOS Convention as 
internationally "lawful uses of the sea", and / or compatible with Article 88 of the LOS 
Convention on the reservation of the high seas for the peacefull purposes. On this narrow 
interpretation, only routine navigation and operations in a strictly technical sense come 
within the scope of this article; military maneuvers, especially those involving the testing 
of weapons and explosives, cannot be regarded as associated with the operation of ships 
d · af75 an arrcr t . 
At the Seventh Session ofUNCLOS III meeting at Geneva 197876, both Brazil 
and Peru still tried to assert this restrictive view in an unsuccessful attempt to reconsider 
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the whole issue, by adding a provision which prohibits foreign warships and military 
aircraft passing through the EEZ from engaging in any military activity in their 200 miles 
EEZs without prior consent77. Certain other developing coastal states, e.g. Cape Verde 
and Uruguay, insisted in their Declarations upon signing the LOS Convention that the 
provisions of the Convention do not allow third states to carry out in the EEZ military 
activities that might affect the rights and interests of the coastal state without the consent of 
that state 78. This position seems to imply that, with the exception of the routine navigation 
activities of warships and military aircraft, any other military activity falls within residual 
rights vested in the coastal state79. 
On the other hand, reference to internationally lawful uses of the sea associated 
with operation of ships, aircraft and submarine .cables and pipelines has been l;lnderstood 
by some others, especially the large maritime powers,' as implying that third states, 
navigational rights extend to the military uses of the EEZ, including the conduct of military 
maneuvers and weapons exercises subject only to the obligation to have due regard to the 
rights of other states exercising their freedom of the high seas80. 
In the author's opinion, it seems very certain that the military use of the EEZ and 
the air above it is authorized under the LOS Convention as a result of the inclusion of a 
general reference to freedoms of navigation and overflight in Article 58 paragraph 1 and 
the insertion of the phrase "and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms". Nevertheless, it seems excessive to give these words a very broad 
interpretation. This is because, first, the military use of the EEZ has been subjected to the 
condition of compatibility with the other relevant provisions of the LOS Convention, 
including, of course, those relating to the interests of the coastal state with respect to living 
resources
81
. Secondly, under Article 58 (1), a genuine link must exist between 
internationally lawful uses of the sea and freedoms in respect of which the said uses are 
associated with82. It follows, that while anchoring, patrolling, emplacement of some 
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devices to ease navigation for submarines and other warships, and operational activities 
needed for the laying of cables and pipelines appear to be related to the specified 
freedoms83, and pose no incompatibility problems, it is not the case with regard to certain 
other military uses. For instance, emplacement of weapons, such as mines, in the EEZ has 
nothing in common with the freedom of the seas, and conflicts with the interests of the 
coastal state and would justify their removal or destruction by the coastal state in the 
exercise of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter84. Similarly, 
military maneuvers involving explosives and weapons testing have no geniune link with 
the freedoms specified in Article 58 (1) and disregard the coastal state's rights over the 
EEZ's living resources. Yet in a situation of high political tension, naval exercises 
involving gunnery and launching of missiles in the'waters of another country's EEZ may 
. be regarded as provocative and intimidating vis a vis that coastal state. The borderline is 
rather murky, but under the circumstances such exereisescould qualify as illegal threat of 
force proscribed by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, as well as Article 301 of the LOS 
Convention. In addition, a coastal state might also claim that certain devices emplaced by a 
third state, for instance, antisubmarine tracking systems, are not associated with the 
operation of ships and consequently not available to third states in its EEZ. 
The conclusion that may be drawn from the above analysis on third state's 
attributed rights in the EEZ is that the freedoms accorded to these states are qualitatively 
the same as the high seas freedoms. They are qualitatively the same in the sense that the 
nature of the rights are the same as the traditional high seas freedoms. Nevertheless, they 
do not represent an extension of the regime of the high seas per se, but originate from the 
sui generis regime of the EEZ and, as such, are subject to its limitations and modalities. 
Quantitatively speaking, these freedoms are less inclusive than traditional high 
seas freedoms, evidently because, under Article 58 of the LOS Convention, the uses have 
been limited to those having a geniune link with the freedoms of navigation, overflight and 
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the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. 
c. Non Attributed (Residual) Rights 
Regarding the exercise of rights in the EEZ, all the most obvious economic rights 
have been attributed in the LOS Convention85. Rights appertaining to scientific research 
are expressly dealt with86. All drilling into the seabed requires the coastal state's 
consent87• Moreover, all the most obvious communication rights have been attributed to 
third states88• For the latter, the freedoms of navigation and overflight are the most 
important. 
Thus, unlike the previous functional regimes that affected the high seas, this 
system produces a situation in which ~ big uncertainty still exists as to which state could 
re.tain the possible uses which do not fall within the rights of either the coastal st~te or third 
states. In case of s.uch residual rights, including rights to unforseen uses of the ocean 
brought about by advances in technology, the provision of Article 59 of the LOS 
Convention is to apply. It says that: 
"In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to 
the coastal state or to other states within the EEZ, and a conflict arises 
between the interests of the coastal state and any other state or states, the 
conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the 
relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the 
interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a 
whole". 
This provision finds its origin in a proposal made by Ambassador Castaneda of 
Mexico at the Second Substantive Session of UNCLOS III, Geneva 197589. It was later 
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Justice, under which the Court may in its decision go beyond the rules of international law 
if the parties agree97. As far as the procedures for the resolution of the conflicts are 
concerned, the guidelines of Article 59 seem to imply that the parties must first make an 
attempt at a diplomatic settlement by negotiating in good faith or using other peaceful 
means of their choice according to the general provisions of the LOS Convention 
governing the settlement of disputes98• If the methods chosen by the parties prove to be 
of no avail, the dispute must be submitted at the request of any party to one of the judicial 
bodies listed in Article 28799 of the LOS Convention, unless the dispute relates to military 
activities and one of the parties has, upon signing, ratifying, or acceding to the LOS 
Convention or at any time thereafter,' made a written declaration exempting itself from 
settling such disputes by compulsory third-party procedures100 . To the author's 
knowledge, no such declarations have been made. 
Section II : The Rights of Third States Related to Access to the EEZ Living 
Resources 
The LOS Convention provides that coastal state's jurisdiction over the resources 
of the EEZ includes certain duties to manage the living resources and to provide access to 
foreign fishermen. As far as access is concerned, Article 62 (2) states that, if the coastal 
state's capacity does not permit it to harvest the entire allowable catch, it "shall" give third 
states access to the surplus. The word "shall" implies that an obligation is cast on the 
coastal state to give access to the surplus. The first question that will be considered relates 
to the scope of the coastal state's obligation to provide access to the surplus. 
Furthermore, a foreign state's status as a LL or DGSs is given special 
recognition101. The LOS Convention describes the conditions for LL and GDS to get a 
share of the EEZ fishery both when there is a surplus and when there is none. But it has 
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left a number of issues unresolved. The most important issue is whether these states have 
any priority in sharing the surplus of the fishery of the coastal state in its EEZ. This is the 
second question that will be discussed hereunder. 
A. Access of Third States to the Surplus Resources of the EEZ 
in General 
Under Article 62 (2), if a coastal state declares a surplus after taking its share, it 
"shall" enter into agreements or other arrangements to give other states access to this 
surplus. The use of the word "shall" means that the coastal state is put under an obligation 
to give access to the surplus of the allowable catch. However, whether or not paragraph 2 
of Article 62 casts an actual obligation on the coastal state to provide access for third states 
to the surplus must be evaluated in the light of several considerations. First, the provision 
in question speaks of the surplus to the harvesting capacity of the coastal state as 
detennined by the same state and not the surplus. to the actual harvesting capacity of the 
coastal state as detennined by reference to objective criterion. Thus, to deny the existence 
of any surplus and consequently access of third states, a coastal state can simply equate its 
harvesting capacity with the allowable catch that is capable of being set at levels that suit 
best its economic interests. Secondly, third state's access to the surplus is made 
conditional upon an "agreement or other arrangements", the tenns of which may not be 
satisfactory or acceptable to third states desiring access to the surplus. The phrase" shall 
through agreement or other arrangement" seems to suggest that an obligation to enter into 
" . h h ki hi' th tal 102 negotIatIons WIt ot er states see ng access to t e surp us IS put upon e co as state . 
The obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach agreement. Nonetheless, 
a coastal state remains obliged under general international law and the provisions of the 
LOS Convention to conduct the negotiations in good faith. In this connection, in its 
Advisory Opinion in the Railway Traffic (Lithuania v. Poland) Case103, the PCIJ 
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observed that the obligation was "not only to enter into negotiations but also to pursue 
them as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements,,104. Thus, it would be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the LOS Convention for a coastal state to impose terms 
and conditions in order to deny access or make access impractical for foreigners once it 
has declared that a surplus exists. Such action will be contrary to the provision of Article 
300 which states that states parties to the LOS Convention undertake to discharge in good 
faith the obligation entered into in conformity with the Convention and to exercise their 
rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in the Convention ina manner that would not 
constitute an abuse of rights. This is to say that the nonexhaustive list of the various 
regulatory powers contained in Article 62 (4), such as payment of fees, fixing of quotas, 
regulation of fishing ,seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount of gear, 
and the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels, etc., should be read in the light of the 
provision enshrined in Article 300 of the LOS Convention and so .should the reql,lirement 
to give access of Article 62 (2) in order to be meaningful in 'both practical and formal 
senses. 
Finally, in the event of disputes concerning the coastal state's sovereign rights 
with respect to the living resources in the EEZ or to the exercise of those rights, such 
disputes may be resolved through various peaceful means, such as negotiations, or 
recourse to any procedure agreed upon by the parties concerned. A coastal state, however, 
is not obliged under Article 297 of the LOS Convention to submit to compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures on an issue arising out of the exercise of its sovereign rights to 
fisheries 105. This includes the coastal state's discretionary powers to determine the 
allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, and its allocation of the surplus to third states in 
accordance with the provisions of the LOS Convention. Thus, a coastal state's refusal to 
set an allowable catch or harvesting capacity, which would result in the allocation of its 
surplus, cannot be challenged. Only if the decision is "arbitrary" can it be pursued through 
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compulsory "conciliation". The Conciliation Commission, however, cannot substitute its 
discretion for that of the coastal state106. Moreover, the report of the commision, including 
. I· d da· b· di h . 107 Its conc USIons an recommen tIOns, are not 10 ng on t e partIes . 
In sum, the coastal state has been empowered under the terms of the LOS 
Convention to decide the total allowable catch of the living resources in its EEZ as well as 
its harvesting capacity. Much flexibility is provided to it in setting the two levels. 
Furthermore, the dispute settlement system established by the LOS Convention precludes 
effective review of the coastal state's decisions on these questions. It follows that the 
obligation to accommodate foreign states is not overwhelming. In fact, the LOS 
Convention gives the coastal state great latitude of discretionary power to decide whether 
Ot not to allow foreign states fishing in its EEZ .. 
B. LL and GDSs Access to the Living Resources of Other State's EEZ's 
Article 62 (2) states that, in giving access for third states to the EEZ resources, 
the coastal state shall have particular regard to the provisions of Article 69 and 70 which 
deal with the rights and duties of LL and GDSs respectively. Some of the constraints on 
coastal state's authority to allocate their surplus are listed in the latter articles. The author 
will attempt, hereunder, to clarify the meaning of the terms "Land-Locked" and 
"Geographically Disadvantaged" states, then proceed to identify the constraints enshrined 
in Article 69 and 70 on coastal state's authority to allocate its surplus. 
1. The Origin and Meaning of the Terms "Land-Locked" and 
"Geographically Disadvantaged" States 
1. 1. The Term "Land-Locked" State 
This term is not an innovation of UNCLOS III. In fact, its use and the 
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determination of its meaning in the domain of public international law had preceded the 
convening of UNCLOS n1108. The United Nations Convention on Transit Trade of Land 
Locked States109, for instance, used this term eight years before the start of UNCLOS 
In. It refers to "any ... state which has no sea coast"llO. This definition has, in fact, been 
borrowed from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas111 . The LOS Convention 
has adopted the same definitionl12. 
The geographical factor is, thus, taken as the determining agent as to whether or 
not a state is land-locked. Any state located on the sea is a coastal state excluded from the 
definition and this is so regardless of whether such a state exhibits some of the 
characteristics of a truly LLS being on a sea coast useless for international trade, or having 
. . 
very short corridors out to the seal13. On the other hand, a LLS exhibiting certain 
characteristics of coastal states by being positioned on international navigable riversl14, 
and consequently having access.to the sea through them or via any one of them, remains 
included in the definition of LLS s. 
Until 1990, the number of LLSs all over the world remained stable. It was 
limited to thirty states : 14 African states, 9 European states, 5 Asian states and 2 Latin 
American states11S. However, the number of these states has very recently increased 
considerablyl16. The big majority of the LLSs belong either to Asia or to Europe. The 
number of Asian LLSs has jumped from 5 to 12 because of accession to independence of 
the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia 117. Those new states, i.e. Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will look for access to the sea, just 
as the other LLSs of the subregion Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, Mongolia, and Nepal have 
done in the past. 
With regard to European LLSs, their number has recently passed from 9 to 12. 
This has occured as a result of the dissolution of the USSR and the disappearance of the 
former Yugoslavia, and the substitution of former Czechoslovakia in January 1993 by the 
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Czech and Slovak Republicsl18. 
1. 2. The Term "Geographically Disadvantaged States 
The tenn "Geographically Disadvantaged states" evolved from the notion" shelf 
locked states" that became frequently used in legal works around the begining of the 
1970s 119. The latter expression refers to states that are : 
"Cut off from the sea-bed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction ... the 
continental shelf of such states have no. boundary with the sea-bed beyond 
national juriSdiction, the area where no individual sovereignty exists .. 120. 
Such states have 
'~Iimit~d possibilities for extending their jurisdiclipn far offshore because of their 
geographic situation. This, for exemple, is the case with states ~hat border on 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas ..... 121. 
By the time the UN Sea-BedCommittee122 embarked in its preparatory work for 
UNCLOS III in 1968, the prospects for the acceptance and establishment of a 200 miles 
functional zone became quite real. Several states discovered that, in addition to being 
shelf-locked, they were also zone-locked. That is, for geographical reasons, they would 
not be able to establish a full 200 miles zone. They also realized that their interests, as a 
consequence of a change of large parts of the high seas, would be adversely affected, 
especially because of the possible limitation or elimination of the freedom of fishing. As 
the expression 'Shelf-Locked States' no longer describes, adequately, this situation, the 
need for a more comprehensive denomination became urgent. This called into being a 
new concept: 'Geographically disadvantaged states'. 
While in the early stages of the UN Sea-Bed Committee only very few states 
referred to this new concept by the end of its fmal session 1973, the concept acquired wide 
currency and recognition 123, though it was still in its fledging state, since no definite and 
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precise legal definition was agreed upon. 
During the first two Substantive Sessions of UNCLOS III, various proposals 
used the concept GDSs and attempted to define it124. But, despite its broad use and 
acceptance, no definition was agreed upon. This was mainly due to the fact that several 
states suggested definitions involving political, biological, economic and ecological 
factors125. Non-agreement on a definition seems to be the reason lying behind the non-
inclusion of the concept in the ISNT. 
Even in subsequent sessions the work on a definition was not an easy and quick 
task. The ICNT that was issued in 1977126 referred in Article 70 (1) to "certain developing 
coastal states in a subregion or region". This was, however, met with certain displeasure 
from the Informal Group of LL and GDSs127 which insisted on the inclusion of the term 
GDSs in the eventual treaty on the ground that it was the appropriate one because of its 
prolonged use in the Conferences's documents. On the other hand, fearing that it could not _ 
be defined precisely, coastal states persisted in objecting to its- introducton in the 
provisions relating to the EEZ. All subsequent texts, including the Draft.ConventionI28, 
avoided the use of the term GDSs and referred instead to the phrase "states with special 
geographic characteristics". This phrase was concocted by Mr. Sataya Nandan of Fiji, the 
Chairman of the Informal Group of LL and GDSs. He explained that this was 
recommended as the best possible way of conveying the same idea of GDSs without being 
plagued by the inherent difficulties of defining a GDS 129. 
The definition which was eventually enshrined in Article 70 (2) of the LOS 
Convention does not proceed on the basis of any fixed definition of GDSs. Instead, it 
refers to this group of states to include : 
"Coastal states, including states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed 
seas, whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the 
exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other 
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states in the subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the 
nutritional purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and coastal states 
which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own". 
In the first place, it is important to note that this definition was, as already 
mentioned above, proposed by the Chairman of Negotiating Group 4, Ambassador Sataya 
Nandan of Fiji, on 15 May 197813°. His suggestions were a part of an overall 
compromise concerning the right of access of GnSs to the living resources of the EEZs of 
coastal states. In the second place, the expression "including states bordering enclosed or 
semi-enclosed seas" was, as Mr Nandan explained, added as a clarification of the 
provisions of Article 70 and not as a new criteria for the identification of the group of 
states to w.hich Article 70 addresses'oit~el;f13 ~. The te~s 'enclosed or semi-enclosed sea' 
have ,be~n defined in Article 122 of the LOS Convention to mean "a gulf, basin or sea 
surrounded by two or more states and conneC?ted ,to another sea or the ocean by a narrow 
'outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic 
zones of two or more coastal states,,132. Thus, most of the states situated' on the 
Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Baltic and the Agean Sea might possibly 
but not necessarily fall within the definition contained in Article 70 (2). This definition 
includes two categories of states. The first category appertains to coastal states that can 
assert no EEZ of their own. The problem here is that it is unclear whether this means states 
which can not assert an EEZ of 200 miles or which have no EEZ at all. In the author's 
opinion, only the latter states will fall within this category. This is because, first, under 
Article 57 of LOS Convention the 200 miles figure is the maximum breadth of the EEZ 
and not a compulsory breadth133. Therefore, a state which can assert, say, a seventy miles 
EEZ can still claim an EEZ. Secondly, those states which are, for geographic reasons, 
unable to assert a full 200 miles EEZ might possibly be covered by the second category. 
The latter refers to coastal states whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon 
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the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other states in 
the same subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of 
their populations or parts thereof. Thus, in order to be identified as falling within this 
second category, a state must fulfill two conditions: the first one is that of the existence of 
a special geographical characteristics; the second condition is that, because of such a 
situation, the state in question is dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of 
the EEZs of other states belonging to the same region or subregion for adequate supplies 
of fish for the nutritional purposes of its populations or parts thereof. However, to say the 
least, both conditions are flawed and ambiguous134. Several questions may be asked in 
this regard. Amongst'others, what geographical situation is being referred to which makes 
su~h states dependant upon the exploitation of the EEZs of other states for the nutritional 
needs of .their populations? And what level of dependence is required for this purpose? 135 
With regard to the first questi0n, it seems that the plausible answer is that the. 
expression "geographical situation"·rders to those coastal states which, because of their 
proximity to other states of the same sub-region or region, can assert only small EEZs, or 
those which because of the characteristics of the adjacent seas gain only minimal benefits 
in fish'eries exploitation from the assertion of an EEZ. While every member-state of the 
Group of Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States136 may satisfy the first 
condition, only very few of them can assert their dependence upon the exploitation of the 
fisheries resources of other states EEZs for the nutritional needs of their populations. 
These might include Belgium, the former Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, 
Singapore and Sweden. The reason is that, apart from these states, the other members of 
the Group are not involved in fishing on a significant scale137 and, consequently, no state 
of dependence upon marine fisheries has emerged. However, taking into account the 
nutritional needs of the developing GDSs and the nutritional value of the fisheries 
resources in these states, it seems fair to say that the provision of Article 70 (2) must be 
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understood to mean previous and future dependence. This view appears to be warranted 
by the provision of Article 62 (2) which states that in giving access to the surplus, coastal 
states should have particular regard to Article 69 and 70, especially in relation to the 
developing LL and GDSs of the same subregion or region. Nonetheless, the definition 
contained in Article 70 (2) remains vague and there exits room for argument as to which 
edb .138 states are cover y It . 
2. Sharing of EEZs Living Resources 
While most developing states spoke in favor of the idea of the establishment of 
the 200 miles EEZ since the start of UNCLOS III negotiations, LLSs objected to the 
creation of such a zone for fear that they stood to·lose their already established rights in the 
area, which till then was pan of the high seas139. Sinceobjeqtioncame especially from. 
these states, it was realized quite~arly in the debate that some concessions would hav:e to 
be made to themto ensure. their support for th~ concept. There was a long-drawn out battle 
between coastal states, onthe one hand, and LL and GDSs, on the other hand, over the 
formula for sharing the living resources of the EEZs140. LL and GDSs demanded that 
every coastal state should reserve to itself and to LL andl GDSs in its neighbourhood that 
part of the living resources of its EEZ which would satisfy the needs of all these states, so 
that LL and GDSs might be able to exercise the right to participate in the use of those 
resources on an "equal and non-discriminatory basis,,141. Only then would other states 
have the right to participate in the resources of the zone. In other words, they sought to 
grant to themselves access to the EEZ living resources in preference to all states other than 
the coastal states concerned. This proposal was objected to by both the distant-water 
fishing states which were not prepared to accept a grant of access to LLSs prior to 
themselves, and by coastal states that were in no mood to accept the right of LLSs "on an 
equal and non-discriminatory basis". The resultant compromise was the formula inserted 
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in the last text of UNCLOS III which gives LL and GDSs the right, 
II ••• To participation, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an 
appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zones of coastal states of the same sub-region or region, taking 
into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all 
the states concerned"142. 
Thus, contrary to the demands of LL and GDSs, this provision has recognized to 
these states the right of participation "on an equitable basis", which implies the principles 
of fairness and justice and not of equality143. Moreover, it has made it very clear that 
, participation of these states in EEZ fishing of coastal states of the same region or 
subregion is like that of any other third states, limited only to the surplus of the allowable 
catch of the living resources of the EEZ of the same region or subregion as determined by 
coastal states144. Thus, if a coastal state does-not declare a surplus or finds that the' 
allowableca~ch is equal or less than its harvesting capacity, then LL and GDSs have no 
right to claim access. 
Furthermore, this provision gives LL and GDSs the right to participate in an 
"appropriate part of the surplus" of the living resources of the EEZs of coastal states of the 
same subregion or region. What is "appropriate" is not, however, defined in the LOS 
Convention. The lack of any definition means that coastal states are left free to use their 
own understanding of the word. 
It is further provided that the terms and modalities of such participation will be 
established by the states concerned through bilateral, sub-regional or regional 
agreements145. Inclusion of the principle of agreement was insisted upon by coastal states 
because they had argued strongly against the claim of LL states to the fishery resources of 
their EEZs as a matter of right146. When seeking agreement, the states concerned are 
required to take into account a set of factors listed in Article 69 (2) and 70 (3)147. The first 
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factor is "the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or fishing industries 
of the coastal state,,148. Accordingly, whether a particular LLS or GDS can secure access 
depends on whether it can negotiate appropriate arrangements with the coastal state and 
other interested states, considering the condition of coastal fishing communities and 
industries. 
It is important to note that, since the right of LL and GDSs was limited in the 
ICNT only to the surplus, these states have expressed serious concern that coastal states, 
through joint ventures with advanced fishing nations, would harvest the entire allowable 
catch, and consequently exclude them from participation despite the provisions of Arts. 69 
and 70149. To meet such a situation, new provisions were added to Article 69 and 70 
(para. 3 and 4 respectively)150, giving also a right of participation even when no surplus 
can be deemedto exist. "When the harvesting capacity of a coastal state approaches a point 
which would enable it to harvest the'entire allowable catch of the resources in its exclusive> 
economic zone", the ,coastal state and other sta~es concerned shall cooperate in the 
establishment of "equitable arrangements" on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis . 
. Such arrangements shall have the objective to allow for participation of developing LL and 
GDSs of the same subregion or region in the exploitation of the living resources of the 
EEZ on tenns and conditions satisfactory to all parties, and taking into account the factors 
mentioned in paras. 2 and 3 of Articles 69 and 70151. As the Chainnan of Negotiating 
Group 4 who introduced these new paragraphs noted the added paragraphs provided for a 
very special and limited situation and not to all cases where the coastal state is able to 
harvest the entire allowable catch. They do not apply to developed LL and GDSs. 
Moreover, the words 'as may be appropriate in the circumstances' means, as the Chairman 
further noted, that emphasis is put on the developing LL and GDSs that have actually been 
fishing in the particular EEZ when the situation arises152. 
This obligation is, however, limited to one merely of 'cooperation' to achieve an 
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'equitable arrangement'. It seems that there is a duty upon the coastal state, but the use of 
h . d' h' . 153 0 h I h . t ese tenns In Icates t at It IS not an onerous one . nce t e coasta state as gIven 
consideration to its duty by engaging in negotiations in good faith with a developing LLS 
or a developing GDS, its duty will be fulfilled154. 
Finally, it must be recalled that Article 62 (2) states that, when the coastal state 
does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall through agreements 
or other arangements give other states access to the surplus, "having particular regard to 
the provisions of Article 69 and 70, especially in relation to the developing states 
mentioned therein". This provision, together with the specific provisions contained in 
Aricle 69 and 70 concerning the rights of LLand GDSs, have been understood by certain 
. authors as giving aprioritiy or preference to access of these states over third states155. In 
this connection, Professor PunaJ. for instance, has said that "it is reasonable. to consider 
the rights of participation.of LL/GDS as being of a different nature ... and enjoying. 
. preference over those of third-party states,,156. However, in the author's opinion, it seems 
difficult to deduce a ·priority or preference for LL and GDSs from the simple fact thatthese 
states have a double basis for a possible right of participation in the exploitation of the 
EEZ's living resources, and that they can point to the specific provisions of Article 69 and 
70. This is because, first, the interests of these states are among the relevant factors which 
shall be "taken into account" by a coastal state in its discretionary powers concerning the 
repartition of the surplus under Article 62 (3). As this provision, indeed, refers to Article 
69 and 70 among the relevant considerations, it is to be expected that a certain allocation 
under Article 62 will also in practice suffice to fulfil the requirements of Article 69 and 70. 
Secondly, such a view finds no support in the negotiating history of UNCLOS III. The 
words "having particular regard to the provisions of Article 69 and 70, especially in 
relation to the developing countries mentioned therein" were introduced on 28 April 1978 
by the Chainnan of Negotiating Group 4, Ambassador Nandan, as amendments to Article 
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62 of the ICNT. In explaining the motives lying behind the proposed amendments, 
Ambassador Nandan stated157 that he wanted to find a compromise between the position 
of the coastal states, which rejected any use of the term 'priority' or 'preference', and the 
position of LL and aDSs that argued to the contrary. In his opinion, such a compromise 
was reached in the amendment to Article 62 (2). This, he thought, had the merit of 
avoiding the use of the terms "priority" or "preference" in Article 69 and 70 and at the 
same time underlines the need for special consideration to be given to LL and aDSs and 
clarifies the relationship between Article 62 and Article 69 and 70158. It follows that the 
message of Articles 62, 69 (3) and 70 (4) seems to be that, where the states competing for 
participation in EEZs fishing are subject to identical terms and conditions, there appears to 
be a basis for arguing the superior claim of the competing LL and aDS's. But, where the 
coas.tal s.tate can make better arrangements with a state other thana LL or a aDS, the LOS 
Convention seems to leave this choice to' the coastal state. 
'Overall, the provisions of Article 69 and 70 constitute a constraint on coastal state 
discretion as to access, but this constraint is limited. The author agrees with Burke's view 
that these provisions give the LL and aDSs or developing LL and aDSs a claim to secure 
access to the surplus. However, realization of this claim requires negotiating with the 
coastal state to reach bilateral, subregional, and regional agreement on terms and 
conditions satisfactory to the coastal state159. It follows that the duty put upon the coastal 
state with regard to LL and aDSs is not significantly different to its duty to other third 
states. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ST ATE PRACTICE RELATED TO THE EEZ : 1975 TO PRESENT 
Introduction 
State practice relating to coastal state jurisdiction over marine fish resources and 
certain other related matters from 1975-1996 reveals that the big majority of coastal states 
whose geographical attributes allow for the establishment of an EEZ have chosen to claim 
and indeed to enforce the 200 miles EEZ. The prolifrration of national claims to 200 miles 
zone with a view to controlling fisheries and other. related matters within this zone 
witnessed an unprecedented pace in the years between 1976 and 19781. By 1977alone 
more than thirty daims were made (Appendix B). Even those states that had previously 
protested against this, practice, but failed to get across their views and to force other states 
concerned to desist from the establishm~nt of a 200 miles zone, have exf~nded their 
fishing rights over the coastal i:ones2.Prominent among these states were the USA; tHe ' 
, 
UK and theFR03. This was significant because it was at that time a generai consensus 
and a near-agreement were emerging at UNCLOS TIl with regard to the 200 miles EEZ. 
This chapter starts with an identification of the various types of 200 mile 
unilateral claims as evidenced in state practice. Afterwards, an evaluation and comparison 
of the content of national EEZ claims on the general level against the yardstick of the LOS 
Convention will be attempted in order to determine to what extent general juridical rights 
and obligations in the EEZ described in the LOS Convention have been included in state 
practice. Finally an analysis of the details ",contained in EEZ claims with regard to the 
specific regimes which are applied to the various activities that can be undertaken in the 
EEZ will be attempted in order to be able to ascertain later in the next chapter with 
exactitude to what extent the LOS Convention's EEZ provisions are now reflective of 
international customary law. 
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Section I : The Territorial Sea Trend 
As was explained earlier in chapter one, prior to the convening of UNCLOS III 
all attempts made by the international community in relation to the codification of the 
international law of the sea had failed to secure an agreement on a maximum breadth of 
the territorial sea4. When UNCLOS I was convened in 1958, territorial sea limits were 
being asserted ranging from 3 to 200 miles. All the broad territorial sea claims came from 
the Latin American and African continents. The principal aim of these extensive territorial 
sea claims has been the protection of the fish resources found in adjacent seas, and their 
reservation for the exclusive exploitation by nationals of the claimant states5. The majority 
of coastal states, however, were satisfied with a 3 miles territorial sea. The situation has 
changed recently as a result of UNCLOS III. By 16 November 1994, no less than 129 
states had established a territorial sea of 12 miles or less6, of which 121 had a 12 miles 
limit which is also the maximum limit ~nder the LOS Convention 7, with the remainder 
having limits of either three, four or six miJes8. 
There has been a steady increase in the number of states claiming a 12 miles 
territorial sea since the adoption of the LOS Convention. Most of the conversions to 12 
miles limit have come either from newly independent states or from those states that had 
previously claimed limits of less than 12 miles. In January 1972 Gabon, for instance, 
asserted a 30 miles territorial sea, and in less than one year later it had increased the limit 
to 100 miles9. Then, in 1984 Gabon rolled the limit back to 12 mileslO. In 1985, the 
Netherlands extended its territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles l1 . Similarly, in 1987 the United 
Kingdoom, perhaps the oldest proponent of the 3 miles territorial sea rule, enacted a law 
which extended the breadth of the territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles, bringing it in line with 
the majority of states12. Nearly all the big maritime states, including the two Super 
Powers, have adhered to the 12 miles territorial sea13. Moreover, three new coastal states 
born out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union have adopted legislation on their 
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respective state frontiers in which they have set the breadth of the territorial sea at 12 
miles: Latvia on 20 December 1990, Ukraine on 4 November 1991 and Lithuania on 25 
June 199214. Estonia also established a 12 miles territorial sea by its law of 10 March 
199315. 
However, there are some developing states which still claim a territorial sea of 
200 miles. These states are Benin, Congo, Ecuador, El.Salvador, Liberia, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uruguayl6. These claims, without exception, 
contained no detailed provisions concerning the duties of the coastal state to conserve and 
manage the living resources within the claimed 200 miles zone. Moreover, no reference 
has been made to the participation of third states in the exploitation of the said resources. 
In fact, fishing within the asserted 200 miles territorial sea has been reserved exclusively 
for vess~ls flyirig their flags. Furthermore, all these claims have made it v~ryclearthat 
vessels of third states enjoy only innocent passage in the 'Claimed 200 miles 'maritime area. 
h is important to recall, at this stage, that international law has always recognized that a 
coastal state has sovereignty over its internal waters and almost absolute authority over its 
territorial sea, subject only to the right of innocent passage17. It follows that each of the 
above-mentioned states has made an assertion of a 200 miles territorial sea in a very strict 
sense. 
It is interesting to note that most of these extensive territorial sea claims had 
existed a long time before the adoption of the LOS Convention 18. Several of them might 
change in order to become ~ore harmonious with the LOS Convention. Indeed, this is 
what has already happened with Guinea's claim that was widened in 1978 to 15019 miles, 
and was brought back later in 1980 to 12 miles20. Similar action was taken by Cape 
Verde in 197721 , Senegal and Madagascar in 198522, Argentina in 199123 and Brazil24 in 
1993. While the dates of reducing these territorial sea claims to 12 miles already indicate 
that this was meant to be a response to the consensus reached at UNCLOS III, such a 
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view has been explicitly confirmed by the legislation of the Cape Verde25 and 
Madagascar26. 
Summing up, the existing practice of states relating to the territorial sea evidences 
that states asserting rights to a territorial sea of 200 miles have become a very dwindling 
minority. It has been suggested earlier in chapter 1 that claims to territorial seas beyond 
twelve miles, particularly those of the Latin American states, were occasioned by the 
perceived need of coastal states to protect their offshore resources from exploitation by 
technically advanced states in an age when the relevant divisions of the ocean space were 
simply those of territorial or high seas. The development of the legal concept of the EEZ, 
however, provides new possibilities and fulfills the functional requirements for coastal 
states to protect their offshore resource~ without resorting to excessive territorial sea 
claims. In <?ther words, there is today no convincing reasons for such extensive territorial 
sea daims as coastal states economic interests are now sufficient! y protected :underthe 200 
mile EEZ. The author, therefore, expects that the remaining 200 miles territorial sea claims 
will ultimately fall into line with the relevant provisions of the LOS ConventiorL 
Indeed, as indicated above, an overwhelming majority of states adheres today to 
the 12 miles territorial sea rule. State practice proves that big and small states, developed 
and developing states in every part of the globe and belonging to various economic 
systems are involved in this practice27. This goes on without protests or persistent 
objection against it28. In fact, adherence to this practice has been accompanied by the 
conception that such a practice is consistent with prevailing international law. In this 
connection, in 1987 the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK 
has correctly observed: "We believe that such limits are permitted by customary law and I 
believe that, though it has a three miles limits, the United States now take the same 
view,,29. Thus, the requirements set by the IC] in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
196930 for a practice to become a custom seem therefore to have been met. Consequently, 
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coastal states are now permitted to extend their territorial sea to a maximum limit of 12 
miles. Any other state asserting a territorial sea of more than 12 miles would be violating 
current internatinallaw. 
Section II : The Exclusive Fishery Zone [EFZ] Trend 
The EFZ is, as has been explained earlier in chapter 131 , a maritime zone beyond 
the territorial sea within which a coastal state asserting such a zone can exercise exclusive 
rights with regard to fisheries found therein32. It has to be remembered, however, that, 
while the right of coastal states to establish such a zone was denied at both UNCLOS I 
and UNCLOS n, it became in the early seventies a well established right33. Nonetheless; 
as it h~sbeen suggested. earlier when dealing with the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 197434, 
international law Of that time permitted the establishmeI}t of such a zone to a maximum 
extent not exceeding twelve miles. Moreover, the coastal state's jurisdiction~ rights were 
. ',' ',' " ' ';'' I.! .• 
confined to fisheries of the water column and did not include jurisdiction over marine· 
scief).tific research or preservation of the marine environment. Thus, 200 miles could not 
be regarded as an accepted limit in 1974, conferring on coastal states the right to expand 
their jurisdiction for fisheries purposes to that extent35. 
The situation had changed greatly in the following years, especially between 
1976 and 1978. As indicated earlier, it was during those years that a consensus was 
emerging at UNCLOS m with regard to the new 200 mile functional maritime zone36. 
In addition to the 200 miles territorial sea claims already discussed under the 
previous section, over twenty states among them the major sea powers, the former USSR, 
the EEe States, the USA and Japan extended their exclusive fishery limits seaward, in the 
years between 1976 and 1978, to 200 miles37. 
The USA, formerly one of the strongest objectors to early Latin American 
extensive maritime claims, has asserted control over the living resources of the waters 
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within the 200 miles limit since March 1, 1977, the effective date of the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act38, which extended U.S fisheries jurisdiction from 12 
to 200 miles from the baseline of the territorial sea. The Act excludes foreign fishing 
from the fisheries zone, except as authorized by international agreement and permit, and 
asserts exclusive fisheries management authority over the fishing resources of the 
continental shelf and the zone's waters39. Aside from evoking a diplomatic protest note 
from Japan40, the FCMA has been successfully implemented and enforced with the 
. f· ed 41 cooperation 0 mterest states . 
The states that have asserted a 200 miles EFZ made it clear that they were not 
violating international law when taking such action. On the contrary, the expansion of 
their exclusive fishery limits seaward up to 200 miles was in accord with. the growing 
consensus among natIons at UNCLOS III. For instance; when the USA established its 
200 miles EFZ in 1976, it declared that the established zone was "generally consistent 
with the consensus emerging at the Conference,,42. Being "in accord with a consensus" 
may also imply that it is in accord with international law. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
~43, the IC] addressed, inter alia, the concept of preferential fishing rights in the 
adjacent high seas in favour of states that are especially dependent on coastal fisheries for 
their economic development or whose populations were overwhelmingly dependent 
thereon for their livelihood. As explained earlier in chapter 1, this concept had been 
introduced by Iceland at UNCLOS I, and had been the subject of discussion both there 
and at the ensuing Conference in 1960 (UNCLOS II). The IC] held that such a concept 
had passed into customary law by the early 1970 s44. In so doing, the Court held that, 
subsequently to UNCLOS II, "the law evolved through the practice of states on the basis 
of the debates and near agreements at the Conferences,,4S. 
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Similarly, in a statement made to Parliament in June 1976 on the Canadian 
extension of its fishery zone to 200 miles, the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs . 
stated that: 
"Our action is based on a growing consensus among nations, a consensus 
which is increasingly finding its way into state practice and is reflected in 
the provisions of the Single Negotiating Text that emerged from the 1975 
Session and has been confirmed in this year's revised SNT',46. 
In the second half of 1976, developments within the EEC in respect of a common 
fisheries policy took a new urgency. It became clear that before the end of the year a 
position had to be defined on the establishment of 200 miles EFz47. In September of that 
same year the Commission of the European Communities 48 submItted proposals to the 
EEC Council of Ministers49 regarding not only a common fisheries policy, :but land 
perhaps more iinportantla regime for negotiations between certain non.,member states and 
the community. The Council adopted a series of ne'gotiating authorizations and a short 
time later the Council of the European Community, in order to protect the legitimate 
interests of the member states and taking due account of the main trends emerging at 
UNCLOS III concerning fishery rights, decided that as from Jannuary 1, 1977, the 
Member States concerned would, through concerted action, establish 200 miles EFZs in 
the North Sea and the North-East Atlantic Ocean50. 
The United Kingdom, Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, 
Denmark, France and the Netherlands complied with the decision in relatively short 
order5l. 
Other maritime powers took similar steps that year as well. Claiming the need to 
protect its interest, the USSR had, on December 10 1976, issued an Edict of the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet52, Article 1 of which states, inter alia, that: 
"In marine areas adjacent to the coast of the USSR, of a breadth up to 200 
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nautical miles computed from the same baselines as the territorial waters, 
there shall be introduced ... provisional measures for the preservation of 
living resources and for the regulation of fishing ... ". 
Japan, which had made a protest in 1976 against the US claim of 200 miles 
EFZ53 , followed suit later on May 2, 197754. Japan has established a fishery zone 
extending seaward to 200 miles, but it does not apply beyond Japanese territorial waters in 
the areas facing China and the Republic of Korea55. 
As has been indicated earlier, most of these states have referred to the emerging 
consensus at UNCLOS III when making their claims. It seems, therefore fitting to ask the 
following question: was the consensus emerging at UNCLOS III around 1976 related to 
the EFZ or did it cover also the more comprehensive concept of the EEZ? Despite the fact 
that for fishery-purposes, fishery zones serve as functional equivalents of EEZs56, in the 
author's opinion, it is still important to determine the substance of this consensus since the 
EEZ does provide the coastal state with jurisdictional and sovereign rights to non-living 
resources extending beyond those associated with fishery zones. In the EEZ,c-the coastal 
state, for instance, is entitled toexercise jurisdiction over scientific research and 
environmental protection in addition to rights to non-living resources57. In attempting to 
answer the above question, reference to the work of UNCLOS III is necessary. It has to 
be remembered that the Second Commitee of UNCLOS III has the broadest mandate, 
embracing virtually all of the subjects of the traditional law of the sea such as the 
territorial sea, straits, archipelagos, the continental shelf and the high seas58. The 
competence of the Committee covered also the topic of the EEZ, including both living and 
1. . 59 non- Ivmg resources . 
Under the designation "Exclusive Economic Zone", several issues were at the 
center of the debates. Among others were, first, the economic rights and obligations of the 
coastal state within the 200 miles limits; secondly, the coastal state rights with regard to 
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non-economic uses of the zone; and thirdly, the rights and duties of third states therein. 
A thorough examination of no less than twenty proposals60 made by various 
states, from developing as well as from developed worlds, with a view to define the rights 
and duties of coastal states within the proposed 200 miles limit, has revealed that, with the 
exception of very few proposals, all of the other proposals made reference to the 
sovereign rights of the coastal state with regard to the natural resources found within the 
200 miles limit, and to jurisdiction over marine scientific research as well as to the 
preservation of the marine environment. 
Moreover, all ofUNCLOS III texts starting with the ISNr>l, RSNr>2, ICNT63, 
revisions 1 and 264 and eventually the Draft Convention65 contained provisions 
concerning coastal states fishing rights as well as coastal states jurisdictional rights with 
regard to marine scientific r~search and the preservation of the maririe environment within 
the 200 miles limit. ,: . 
'Furthermore, going through UNCLOS III documents the author has found not a 
single phrase attributed to the President of the Conference or to the Chairman of the 
Second Committee implying that he opposed the EEZ because it also deals with marine 
scientific research and the preservation of the marine environment. Reference to the words 
"exclusive economic zone" and not to "exclusive fishing zone" was, in fact, made in 
nearly every statement or explanation made by them regarding the work of the 
Conference. 
In addition, all the LOS Convention's provisions related to the 200 miles 
jurisdictional zone refer to the EEZ and not to the EFZ. To borrow the words of Professor 
Brown, "the concept of the exclusive fishing zone is nowhere referred to in '" the UN 
Convention,,66. 
On the basis of the above reasons, the author is inclined to say that the consensus 
which emerged at UNCLOS III between 1976 and 1978 was not restricted to the rights of 
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coastal states over fisheries within the 200 miles as contended by Japan and certain other 
Western European States, but covered the EEZ with its various uses, including scientific 
research and environmental protection. Indeed, as the United Kingdom observed in the 
Channel Continental Shelf Arbitration (UK v. France), 197767, there was still at that time 
controversies on the content of the jurisdiction to be exercised by coastal states within the 
200 miles EEZ68. But, those controversies concerned only very few matters, namely, the 
question of access to fisheries for LL and GDS states, the protection of marine mammals 
d dr . 69 an ana omous specIes . 
The topics of marine scientific research within the 200 miles EEZ and the 
continental shelf and that of the preservation and protection of the marine environment 
were among the topics falling within the competence of the Third Commitee of 
UNCLOS Iieo. The vast majority of statements and proposals relating t() marine scientific 
research f~lly endorsed the view that coastal states would have jurisdiction over scientific 
research activities related to the natural resources found within the EEZ 71. The main 
difference between those statements and proposals concerned the extent of coastal states 
jurisdiction with respect to research activities that have nothing to do with the natural 
resources of the EEZ 72. 
As will be shown later in more detail, it is today generally accepted that coastal 
states can exercise at least jurisdiction over marine scientific research activities taking place 
in the EEZ and having connection with the EEZ resources. In this context, Professor 
Bernhardt has correctly said that "state practice clearly shows that coastal states can claim 
some exclusive rights in the 200 miles zone, what is doubtful is not the existence of rights 
but their number and content". He has further stated that "there are good reasons for the 
assumption that customary international law also reserves to the coastal states the other 
rights mentioned in Article 56 of the Convention, if they claim such rights,,73. This means 
that coastal states can claim under current international customary law the right of 
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jurisdiction over marine research provided for in Article 56 paragraph 1 (b) (ii). 
Moreover, in his extensive work entittled "Marine Scientific Research and the 
Law of the Sea" published in 1982, Soons observed that "claims to jurisdiction over 
marine scientific research in exclusive economic zones going beyond the jurisdiction 
which coastal states are entitled to exercise over marine scientific research involving the 
taking of fish, are not valid under present-day general customary law,,74. This statement 
implies that coastal states are allowed under customary law to exercise a right of 
jurisdiction over marine research activities related to the resources of EEZ, if they wish to 
do so. 
As far as the preservation and protection of the marine environment in the EEZ is 
concerned" it haS to be recalled that before the start of UNCLOS III several proposals 
were submitted to the UN Sea~Bed Committee advancing the idea that the future EEZ 
regime would also empower coas,t;'ll states, to take sollie measures for the purpose of 
controlling pollution in the EEZ in order to protect the economic resources found 
therein 75. This idea received later at UNCLOS III big support. In this connection, in 1975 
Professor Oxman described the accomplishments of the Caracas Session of 1974 on the 
EEZ, in the following terms : 
"Over 100 countries spoke in support of an economic zone extending to a 
limit of 200 nautical miles as part of an overall treaty settlement. With 
respect to the content of the zone, there is widespread support for the 
following : (a) Coastal state sovereign or exclusive rights for the purpose of 
exploration and exploitation of living and nonliving resources; (b) Exclusive 
coastal state rights over artificial islands and most installations; 
(c) Exclusive coastal state rights over drilling for all purposes; (d) Coastal 
state rights and duties with respect to pollution and scientific research ... ,,76. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it is submitted that under present-day 
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customary international law related to extended jurisdictional zones, coastal states are 
entitled to claim exclusive economic zones and not only exclusive fishery zones. As has 
been explained earlier, the EEZ is the broader concept, and exclusive fishing rights are the 
centerpiece of the rights comprised by the broader concept 77. Customary international law 
does not mandate that a coastal state assert the broader concept78. In this context, Soons 
has correctly said that states "are not required by international law to fully exercise all 
rights (with corresponding duties) they acquire under customary international law ... ,,79. It 
follows that, if a state desires to restrict its claim to one of the functions prescribed, as has 
been done by the United Kingdom80, Canada81, Denmark82, Japan83, and the 
Netherlands84, its action remains within the confines of current customary international 
law. 
Section III : Tbe EEZ Claims and their Conceptual Content 
In this section, the author will try, first, to trace the numerical evolution of EEZ 
claims from 1975 to 1996, and, secondly, to examine the content of the EEZ claims as 
evidenced in national proclamations and / or legislation and decrees and compare it with 
the EEZ content enshrined in Part V of the LOS Convention. 
A. The Evolution of EEZ Claims from 1975 to 1996 
The period between 1975 and the resumed Eight Session of UNCLOS III in 
New York from July 16 to August 24, 1977, was marked by a large advent of the 200 
miles EEZ ,in state practice. In this short period alone, no less than 47 coastal states 
advanced claims to a 200 miles EEZ85. Of these claims, Africa has produced 15, Asia 10, 
mainland Latin America 7, the Caribbean Island states 5, Western Europe 4 and Oceana / 
Australia 686. This rapid adoption of the 200 miles EEZ concept in state practice, and 
global spread of such practice to every geographic region at a time that two or more years 
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were still needed for the tennination date of the work of UNCLOS III was, as has been 
explained earlier, engendered by the general consensus and the near-agreement which 
were emerging at UNCLOS ill concerning the 200 miles EEZ in that period. 
During the same period a minority of states had opted for the establishment of an 
EFZ87, that is to say asserting something less than an EEZ. Among those states were the 
USA~ the UK, the USSR, and Japan88. The assertion by these states, especially the big 
maritime powers, of an EFZ when consensus allowed a full EEZ at the middle of 
UNCLOS III, is not without significance. It indicates their desire to undennine the EEZ 
concept sponsored by the developing states of Latin America and Africa. Already at the 
Caracas Session 1974, several of these big maritime powers expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the 200 miles EEZ concept. Mr Ogiso, on behalf of Japan, for 
instance:.stated that: 
~'His D~iegation interpreted proposals for an exClu,sive economic zone as . 
involving a zone in the high seas in which the coastal state had exclusive 
rights over all resources, living and non-living,,89. 
Similarly, Sir Roger Jackling, the representative of the United Kingdom said: 
"His delegation had however, made it clear that it regarded the coastal state 
rights in an economic zone to be rights in relation to the resources of the 
sea-bed and the water column. It had therefore been deeply concerned to 
note a growing tendency to take for granted those rights to the resources 
and to make demands for further competences, not directly related to 
resources within the zone90". 
Thus, these two statements assert clearly that the content of the 200 miles EEZ 
concept should be confined to the economic resources that are found therein. All other 
activities that may be undertaken in the zone and not directly connected with the 
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources, including the conduct of marine 
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scientific research, would remain outside the competence of the coastal state. 
In the author's opinion, by resorting to exclusive fishery zones at a time 
UNCLOS III was still in progress, the maritime powers were seeking to influence the 
work ofUNCLOS III on the EEZ so that the rights of coastal states within the zone would 
be restricted to fisheries. This view finds some support in the fact that national laws 
establishing those zones emphasized the provisional character of the measures enshrined 
in them. In this direction, one may quote the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR of 10 December 1976 on Provisional Measures to Conserve Living 
Resources and Regulate Fishing in the Sea Areas Adjacent to the Coast of the USSR, 
noting that an "increasing number of states, including some adjoining the USSR" have 
been establishing economic or fishing zones up to 200 miles without waiting for the 
conclusion of UNCLOS Ill, and that. "pending the conclusion of a convention" immediate 
action is needed to protect the interests of the SovietState91 . 
However, the" action of these states did not succeed; In fact, many other coastal 
states, most of which were developing ones, had .subsequently followed the EEZ pattern 
establishing their own 200 miles EEZ. Thus, in addition to the forty seven claims which 
were made up to 197892, seven other claims were made in 1979, 4 in 1980, and 5 in 
198193. 
It was in 1982 that the practice of those states establishing 200 miles EFZs had 
totally failed. This happened when the EEZ concept was eventually retained in the final 
text of UNCLOS Ill. 
Since the adoption of the LOS Convention in 1982, the number of EEZ claimant-
states has been increasing gradually. In 1983 five more EEZ claims were made, 6 in 1984, 
3 in 1986, 1 in 198794, 2 between 1989 and 199095, and no less than six EEZ claims 
were made between 1991 and 199596. Today, according to the latest available 
information, no less than 92 coastal states have proclaimed exclusive ecnomic zones 
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within the limit of 200 miles from the bas lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured97. Indeed, several other coastal states have not established EEZs98. 
However, in the present author's opinion, the failure of those states to create EEZs has 
been due to certain practical considerations rather than to doubts about the legitimacy of 
such a zone. The majority of states that have not established EEZs border one or more of 
the semi-enclosed seas99. One salient consideration is the fact that in such seas 
delimitation problems become especially difficult as they may involve, simultaneously, 
boundaries with both adjacent and opposite states 100. The Mediterranean Sea, for 
instance, is a semi-enclosed sea where the furthest point from shore is only 370 
kilometres 10 1. All of the Mediterranean would be under national jurisdiction if the states of 
the ,region had promulgated 200 iniles EEZs. As a result, every state would have to delimit 
its boundaries not only with adjacenptates but also with opposite states102. Needless to 
s~y, such claims could lead to jurisdi<;tional disputes in an area renowned for its political 
volatility. To, this. end, the ,states of the region have been extremely cautious when making .' 
claims to extended jurisdiction. 
Of the eighteen states bordering the Mediterranean Sea, only very few states have 
established EEZs103. Upon ratifying the LOS Convention, Egypt declared that it would 
exercise the rights attributed to it in the EEZ by the provisions of Part V and VI of the LOS 
Convention 104. But, to the author's knowledge, this Egyptian claim has not been 
implemented. Moreover, while France and Spain have both created EEZs, the two states 
have proclaimed EEZs only on their Atlantic coasts, avoiding the creation of such a zone 
in the Mediterranean105. The same holds true for Morocco, which promulgated a 200 
miles EEZ for its Atlantic waters but not for its Mediterranean waters 106. Likewise, 
Turkey had established an EEZ in the Black Sea in 1987, but it has excluded the 
Mediterranean coast from the scope of its legislation, an area rife with delimitation 
problems with Greece107. 
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Finally, those states which have asserted EFZs only were aware that modern 
international law permitted coastal states to claim more than sovereign rights over living 
resources. This is evidenced by the fact that, although a very considerable number of 
states had established EEZs before the adoption of the LOS Convention, none of the EFZ 
claimant states raised any protest against such practice. In fact, some of these states have 
subsequently indicated a willingness to adapt their national legislation to the LOS 
Conventionl08 and some others have already done so. In this connection, the US and the 
former USSR converted their former 200 miles EFZs into EEZs in 1983 and 1984 
respectively 109. These conversions have contributed much to the growth of the number of 
the EEZ claimant states. They also lend some more support to the view expressed earlier 
that the consensus which emerged at UNCLOS III concerned the full EEZ and not just the 
sovereign rights of the coastal state over living resources. 
It is interesting to note that subsequent conversion of an existing 200 miles EFZ 
into an EEZ was effected by Poland in 1991 110, Sweden in 1993111 and Australia in 
1994112. Moreover, several European coastal states that had proclaimed EFZs in the past, 
have recently made their intention very clear that they are considerring extension of 
jurisdictional competences in the North Sea in accordance with the LOS Convention, 
especially with regard to its Part XII113. 
B. The General Ingredients of the EEZ in Nation~1 Claims 
The general ingredients of the concept of the EEZ have been included in Articles 
55, 56 and 58 of the LOS Convention. When national EEZ claims are closely read, an 
important fact stands out immediatly. With the exception of a few claims that have been 
shaped in a very brief manner, all the other EEZ claims have borrowed much from the 
EEZ concept which was agreed upon at UNCLOS III. In this subsection, the author will 
attempt to establish with precision the LOS Convention's EEZ basic ingredients that have 
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been widely contained in national EEZ claims, 
1. Definition of the EEZ 
Article 55 of the LOS Convention states that the EEZ is an "area beyond and 
adjacent to the teritorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in" Part V, 
This provision suggests clearly that the territorial sea and the EEZ are two distinct 
geographical and juridical zones in the LOS Convention, 
Of the eighty claims examined, over seventy claims included a provision related 
to the definition of the EEZ, Of these claims, fifty-one have adopted a definition that is 
more or less couched in the words of Article 55 and 57 of the LOS Convention, The US 
Presidential Proclamation No, 5030 of March 10, 1983, for instance, defined the United 
State'~ EEZ asa"zone contiguous to the territorial sea .. , extending to a distance 200 
nau~ical miles from the baseline from which the .breadth of the. territorial, sea,is 
measured" 114, Similarly, Thailand's Royal Proclamation of February 23, 1981,has 
provided that the EEZ "of the Kingdom of Thailand is an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea whose breadth extends" to 200 miles measured from the baselines used for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial seal15, National EEZ legislation of Cubal16, Costa 
Ri 117 D " RbI' 118 G 119 I I d120 I d' 121 I d ,122 I ca , OmInICan epu IC , uyana ,ce an ,n Ia ,n oneSIa , vory 
C 123 K' 'b ,124 M d 125 M I ,126 M " 127 M ' 128 oast , In au, a agascar , a aysIa, aunuus, eXICO , 
M 129 M b' 130 N Ze I d131 N' ,132 Pak' 133 Ph'l' , 134 orocco , ozam Ique , ew a an ,Igena , Istan , I Ippmes , 
Sao Tome and Principe135, Seychelles136, Solomon Islands137, Spain138, Sri Lanka139, 
Suriname140, Tonga141 , Trinidad and Tobago142, Vanuatu143, Venezuela144, Vietnam145 
and Western Samoa146 contained identical provisions, Thus, like the LOS Convention, 
the majority of national EEZ legislation explicitly indicates that the territorial sea and the 
EEZ are two distinct institutions of the law of the sea, subject to two different legal 
, 147 
regImes , 
205 
On the other hand, while a very few national EEZ legislation omitted any 
definition of the EEZ 148, certain others have adopted a definition which is imprecise. For 
instance, Guatemala's Decree No. 20n6 of July 1, 1976 states in Article 3 that: "The 
Republic of Guatemala establishes an exclusive economic zone which shall extend 200 
nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured,,149. Similarly, the Portugase Law No. 33n7 of May 28,1977 provides that: 
"An economic zone is hereby established, the outer limit of which is a line where each 
point is at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the point closest to the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured" 150. Such a formulation has been 
:repeated in the EEZ proclamations or legislation of a few other states 151. However, in the 
author's opinion, in the case of such states, this problem seems to be more a matter of 
imprecise wording or oversight rather than actual intention to conf\lse the distinction 
between the two juridical zones. This is for the simple reason that most.of these states 
have explicitly asserted a 12 miles territorial seal52. 
2. The Legal Status of the EEZ 
Article 55 and 56 of the LOS Convention indicate that the EEZ is neither a part of 
the territorial sea nor that of the high seas. Article 55 defines the legal status of the EEZ 
only within the framework of LOS Convention. It is a zone sui generis . It is worth 
recalling that the sui generis formulation attempts to resolve the conflict between certain 
developing coastal states which advocated a territorial sea character of the EEZI53, 
implying that the residual competences remain with the coastal states, and the big maritime 
states advocating a high seas character in order to ensure that freedom of navigation and 
other uses of the ocean in the vast areas enclosed by the EEZ would lie with the flag 
states l54. 
Of the ninety-two EEZ claims which have been made up to now, not a single 
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claim has either explicitly or implicitly attempted to assimilate the EEZ with the high seas. 
The absence of state practice favorable to the thesis of the EEZ as high seas is, in the 
author's opinion, logical, as this thesis was strongly rejected at UNCLOS III and has been 
expressly refuted by the final text of the Conference. 
Similarly, the territorialist practice is, as indicated earlier, sporadic. Only very 
few developing coastal states, especially from Latin America, have claimed a 200 miles 
zone of national sovereigntyl55, thus assimilating the asserted zone with a territorial sea 
claim. Moreover, the number of states adhering to this practice has recently decreased 
considerably owing to the fact that some of these states have recently revised their 
legislation to be consistent with the LOS Convetion's EEZ provisions 156. 
In addition, Uruguay has defected from the territorialist group by becoming a 
·party to the LOS Conventionl57, while Nicaragua, Panama andEL Salvador have all 
signed the LOS Convention, thus showing a clear degree of commitment to its 
principles 158. Indeed; Nicaragua went even further, promisil1g, on signing the 
convention, to introduce adjustments into its domestic laws "as may be required in order 
to harmonize it with the Convention,,159. 
Since state practice supports neither the high seas thesis nor the territorial sea 
thesis, the sui generis character of the EEZ is therefore the alternative. Of the 82 claims 
surveyed, more than sixty-five claims have enumerated the rights to be enjoyed by the 
claimant state within its EEZ and specified the rights of third states. For instance, Article 
48 (1) of Decree No.77 of 7 January 1987 of the State Council of the People's Republic 
of Bulgaria on the Exclusive Economic Zone of Bulgaria in the Black Sea160 provides 
that, in the EEZ, Bulgaria shall excercise "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
developing, exploiting, protecting and managing the living, mineral and energy resources 
of the sea-bed, its subsoil and the waters supeIjacent to the sea-bed, and with regard to 
other activities for the exploration and exploitation of the zone". Paragraph 2 adds that 
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Bulgaria exercises also exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the construction 
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research and the 
protection of the marine environment. Article 49, on the other hand, states that in the EEZ, 
"all states enjoy the freedoms of navigation, overflight, the laying of cables and pipelines 
and other internationally lawful procedures related to the use of the sea for such 
purposes". 
Similarly, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1989161 of 
Tanzania states in Article 9 (1) that within the EEZ the United Republic of Tanzania has 
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-
bed and its subsoil,and wi~h regard to other activities for the economic exploration and 
exploitation of .the zone". The same Article states, further in paragraph 2 that the Republic ' 
has also jurisdiction widi regard to tile establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures, a~ well as over scientific research and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. Moreover, Article 11 provides that the United 
Republic recognizes within its EEZ "the right of other states, whether coastal or land-
locked, to freedom of navigation and overflight, the laying of cables and pipelines and 
other uses of the sea relating to navigation and communication". Similar provisions have 
been repeated in national EEZ proclamations and legislation of no less than sixty-three 
other coastal states l62. This means that the EEZ is being viewed as a functional maritime 
area in which a coastal state and third states enjoy well defined rights and have certain 
duties towards each other. Such a practice is therefore in line with the provision contained 
in Article 55 of the LOS Convention. Consequently, the sui generis character of the EEZ 
seems to have been confirmed by state practice. 
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3. Delimitation of the EEZ between Adjacent and Opposite States 
The issue of delimitation of the EEZ between states with opposite or adjacent 
coasts was the subject of long debates at UNCLOS 111163. Debates centered mainly on 
whether boundaries should be effected in accordance with the median or equidistance line 
or according to equitable principles and special circumstancesl64. Because the conflict 
among the participating states could not be resolved, the resulting Convention text is too 
general and provides little of substancel65. The provision inserted in Article 74 (1) 
relating to the delimitation of the EEZ, which is identical to that contained in Article 83 (1) 
on the delimitation of the continental shelf, states that: 
"The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with opposite 
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referreq to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
i,n order to achieve an equitable solution". 
Accordingly" the process of delimitation of the EEZ and thecontinentalshelfis 
based on three principles: agreement, consistency with international law and an equitable. 
solution. 
As far as EEZ delimitation is concerned, state practice is varied. In much of 
national EEZ proclamations and legislation surveyed by the author, the maritime boundary 
with adjacent or opposite states is to be determined by agreement. Pending such 
agreement, the boundary must not exceed the median or equidistance line from the nearest 
point from which the width of the territorial sea is calculated. This is valid for countries 
where the sea areas between them are less than 400 miles. In this connection, the 
provision of paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Zone Act of the 
United Republic of Tanzania of 1989166 stipulates that, where the median line between the 
Republic and any adjacent or opposite state is less than 200 miles from the baselines, " the 
outer boundary limit of the zone shall be that fixed by agreement between the United 
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Republic and that other states, but where there is no such agreement, the outer boundary 
limit shall be the median line". A similar provision has been included in the Icelandic Law 
No. 41 concerning the Territorial Sea, the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelfl67, 
the Maritime Boundaries Act No. 10 of 1977 of Guyanal68, and the 1978 Act No. 20 of 
Grenadal69. Such a provision is, however, found in only a few national EEZ instruments. 
In severals cases, national EEZ legislation omits any reference to agreement 170. 
The LOS Convention provides for delimitation by agreement in accordance with 
international law. Thus, national legislation which does not acknowledge the important 
element of agreement in delimiting EEZ boundaries may be deviating not only from the 
requirements of the LOS Convention but, more importantly; also from general 
international law. In this context, it is worth recalling here that, with regard to analogous 
claims, the ICJ had, in the past, expressed the view that, according to the basic tenets of 
law,~nd of opinio juris, delimitation .of boundaries is. to.be effected by agreement between 
the parties concerned in accordance with equitable principles and taking into account all 
1 · 171 re evant CIrcumstances . 
In several other cases, only delimitation by agreement is provided for in national 
legislation, but without any reference to the median / equidistance line principle l72. Yet, 
the practice of certain other states fluctuates. The United States, for example, has not 
subscribed to a strict rule of boundary delimitation whether by legislation or by action. 
Rather, in accordance with the theory of equitable principles, it has developed its position 
based on the circumstances of the particular boundary in question. Thus, it argued against 
the application of equidistance in the Gulf of Maine Area Case with Canada before a panel 
of the ICJ 173, but used equidistance in its agreement to fix the boundary with Mexico 174. 
In addition, there exist also a number of enactments that make no reference at all 
th . fd I' .' fb dari 175 to e questIon 0 e ImItatIon 0 oun es . 
On the basis of this discussion, one may conclude that, with regard to EEZs 
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delimitation, state practice is not homogeneous and lacks stability. It will be some more 
time before the law in this area stabilizes. 
4. The Basic Rights and Jurisdiction of the Coastal State in the EEZ 
According to the LOS Convention, in the EEZ coastal states have sovereign 
rights over the natural resources of the zone and jurisdiction with respect to the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine research, 
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment176. Thus, under this 
heading, the author will try to examine the extent to which these basic rights have been 
received in state practice. 
4. 1. The Coastal State's Rights Contained in Art. 56 para. (1) (a) 
Regarding the question of rights, Article, 56 (1) (a) of the LOS Convention, 
provides that, in the EEZ, the coastal state has "sovereign rights" for the purpose of 
exploring and exploitating, conserving and managing the natural resources found in the· 
zone and with regard to other activities for the other economic exploitation and exploration 
of the zone such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and wind. There is, 
at the level of national legislation, widespread consensus with respect to the coastal state's 
sovereign rights for the purposes enumerated in the above-mentioned provision. Almost 
all states claiming rights to an EEZ have included in their national legislation this 
fundamental conceptl77. Indeed, small variations in wording can be detected in some 
national instruments when they are compared with the corresponding provision of the 
LOS Convention, but they may be unintentional and perhaps even unimportant178. 
Moreover, the idea that in the EEZ coastal states have sovereign rights over the 
natural resources of the zone is also found in numerous agreements. For instance, Article 
64 of the Fourth APC - EEC Convention of Lome of December 15, 1989 provides that the 
Community and the ACP States recognize that coastal states exercise sovereign rights for 
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the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the fishery resources of 
their respective exclusive economic zones 179. Similarly, the preamble of the Niue Treaty 
on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific 
Region, which was concluded in July 9, 1992, states in part that, "in accordance with 
international law as expressed in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
coastal states have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the fisheries resources of their exclusive economic zones and 
fisheries zones,,180. 
Of the states claiming an EEZ, only the claim of the Sultanate of Oman speaks of 
sovereignty. The Royal Decree No. 15/81 of 1981 provides that Oman "shall have all 
sovereignty of the EEZ for the purposes of exploring and developing its aquatic and other 
wealths,,181. Sovereignty means a state "subject to no other state, and having a full and 
exclusive authority within its junsdiction,,182. Thus, the fact that the above' provision 
speaks-of sovereignty for only specific rights of economic nature means that the range of 
the claim is limited. Consequently, even Oman's claim seems to be a functional claim and 
not one of sovereignty over the zone itself. 
4. 2. The Coastal State's Rights Contained in Art. 56 (1) (b) 
The other rights set out in Article 56 (1) (b) are of a purely jurisdictional as 
opposed to sovereign character183. These jurisdictional rights relate to artificial islands, 
installations and structures, the full regime for which is set out in Article 60; marine 
scientific research, which is stipulated in Part XIII of the LOS Convention, especially 
Articles 246-254; and preservation of the marine environment, which is set out in Articles 
208,210,210,211,214,216, and 220 of Part XII. 
An examination of the provisions dealing with the rights of the coastal state as 
contained in the national legislation establishing EEZs reveals that most of the EEZ 
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claimant states have also asserted certain other jurisdictional rights within the EEZ. In this 
connection, an important number of this legislation has, expressly, made a specific claim 
with regard to the jurisdiction of the coastal state over artificial islands, installations and 
structures within the EEZ, thus following the provision contained in Article 56 (1) (b) (i) 
of the LOS Convention. Over sixty-eight legislation has made this type of claim 184. This 
legislation include among others that of Bulgarial85, the Dominican Republic l86, 
Indi 187 J . 188 K 189 MI· 190 M . 191 N· . 192 S d 193 a , amalca , enya , a aysla , eXlCO , Igena , we en , 
Surlname194, Tanzanial95, United States 196 and Venezuala l97. For instance, the Decree 
No. 77 of 7 January 1987 of Bulgaria states in Article 2 (2) that in the EEZ the people's 
Republic of Bulgaria has jurisdiction over "the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures". Similar provisions have been included in the domestic 
. l~gislation of numerous, oili.er coastal states 198. 
On the otQer hand, the' legislation of several states claim jurisdiction riot qnly 
. , ~ ~ ~.- '. . . 
over artificial islands, installations andstrutture~, but also over devi~es, for economic or 
other purposes. These include among others, the legislation of Burma, India, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri-Lanka, and Vanuatu. It is important to 
recall here that, unlike the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelfl99, neither Article 56 
nor Article 60 of the LOS Convention make reference to 'devices,200, a term used in other 
parts of the LOS Convention201. Consequently, all national legislations listing such 
objects among those falling under the coastal state's jurisdiction appear to have exceeded 
the provisions of the LOS Convention. 
Moreover, the vast majority of states claiming an EEZ have already either 
explicitly or implicitly asserted jurisdiction over scientific research activities in their 
respective EEZs. Of the claims relating to the EEZ included in Smith's compilation, 62 
legislation has made this kind of claim202. Examples of them are to be found in the cases 
of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Colombia, Cook Island, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, 
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Grenada, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal and Western Samoa203, with the United 
S 204 F 205 d S . 206 b' "fi . . tates , rance , an pam emg sIgm Icant omISSIons. 
It is to be noted that a significant number of this national legislation claim only 
'jurisdiction' with regard to this matter, thus following generally Article 6 of the LOS 
Convention. But, there are also other states which have asserted, in their domestic 
legislation, 'exclusive jurisdiction' rather than merely jurisdiction as provided for in 
Articles 56 and 246 of the LOS Convention207. Examples of these claims are to be found 
in the legislation of Burma, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri-
Lanka Vanuatu, and Vietnam208. The significance of referrring to 'exclusive jurisdiction' 
is not clear. However, such a wording could have a connotation beyond the terminological 
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aspect . 
Furthermore, the Los Convention provides in Article 56 (1) (b) (iii), for the 
co~stal state to exercise jurisdiction as provided for in "its relevant provisions with regard 
to the protection and the preservation of the marine environment in the EEZ. A surVey of 
national legislation establishing EEZs shows that most of them contain a specific claim 
d· . . al .. h h 210 I . I 80 regar mg manne enVlfonment protectIon In t e t e rone . n numenca terms, over 
states made assertions to this type of claim211 . Of these eighty claims, no less than sixty-
nine of them have expressed the authority of the coastal state, in this field, in terms of 
jurisdiction212, thus coinciding in principle with the substantive description and the extent 
of the LOS Convention and other treaties213. However, few of them have enacted detailed 
provisions designed to implement Articles 207 to 222 of the LOS Convention, which 
require states to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations214. 
There are also several national claims which have asserted 'exclusive jurisdiction' 
over environmental protection within the EEZ, thus going beyond the wording of the LOS 
Convention, which confers upon coastal states only 'jurisdicdiction' with regard to the 
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protection and preservation of the marine environment. For instance, the Colombian Law 
No. 10 of August 4, 1978 states in Article 8 that the Colombian Nation "shall also 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction for ... the preservation of the marine environment,,215. 
Identical provisions have been included in the domestic legislation of Burma216, 
G 217 I d' 218 M .. 219 S h 11 220 d V 221 Th' h uyana ,n Ia , auntlUs ,eyc e es , an anuatu . IS, owever, may 
be explained by the fact that all of these claims were made around the middle of UNCLOS 
III and, consequently, were possibly influenced by an earlier draft ofUNCLOS III which 
provided for 'exclusive jurisdiction' in this matter222. The wording was later altered to 
reflect the fact that both the coastal states and the flag state share responsibility for 
enforcing international standards for the reduction and control of certain types of marine 
pollution in the EEZ: 
" Moreover, it is interesting to note that even those European states which had 
earlier proclaimed EFZs, only ,have recently made their intention very clear to take action 
with the aim of increasing their respective jurisdiction to include jurisdiction over 
environmental protection in accordance with the LOS Convention. In this context, the 
Paris Ministerial Declaration on the Coordinated Extention of Jurisdiction in the North 
Sea, adopted in September 1992, states in part that the states concerned "undertake to 
initiate the process either of establishing exclusive economic zones in areas of the North 
Sea where they do not exist for the purpose of protecting and preserving the marine 
environment or of increasing coastal state jurisdiction for that purpose, in accordance with 
international law and without going beyond the scope of the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,,223. 
In sum, the present author's review of national legislation establishing EEZs 
reveals that EEZ claimant states generally follow the conventional basic rights provided for 
in Article 56 of the LOS Convention. Despite the fact that, in certain national laws relating 
to the EEZ, the description of the asserted jurisdiction differs from that of the text of the 
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LOS Convention, those differences should not necessarily be seen as indications of the 
intention of the states concerned to apply to the zone rules different from those of the LOS 
Convention. In several cases those differences may be explained simply by the fact that 
some of the national laws establishing the EEZ were enacted before the texts being 
negotiated at UNCLOS ill had taken their final form224. 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it must be noted, at this stage, that almost all EEZ 
national legislation has put an emphasis on the coastal state's various rights and has 
omitted reference to the duties placed upon them by means of Article 56 (2).On this 
phenomenon, Moore has correctly said that there exists "almost universal elimination of 
the reference ~o 'duties' in the 'catch-all' phrase at the end of the enumeration of coastal 
states rights over the EEZ,,225. Moreover, an FAO survey identified the word duties as 
only being retained in the legislation of Antigua and Barbuda, Djibouti, Dominica, 
. 226 Guatemala, and Kenya . 
5. The Basic Rights of the Generality of States in Foreign EEZs 
As has been explained earlier, under both customary international law and the 
Convention on the High Seas227, the freedom of navigation, overflight and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas were available to ships and planes of all 
states subject, of course, to the criterion of 'reasonable use' and consideration for the 
legitimate rights of other high seas users. These freedoms are all recognized within the 
EEZ by means of Article 58 of the LOS Convention. Under Article 56 (2), the coastal state 
is expected to have due regard for these third state rights and duties, treating them in a 
manner compatible with the provisions of the Convention. A complementary due regard 
obligation vis-a-vis the coastal state is imposed on third states in Article 58 (3). The due 
regard standard is, as described by Professor Oxman, a latinized version228 of the 
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reasonable regard requirement stipulated in Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas. 
At the national level, the legislation of a considerable number of states has 
explicitly recognized freedom of navigation and overflight by foreign vessels and aircraft 
through or over the EEZ. For instance, Article 3 of the Royal Proclamation of Thailand229 
provides that, in the EEZ, the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines shall be governed by international law. Moreover, in a 
statement made in 1993 by the Thai Foreign Ministry230, Thailand has referred to the 
freedom of navigation in the EEZ of another state as part of customary international law 
codified by the 1982 Convention, and declared that it does not consider itself bound by the 
laws and regulation~; which tend to .restrict such freedom. Along the same lines, the 1978 
Act ·of Venezuela ES,tablishing an Exclusive: Economic Zone Along the Coasts of the 
, . 
MainHmdand Islands of the Republic states categorically that "other states, whether coastal 
or land-locked, shall enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of the present Act, the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight... and other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
associated with navigation and communication,,231. This provision is in line with the LOS 
Convention. Identical provisions have been included in the legislation of over forty-two 
states. These include among others that of Barbados232, Bulgaria233, Burma234, 
D .. RbI' 235 G d 236 G 1 237 I d . 238 h I C 239 omlmcan epu IC , rena a , uatema a ,n oneSIa ,t e vory oast , 
J . 240 M 241 Ph'l" 242 S T d P' . 243 S . 244 amruca , orocco, I lpmes , ao orne an flnclpe , pam , 
S · 245 S d 246 Th'l d247 T' 'd ddT b 248 T . 249 d h unname , we en , al an ,nm a an 0 ago ,anzama an t e 
United States250. 
On the other hand, numerous other EEZ claims omitted reference to freedoms of 
navigation and overflight. Examples of these claims can be found in those of Bangladesh, 
Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, France, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Iceland, 
Mozambique, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vietnam251. Such an omission has been 
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viewed by certain authors as indicating a reluctance to recognize such freedoms or to 
acknowledge such rights as being implicit and genuine rights of the regime on the EEZ252. 
In the author's opinion, such a view does not seem to be correct. This is because all the 
states whose legislation contained no referrence to freedom of navigation and overflight in 
the EEZ had argued at UNCLOS III in favor of retaining these freedoms in the EEZ. For 
instance, at the First Substantive Session, Caracas 1974, the delegate of Bangladesh stated 
that the future EEZ regime should include that: 
"All states should enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight 
and freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines subject to the 
exercise by the coastal state of its rights as provided in the future 
convention,,253. 
, ~imilar statements were made at- that same 'session by the representatives of 
H .. 254 MI· 255 d S '. L k 256 run ; a aysIa an n an a . 
This ,omission 'should not, therefore, be deemed to have, or intend to have, a 
negative impact llpon navigation and overflight257, but should be interpreted as a simple 
omission which does not alter the essential features of the EEZ. This view appears to be 
reinforced by the fact that a number of the states belonging to the above-mentioned group 
have ratified the LOS Convention258, thus signifying their acceptance of the basic 
freedoms to be enjoyed by third states in the EEZ. 
More worrisome perhaps are the EEZ claims of four developing states, namely 
Guyana, India, Mauritius, and Pakistan. All these states made assertions in their respective 
legislation that they may regulate, in nationally designated areas of the EEZ, entry into and 
passage through the waters and airspace of the EEZ259. For instance, Article 7(6) of the 
Indian Act on the Maritime Zones stipulates that the Government may provide for 
regulation of entry, passage through designated area "by establishment of fairways, 
sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of navigation 
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which is not prejudicial to the interests of India,,260. Identical provisions have been 
enshrined in the national legislation of Guyana, Mauritius and Pakistan261 . Such claims 
seem to go even beyond the rights provided for the coastal state in the territorial sea, in 
which, under Article 22 of the LOS Convention, for instance, traffic separation schemes 
may be established, but several specific matters are to be taken into account, including 
consideration of recommendations of the competent international organization and 
channels customarily used for international navigation. The national legislation of these 
states which apply to the EEZ do not even provide for any consideration of these factors, 
but rather stresses national discretion. Such asserted rights have no basis in the LOS 
Convention. 
In addition to the claims analyzed above, three other states have asserted rights 
that may have some significance for navigation. For instance, section 1 of Law No. 32n6 
of the Maldives provides that "ships of aU states. shall enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the ... exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Maldives,,262. Innocent 
passage is a practice which relates to the territorial sea alone and its use in connection with 
the EEZ blurs the legal distinction between these two zones that should be clearly 
recognized. The same Law states further that the Maldives prohibits, without its 
authorization, the entry of foreign fishing vessels into its EEZ263. The protection of the 
EEZ fisheries from unauthorized foreign fishing activities seems to be the motive force 
lying behind this claim. Nonetheless, such a claim has no foundation in the LOS 
Convention. 
Finally, numerous national legislation provides, in accordance with Article 58 of 
the LOS Convention, for the freedom of laying submarine cables and pipelines264. 
However, the record is not quite as good as with navigation and overflight. Either the 
reference to the laying of cables is omitted, although the freedom of navigation has been 
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accorded265, or the domestic legislation provides for subsequent restrictions266. 
Section IV : The Specific Legal Regimes Regulating the Various Activities 
in the EEZ in State Practice 
As has already been said in more detail in chapter 2 and 3, the LOS Convention 
sets out a detailed legal regime for every single activity that may be exercised within the 
EEZ. In this section, the author will attempt to study the detailed rules contained in state 
practice in relation to every particular activity in the zone. The purpose is to try to 
determine with precision the extent existing state practice has evolved in accordance with 
. the LOS Conventiqn's specific legal regime. 
A.. The EEZ. Fisher,ies System in Coastal State~ Practice 
According to the fisheries system set out in Part V of the LOS Convention, 
especially in Articles 61 to 73, the coastal state has sovereign rights over and the 
responsibility to secure conservation of living resources in the EEZ and to ensure that they 
are not endangered by over-exploitation267. Management and conservation measures are to 
be designed to maintain stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yields 
as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, and taking into account 
fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and generally recommended subregional, 
regional or global minimum standards. The coastal state is also placed under the duty to 
. ·1·· f h 268 d· h· h d . promote optImum utI lzaUon 0 t ose resources ,an, m t IS context, as to etermme 
the allowable catch of fish species in its EEZ269 as well as its harvesting capacitl70. If the 
coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, access to any 
surplus has to be given to other states271. In selecting such other states, the coastal state is 
required to take into consideration the significance of the living resources of the area to its 
own economy, the rights of LLSs, the requirements of the developing countries in the 
region or subregion and traditional fishing practices272. It is proposed to examine under 
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this subsection to what extent these major constituent elements of the regime related to the 
conservation and utilization of the EEZ living resources have been expressed in state 
practice. 
1. Coastal State's Conservation and Management Responsibilities 
Under the terms of the LOS Convention, the coastal state has sovereign rights 
over and the responsibility for the conservation, management and utilization of the living 
resources of the EEZ273. Article 61 is the' key article regulating conservation. The main 
conservation goals enshrined in it are to ensure: (1) the determination of the total 
allowable catch (TAC)274; (2) tryat the living resources in the exclusive economic zone are 
not endangered by over-exploitation275; (3) that the populations of harvested species are 
maintained or restored at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield 
, ' 
(MSy)276; and (4) that associated 0r dependent specIes are maintained a,bove levels at 
h· h th . od' 'b . I 1.._ d' 277 w IC err repr ucUon may ecome senous y tllJ:eatene .' . 
An examination of EEZ legislation and proclamations and fisheries regulations of 
EFZ claimant states which, as has been seen earlier, may be relevant278, wou,ld show on 
the whole that reference to management and conservation responsibilities of the coastal 
state with regard to living resources found within the asserted 200 miles zone is common 
h .. f h . I . 279 S I' I' d I . to t e vast maJonty 0 t ose natlOna mstruments . orne egIs atIon an proc amatlOns 
contain detailed provisions specifying the objectives of management and conservation of 
living resources in terms more or less reminiscent of the provisions of the texts of 
UNCLOS 111280. The Mexican legislation281 , for instance, provides that the aim of 
management and conservation measures is to ensure that the living resources of the EEZ 
are not endangered by over-exploitation282. The legislation places an obligation on the 
Federal Executive Branch to take proper management and conservation measures283. The 
relevant Portuguese law284 provides that the Government shall enact and enforce 
regulation of fishing in the EEZ, including, inter alia, the TAC and the MSY for the 
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fisheries as a whole, and the protection, conservation and restoration of the living 
resources of the EEZ285. 
The United States EEZ Proclamation286 recognizes the responsibility of the US 
to manage and conserve the living resources of the EEZ, but does not elaborate on the 
conservation measures within the zone. It is the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976 287 which provides for such measures within the United States 200 miles 
zone. Indeed, the measures provided are probably the most comprehensive measures 
found in any national legislation. Conservation and management measures are defined as 
being measures required to rebuild, restore or maintain fishing resources and the marine 
environment, and designed to ensure a supply of food, other products or recreational 
b.enefits ona continuing basis to avoid irreversible or long term adverse effects, and assure 
a future choice of options for the use of those resources288. The optimum yield is to be 
based on the MSY as modified by relevant economic, social or ecological factctors289. 
A considerable' number of other EEZ, and EFZ claims have adopted the UNCLOS III 
conservation goals290. 
On the other hand, numerous states, most of them developing ones, have referred 
in their EEZ legislation to the duty to manage and conserve the EEZ living resources, but 
such references are mainly at the general level which does not correspond to the precise 
wording of Article 61 and 62 of the LOS Convention291. Bangladesh292, Malaysil93 
and Tuvalu294 can be classified in this group. 
It has, nowadays, become obvious that, in the absence of a reliable factual basis, 
it is very difficult to formulate sound fisheries management and conservation schemes295. 
Reliable scientific information on fish stocks, technology and trained personel are 
prerequisities for good fishery management and development296. Complex and timely 
scientific computations and research to satisfy the requirements contained in Article 61 
paras. 1,2,3, and 4 are beyond the capacity of a significant number of developing coastal 
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states. There is, therefore, a great possibility that a number of developing states have been 
inhibited from adopting the LOS Convention's specific goals in their legislation simply 
because they lack the technology and know-how to obtain the scientific evidence required 
under the LOS Convention297. 
Moreover, a third group of EEZ legislation has remained silent with regard to the 
conservation obligation and the specific management and conservation objectives 
contained in Article 61 and 62 of the LOS Convention. Examples of the claims belonging 
h· bed' h f C b d' 298 C R' 299 E 300 to t IS group are to e 10Un m t e cases 0 am 0 Ia , osta Ia , gypt , 
E . I G' 301 G I 302 G' 303 G' B' 304 I C 305 quatona umea , uatema a , umea , umea Issau , vory oast , 
Mozambique306, Oman307 and Thailand308. However, in the author's opinion, the 
absence of any reference in this legislation to conservation responsibilities does not, of 
course, mean that such responsibilities are not accepted by these states. This is because, 
first, th~ very development of the 200 miles zones has been intimately connected with tpe 
'd f . . 309 dl h . bl" d h . I ea 0 conservatIon ; secon y, t e conservatIOn 0 IgatIon an . t e conservatIOn 
objectives includeq in Article 61 and 62 of the LOS Convention received very large 
support at UNCLOS III and remained the same throughout the Conference's texts since 
their first appearance in the 1975 ISNT31O; and thirdly, legislative drafters are traditionally 
cautious in using language that unnecessarily acknowledges their stateS obligations under 
internationallaw311 . They are mostly concerned with the coastal state's fisheries rights in 
the claimed zone. It follows that, in the case of such states, this problem seems to be a 
matter of legislative technique rather than any actual intention to refuse accepting 
management and conservation responsibilities. 
2. Optimum Utilization and Foreign Access 
As has been explained in chapter two in more detail312, the second main 
obligation placed upon the coastal state is to promote optimum utilization of its EEZ living 
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resources
313
. However, any activity in this regard should not, according to Article 62, be 
allowed to prejudice or affect the conservation obligation found in Article 61. This means 
in effect that, whatever level of utilization 'optimum' may require, the exploitation of the 
EEZ living resources should not be unde~aken beyond the limits prescribed in Article 61, 
f 
i.e. beyond the level of MSY as qualified by relevant economic and environmental factors 
so as to ensure that the fish stocks are not endangered by over-exploitation. 
Specific reference to this obligation is found in the EFZ and EEZ claims of many 
states. Examples of these claims can be found in the laws of Australia, Cuba, Mexico, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Sao Tome and Principe, the former 
USSR, and Venezuela314. For instance, Article 6 of the 1978 Act Establishing an 
Exclusive Economic' Zone Along the Coasts of the Mainland and Islands of the Republic 
of Venezuela315 provides that "the Republic shall promot,e the optimum use of the living 
resources of the exlusive economIc zone'without prejudice" to the provisions related to 
conservation of the living resources. This provision is exactly similar to the provision 
enshrined in Article 62 para. 1 of the LOS Convention. Australia's legislation declaring a 
200 miles fisheries zone places an obligation upon the Minister of Fisheries to pay regard 
to the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources of the Australian fishing zone 
and to ensure that the living resources of the Australian fishing zone are not endangered by 
over-exploitation316. Similarly, the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone Bill of 1984 
requires the Director General of Fisheries to prepare and continuously upgrade fishery 
programes based on the latest available scientific knowledge to ensure optimum utilization 
f fi h . l' . hod' 317 o IS ery resources m me WIt go management practIce . 
In contrast, an overwhelming majority of national legislation is silent over 
'optimum utilization' as an objective to be promoted by coastal states. However, this 
omission does not seem to imply that the states in question do not recognize the optimum 
use of the living resources found in their respective EEZs or EFZs. This is because, first, 
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both the historical development of the EFZ and EEZ and the negotiations which took place 
at UNCLOS III bear witness to the desire and aspiration of all states to improve the 
economic and social development of all peoples of the globe318; secondly, although 
national legislation and proclamations of this group of states do not make any reference to 
the provision contained in Article 62 para. 2 of the LOS Convention according to which 
coastal states have an obligation to ensure harvesting of the entire allowable catch, direct 
or implied reference to the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources of the 
zone is found in a number of fishery agreements to which these states are parties. In this 
connection, the preamble to the Fisheries Agreement between the United Mixican States 
and the Republic of Cuba of July 26, 1976 provides in part that "considering that the 
Government oftne United Mexican States plans to promote the optimum ~tilization ... iI319 .. 
Identical wordings are contain~d in the Angola/Spain Fishing Agreement of April 6, 1981 
as well as in the .Mauritania/Spain Fishing Agreement of 198232°; thirdly, the Fourth 
Lom6 Con~ention, concluded between 'the EEC and the ACP states in December 1989, 
obliges the parties "to promote the optimum utilization of the fishery resources" of the 
African, Carribean and Pacific coastal states321 . It would, therefore, seem that, unless the 
coastal state can justify its refusal on such grounds as conservation measures, it is obliged 
under current customary international law to give due regard to the interests of third states 
and promote the objective of the optimum use of its EEZ fisheries. 
As far as the right of third states to fish in foreign EEZs is concerned, the LOS 
Convention empowers and obliges a coastal state which is a party to it to determine the 
AC of the living resources of its EEZ to promote the objective of optimum utilization of its 
EEZ fisheries. Having determined the AC, it would be required to determine also its own 
capacity to harvest these resources. If its capacity does not permit it to harvest the entire 
allowable catch, it shall give other states access to the surplus322. Nevertheless, as has 
been already explained in chapter 2, the duty to accommodate foreign states is not 
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overwhelming. Large flexibility is given to the coastal state in harvesting the EEZ 
resources. A decision concerning access of third states may take into account the economy 
of the coastal state and other national interests323. Moreover, the dispute settlement system 
established by the LOS Convention precludes effective review of the coastal state's 
decision on these questions324. Consequently, the LOS Convention, essentially gives the 
coastal state very wide discretion to determine whether or not to allow foreign states to fish 
.. EEZ325 ill Its . 
There is a big difference in the way in which the LOS Convention provisions on 
foreign access to the surplus are treated in national EEZ or EFZ legislation. Some of this 
legislation contains provisions that are almost similar to those included in the LOS 
Convention. Examples of them can be found in the legislation of Cape Verde, Cuba, 
J' /' 
Portugal, Sao/Tome and Principe, New ZealllOd and the laws of those states that followed 
the New Ze.aland pattern, namely Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue and Tonga326. The Territorial 
Sea and Exclusie Economic Zo,ne Act of New Zealand, for instance, requires the Minister 
of Fisheries to determine the TAC for every fishery in the EEZ and to determine the 
harvesting capacity of the national fleet, and goes on to specify that the remaining portion 
constitutes the allowable catch for foreign fishermen327. It also empowers the Minister to 
apportion the allowable catch for foreign fishing craft among foreign countries and sets out 
a number of criteria which the Minister may take into consideration in making such 
apportionment328. These criteria, on the whole, include support for the interests of states 
that have habitually fished within the zone or helped in research, identification of stocks, 
or cooperated in the conservation and management of resources and the enforcement of 
New Zealand law relating to such resources329. The list of criteria is expressly made non-
exhaustive. Very similar provisions are included in the fisheries legislation of the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Paulu330. 
On the other hand, a significant number of claims provide for foreign access to 
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fisheries in the EFZ or EEZ under national licences and permits but no mention is made of 
foreign right to fish for any surplus. These claims include among others those of 
Barbados, Grenada, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Norway, Spain, Togo and Western 
Samoa331 . Such a situation has led certain authors to question whether access provided by 
h· 1 . 1 . 1· 1332 H . h h' t IS egIS atton meant access to surp us or access In genera . owever, In t e aut or s 
opinion such uncertainty can easily be excluded once one delves deeper into the practice of 
these states. The attitude of this legislation may reasonably be interpreted as meaning 
access to the surplus of fish as provided for in the LOS Convention. This is because, first, 
a number of these laws have expressly adopted the obligation of optimum use of the living 
resources found in the established zone333; secondly, a large number of bilateral fisheries 
agreement~ concluded subsequently by the states in ,question have contained in their 
preamb.le a dir~ct reference to the work of UNCLOS III or a specifi<; reference to the 
provisions of Article 62 of the LOS ConventIon. These fisheries agreements include, _ 
amongstm~nyothers,the agreements concluded in the very early eighties by Guinea 
-Bissau andGuinea with the EEC334; thirdly, a number of these agreements have referred 
either to the concept of surplus335 or to that of optimum use of the fishery of the zone. The 
Spanish! Angola Agreement of 1980 and the 1982 Fishery Agreement between Mauritania 
and Spain, for instance, have both referred to the rational management and full utilization 
of the living resources in their respective EEZs as well as to optimum exploitation of the 
biological resources found therein336. 
Moreover, in several other cases national legislation on EEZs have made no 
mention at all to foreign access to EEZ fisheries. This is, for instance, the case of the 
national legislation of Bangladesh, Burma, Colombia, Comoros, Dominican Republic, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Thailand337. However, this does not 
seem to imply that the states in question reject access of foreign fishermen to their 
respective EEZs. This is because, first, none of these states has explicitly denied foreign 
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access to the proclaimed zone for fishery purposes338; secondly, several fisheries or 
cooperation agreements to which many of these states are parties show that foreign access 
to fisheries resources that are found in the maritime zones under their jurisdiction is 
expressly recognized339. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be concluded that most of coastal 
states that have established EFZs or EEZs allow access for foreign fishermen to the living 
resources found in their proclaimed zones. Thus, the most important remaining issue is 
what is the specific regime under which foreign access takes place? This question is dealt 
"" 
with hereunder. 
2. 1. Criteria of Access 
Article 62.(3) of the LOS Conventin states that the coastal state would take into , 
account when providing access. to foreign fishing vessels "all relevant factors". The same . 
provision goes on to enumerate a number of factors that are meant to be illustrative. With 
the exception of the first one which relates to the significance of the EEZs living resources 
to the economy of the coastal state concerned and its other national interests, all other 
factors provide guidelines for selecting the states to be allowed access. These factors are 
considered hereunder in turn in the light of existing state practice. 
2. 1. 1. Reference to the Provisions of Article 69 and 70 (LL/GDSs) 
At the national level, only the legislation of two states has explicitly referred to 
the participation of LL/GDSs in the exploitation of the living resources of the asserted 
zone. The legislations in question are the Moroccan Law No. 1 181-179 and Togo's 
Ordinance N°o. 24/197734°. For instance, Article 4 of the Togolese Ordinance No. 24 of 
1977 provides that "the Togolese state engages itself to allow neighbouring states in the 
hinterland to participate in the exploration of biological resources in the context of bilateral 
228 
and regional agreements". In a similar manner, the Moroccan Law No. 1-81-179 states 
that, "in particular, in consideration of African solidarity, Morocco will uphold the 
principle of privileged cooperation concerning biological resources with land-locked 
neighbouring countries under terms and conditions to be established by bilateral, regional, 
or subregional agreements,,341. 
The wording of the above provisions is in line with the phrasing of the 1974 
Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea342. 
This conformity may be explained by the fact that African coastal states had from the start 
of the work of UNCLOS III shown their sympathy to the problems of LL/GDSs and had 
d h . d" . h 343 expresse t. err rea mess to gIve more concessIons to t ese states . 
There is also certain conformity between the Moroccan and Togolese legislation 
and the texts orUNCLOS IIJ. This is apparent in Article .62 of the LOS ConveotioQ and 
the previouscQrre~ponding provisions of the ISNT and RSNT. The two prqvisions 
and Article 62 (2) of the LOS Convention characterize the concession of fishing in the EEZ. 
of a neighbouring country as a concession to participate, without de,scribing this 
participation as a right. The modalities of such participation are to be agreed upon by the 
coastal state and the LL/GDSs concerned. Thus, no automatic access is recognized, but 
only a duty to negotiate agreement subject to the terms and conditions of the coastal state. 
The difference between the Moroccan and Togolese provisions is very slight and 
almost insignificant. Both provisions precondition the participation of LL/GDSs in the 
utilization of the living resources upon a prior conclusion of bilateral or regional 
agreements. However, Togo appears to make it clear that there is a duty upon itself to 
grant LL/GDSs access to the living resources of its EEZ. Morocco, on the other hand, 
merely adheres to the principle of 'privileged cooperation'. 
As has been indicated, all the other national legislation contains no specific 
provision on access of LL/GDSs to the EEZ living resources, and includes general 
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principles regarding foreign fishing, leaving the task of determining detailed rules to the 
administrators. For instance, the formulation that foreign fishing is to be exercised in 
accordance with bilateral or regional agreement has been enshrined in several claims. 
Indeed, certain coastal states have translated the abovementioned formulation into 
somewhat concrete propositions. Among those states are New Zealand and the United 
States of America. The legislation of these two states has made allusion to some 
considerations, such as whether foreign fishermen have habitually fished in the waters 
encompassed by the EEZ, the pattern of cooperation of foreign fishermen in fishery 
research and the conservation and management of fish in that area344, without making any 
reference to LL/GDSs. Thus, comparing what is provided for in this legislation with the 
provision of Article 62 (3) of LOS Convention, one can only say that they are far apart. 
Not only did the legislation ignore altogether the participation of LLlGDSs.in the utilization 
. of the livin~resources oftheirEEZs, but, more importantly, there.seems to be an implied 
rejection of acce.ss to the fisheries resources by LL/GD~s. This is c1e~ from· the above 
enumeration which omits any reference to LL/GDSs. It is worth noting, at this stage, that 
most of LL/GDSs are developing states345 having no marine fishing industry. It follows 
that any access which is restricted to states that have traditionally exercised fishing in the 
EEZ is an implied refusal of LL/GDSs participation in the use of the living resources of the 
zone. The reason is that LL/GDS's lack a marine fishing industry and, if a few of them 
possess such industry, they must have acquired it recently; and consequently they might 
have not been fishing in those areas for a long time as the word 'traditionally' seems to 
convey. 
In practice, fishing in foreign EEZs has come to be governed under the terms of 
a growing number of agreements and other arrangements346. The network of those access 
agreements is complex and multiform with the result that identification of patterns or 
trends is not an easy task347. Four types of arrangements seem to predominate. These are 
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bilateral agreements, joint venture agreements348, charter arrangements349 and contracts 
for over-the-side sales350. Our focus, however, is put upon bilateral fishery agreements 
and joint venture agreements. For the coastal state, they serve as instruments for regulating 
and securing a broad range of benefits from granting access. For the foreign fishing states, 
they operate as a framework defining the concessions given regarding the 200 miles zone 
and, increasingly, as a technique to secure access in conditions of intensified competition. 
With regard to Article 69 and 70 of the LOS Convention dealing with the rights 
of LL and OOSs to participate on an equitable basis in the surplus of the living resources 
of the EEZs of foreign coastal states, as in the case of national legislation, treaty practice 
has not been influenced by those provisions. In this context, an analysis covering more 
than one 'hundred bilateral fishing agreements was. done in 1982 by Carroz and Savini in 
whiCh t~e' two~utQrs,have ~oncluded that "none of the bilateral agreements concluded so 
far· make an express·reference to the right of these two categories of states,,351. Moreover, 
in a subsequent study related to fishery agreements concluded by the African cQastal states 
located on the Atlantic Ocean, the same two authors reached a similar conclusion. Iri this 
connection, they have correctly said: 
"Aucun des accords bilatereaux conclus jusqu'ici dans la region ... ne se 
refere expressement, au droit de ces deux types d'Etats ou ne confere des 
droits de peche a des Etats sans Iittoral,,352. 
However, since 1984 reference to Article 69 and 70 of the LOS Convention has 
began to emerge in treaty practice and positions of principle. In 1984 the seven states 
members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) decided to create a 
Higher Fishery Science Institute for the purpose of training highly qualified specialists 
from the region. They discussed also the possibiblity of setting up a joint fishing company 
with financial support from the African Development Bank353. 
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Needless to say, the setting up of such joint fishing venture would give a good 
opportunity to the three LLSs of the Community namely, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 
to participate in the exploitation of the living resources in the EEZs of coastal states in the 
subregion. 
Moreover, in 1987 Algeria and Mauritania concluded an Agreement relating to 
Cooperation in Fishing Matters whose preamble refers explicitly to the LOS Convention as 
well as to Article 70 dealing with the right of aDSs to participate in the exploitation of the 
EEZ's living resources354. 
In .addition, Bolivia, a signatory to the LOS Convention, signed with Peru on 24 
January 1992 an agreement under which Peru grants to Bolivia the free use of its port 
facilities. The agreement includes also the possibility for Bolivia to enter intojoint ventures 
with Peruvian companies to engage in fishing activities355. Such an agreement represents 
the first inpiementatioll of Article 69 of the LOS Convention granting fi~hing rights to a 
land locked state of the same region. 
Nonetheless, like legislative practice, treaty practice referring to the provisions 
contained in Article 69 and 70 remains very scant. 
2.1.2. States Whose Fleets Habitually Fished in the Waters Now 
Encompassed by the EEZ 
Article 62 (3) has adopted "the need to minimize economic dislocation in states 
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone" as one of the relevant factors that the 
coastal state shall take into account when giving access to the surplus of fish of its EEZ. 
This factor refers to states whose fishing fleets have, in the past, engaged in regular 
fishing activities in areas, previously high seas but now encompassed in the EEZ. It is the 
last mentioned factor in a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when giving 
access to the surplus. Thus, if the order of those factors is given legal weight, as has been 
232 
suggested by certain authors356, the factor of economic dislocation in states whose 
nationals have habitually fished in the zone together with that of states which have made 
substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks should have the least weight 
among those enumerated. However, as already suggested in chapter 3357, the coastal 
state's choice is ultimately dependent on the terms and conditions that it finds satisfactory, 
and this may mean that a state in this last category will be granted preference. If any order 
of priority is suggested by the provision contained in paragraph 3 of Article 62, it seems 
that it is undermined by the discretionary power given to the coastal state to establish the 
terms and conditions of access which satisfy it. 
Thus, it seems that, under the above provision, the coastal state is only obliged to 
take this factor into consideration together with all other relevant factors. Moreover, it has 
to,·be taken into consideration only in so far as to minimize the economic dislocation of the 
state whose nationalsh.ave habitually fished in the waters now coming under the coastal 
state's jurisdiction. Therefore, such nationals are not recognized as having an automatic 
access to a part of the allowable catch reserved to third states. 
Legislative practice concerning the criteria of access to the surplus of the EEZ's 
living resources displays considerable variety. A small number of national legislation 
referred to traditional fishing rights as a factor among others which is to be taken into 
acount in giving access to the surplus. These states include, among others, Fiji, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Spain and the USA 358. The national legislation of New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji, for instance, has adopted very similar provisions. 
Each one of them assumes control over all fishing resources within the 200 miles EEZ and 
authorizes the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act to grant licences on a 
wide variety of terms and conditions, including payment of fees359. Moreover, all of them 
have specified the criteria to be applied in giving access to foreign fishing vessels. While 
all do refer in the criteria for granting access to states that have habitually fished in the 
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area
360
, nDne Df them has made any reference to. LL Dr GDSs. HDwever, as Dne authDr 
has said, nDn-reference tDLL and GDSs in the last three laws is pDssibly due to' that the 
participatiDn Df LL and GDSs is postulated Dn a regiDnal basis361. 
The Spanish Law No.. 15/1978 provides that "fishing in the eCDnDmic ZDne shall 
be reserved fDr Spanish natiDnals, and subject to. agreements ... to. natiDnals Df thDse 
cDuntries whDse fishing vessels have fished in the zDne,,362. This provisiDn Dmitted any 
reference to. all the Dther factDrs cited in Article 62 Df the LOS CDnventiDn. HDwever, it 
seems that it reflects faithfully Spain's understanding Df Articles 62 (3), 69 and 70 which 
give a top priDrity to. states that have habutually fished in the EEZ Dver LL and GDSs 
h· h k th 363 w IC see entrance to. e ZDne . 
The United States legislatiDn includes interesting details with regard to. the criteria 
of access. SectiDn 201 (e) Of the 1976 Fishery ConserVatiDn and Management Act364 
.provides that the Secretary of State, shall determine the allDcatiDn amDng fDreign nations 
Df the tDtal;allDwable level Df foreign fishing which is permitted with respect to.' any fishery 
subject to. the exclusive fishery management authDrity Df the United States. In making any 
such determinatiDn, the Secretary Df State and the Secretary shall cDnsider, first, whether 
and to. what extent fDreign natiDnals have traditiDnally engaged in such fishery; secDndly, 
whether such natiDns have cDDperated with the United States in, and made substantial 
cDntributiDns to., fishery research and the identificatiDn Df fishery reSDurces and; thirdly, 
whether such natiDns have cDDperated with the United States in enfDrcement and with 
respect to. the cDnservatiDn and management Df fishery reSDurces. Thus, while the United 
States legislatiDn, like the LOS CDnventiDn, provides fDr an illustrative list Df factDrs, it 
gives a tDP priDrity to. traditiDnal fishing rights. This apprDach Df the United States is nDt 
immediately clear. It is probably due to. the United States pDsitiDn tDwards the law Df 
fisheries at that time. By 1976, the United States was still an DppDnent to. the EEZ cDncept. 
The issuance Df the 1976 Act was a clear indicatiDn Df its suppDrt Df the traditiDnsllaw Df 
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fisheries as reflected in the 1958 Convention and the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction 
judgement. 
The 1980 amendment to the FCMA fonnula mentions traditional fishing as one of 
the factors to be taken into account in giving access to the surplus365. But allocation is 
de . aril th b . f . ad li· d . . h 366 rna pnm yon e aSIS 0 cooperattve tr e po Cles an a reCIprOCIty sc erne . 
With the exception of the above claims, none of the other existing national 
legislation establishing EFZs or EEZs made any reference to the notion of traditional 
fishing rights. All national legislation enacted by African and Latin American States have 
adhered to this pattern. A plausible explanation for such a pattern seems to be that a 
significant .number of thes~ states have attained their independence recently. Therefore, 
any allusion to traditional fishing rights. would mean an open invitation to developing 
states to·cbntinue plundering what is left .of the living resources of the sea adjacent to their 
coasts: 
As far as bilateral fishery agreements are concerned, no clear picture of conduct is 
, 
apparent. The big majority of bilateral agreements concluded between developed states 
have made reference to traditional fishing rights367. For instance, the preamble of 
Japan/South Africa Fishery Agreement of 6 December 1977 states that "considering also 
the desire of the Gouvernment of Japan that nationals and fishing vessels of Japan 
continue to pursue their traditional interests in the development and utilization of fishery 
resources off the coast of the Republic of South Africa,,368. Similarly, the framework 
agreements entered into by the USA with EEC, Norway, Portugal and the USSR have all 
stipulated that "in detennining the portion of the surplus that may be available to vessels of 
the country, the Government of the United States will decide on the basis of the factors 
identified in the United States law, including whether and to what extent the fishing 
vessels of such nations have traditionally engaged in fishing in such fishery,,369. 
Moreover, almost all of the bilateral agreements concluded by Spain370 and the EEC371 
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contain a preambular reference to this interest. 
On the other hand, generally, most of the bilateral fishery agreements granting 
access to fisheries in waters under the jurisdiction of developing states made no mention of 
traditional fishing and of the need for reducing economic dislocation. However, 
exceptional cases are to be found, especially in the bilateral agreements concluded between 
the EEC and some developing states. These agreements include, among others, the Guinea 
BissaulEEC Fisheries Agreement of April 26, 1981, the EEC/Senegal Agreement of 
January 21, 1982 amending the Agreement on Fishing off the Coast of Senegal signed on 
15 June 1979, and the Equatorial GuinealEEC Fisheries Agreement of 1984. All of them 
contain the routine EEC clause which states that "taking into account the fact that vessels 
flying the flags of Member States of the Community habitually engaged in fishing 
activities in that zone,,372. 
Finally, befory leaving this point,. it is worth reGalling that'the concept of 
traditional. fishing rights was sufficiently elucidated by the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Cases373.There, the Court observed that the traditional rights of the applicant 
(the UK) should be accommodated with the preferential rights of Iceland. Such an 
accommodation could not be based, however, on a phasing out of the fishing rights of the 
United Kingdom. The Court then went on saying that "due recognition must be given to 
the rights of both parties, namely the rights of the United Kingdom to fish in the waters in 
dispute, and the pr~ferential rights of Iceland. Neither rights is an absolute one,,374. The 
Court, thus, placed the British traditional rights on the same level as the Icelandic rights. 
However, traditional fishing activities in areas previously high seas, but now 
encompassed by the 200 miles EFZ or EEZ, do not have the same position under both the 
LOS Convention and in state practice. As already explained, traditional fishing rights 
constitute, under the terms of the LOS Convention, only one of the numerous criteria that 
a coastal state may take into consideration in giving access to the living resources falling 
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under its jurisdiction. Moreover, access of third states, including access of states whose 
fishing fleets have habitually fished in the area included in the zone, has been limited to the 
surplus whose determination rests within the coastal state's absolute discretion. 
Furthennore, there is no duty upon the coastal state to give a portion of what is left of the 
TAC to states whose fishing fleets have traditionally carried out fishing activities in the 
asserted 200 miles zone. On the contrary, it may exclude them altogether. If they were 
excluded, no remedy to redress the situation would be available to them. This is simply 
because the dispute settlement systeIlJ established by the LOS Convention precludes 
effective review of the coastal state's decision375. 
2. 1.3. States which Cooperated in Research and Identification of Stocks 
According to Article 62 (3), the other consideration to be taken into acco~nt by 
the coastals~tate in .granting access is that of states that have made substantial efforts in 
research and identification of stocks found in its EEZ. Like the preceding criteria, states' 
that have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks are, at least as far 
as the underdeveloped states are concerned, also distant-water fishing states376. 
This criterion has been reflected in the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act of 1977 of New Zealand. The Act in question provides that in making an 
apportionment of the surplus the Minister may take into account, among other criteria, 
"whether such countries have co-operated with New Zealand in fisheries research and in 
the identification of fish stocks within the zone,,377. The United States FCMA 1976, 
Section 201 (e), as amended in 1980, includes a similar provision. 
However, the big majority of national legislation establishing EFZs or EEZs do 
not refer to that criteria. Moreover, with the exception of a few bilateral fisheries 
agreements concluded by some DWFSs, namely Japan, the United States and the 
237 
USSR378, no other agreement contained any allusion to it. 
2.1.4. The Requirements of Developing States in the Sub-Region or 
Region in Harvesting Part of the Surplus 
This criteria is the third item mentioned in the illustrative list of factors enshrined 
in Article 62 (3) of the LOS Convention. 
Reference to this criteria in national legislation is very scant. Only two African 
coastal states, namely Morocco and Togo, appear to have expressly mentioned this 
criterion. Thus, Article 13 of the Moroccan Decree No. 1/81n9379 provides that, "in 
consideration of African solidarity, Morocco will upheld the principle of privileged 
coopreration concerning biological resources with landlocked neighbouring countries 
under tenns and .conditions to be established by bilateral, r~gional or subregional 
agreements". Similarly; the TogoleseOrdinance No. 24 of 1977 states that, "in the spirit 
of intra-African solidarity, the Togolese State ... 'allow neighbouring states in the hinterland 
to participate in the exploitation of biological resources in the context of bilateral and 
regional agreements,,380. Thus, these two states remained faithful to the 1974 Declaration 
of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea381 to which they 
were parties. 
Apart from the above legislation, all the other EFZ or EEZ claims kept silent on 
this criterion. Furthermore, only very few bilateral fisheries agreements appear to take into 
account the criterion relating to the requirements of developing states in the sub-region or 
region. These agreements include, among others, the Shrimp Fishing Agreements 
concluded in 1975 by Brazil with Barbados, Trinidad, Tobago and Suriname382. 
2. 2. Conditions Governing Access 
Article 62 (4) of the LOS Convention states that foreign fishennen are to comply 
238 
with conservation measures and "other terms and conditions established in the regulations 
of the coastal state". These may include licencing and payment of fees (in the case of 
developing coastal states they may consist of 'compensation in the field of financing, 
equipment and technology relating to the fishing industry'), management measures, 
including regulation of catch effort, and conditions relating to surveillance, the conduct of 
specified research programs, the landing of catch in the coastal state, joint venture and 
other cooperative arrangements, the training of personal383. The list of examples is 
illustrative. 
An examination of national claims made by coastal states with regard to EFZs or 
EEZs indicates that the conditions attached to foreign fishing are, generally, in conformity 
with the provisions enshrined in Article 62 of the LOS Convention. In the majority of 
cases, these conditions include, but are not restricted to, the following : licensing .and 
payment of fees; conservation and management measures; reporting requirements and 
observers; joint ventures; and research and fishery development assistance. 
2. 2. 1. Licensing and Payment of Fees 
The participation of foreigners in the sharing of the 200 miles living resources of 
coastal states is not allowed automatically once a surplus of the TAC is declared to exist by 
a coastal state. In fact, most of those states which have established EFZs or EEZs make 
such participation dependent upon the conclusion of an agreement and the issuance of a 
fishing licence by the competent authorities of the coastal state in whose waters fishing 
would take place384. Moreover, the main condition which most fishery agreements impose 
upon the exercise of foreign fishing within the EFZ or EEZ is the possession of a valid 
licence by foreign fishing vessels. In other words, even in the case of the presence of a 
fishery agreement between a coastal state and a foreign state, nationals of the latter must, 
as a preliminary condition, obtain a fishing licence whose obtainment depends on a prior 
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satisfaction of the conditions attaching to it. Licence conditions are in some cases included 
in the legislation itself385, while in certain other cases are left to be set later in regulations 
to be made by administrators386. 
Generally speaking, obtainment of a fishing licence is subject to payment of fees. 
In establishing licence fees and other payments for fishing rights, coastal states are faced 
with a basic choice between fees based on the actual catch and lump sum payments387• 
Royalty payments may present a more accurate, in a sense more equitable, method of 
revenue sharing between coastal states and foreign fishing vessels, and they avoid the 
danger of encouraging over-intensive fishing methods. They also appear to place least 
risks on foreign vessels, which pay only for the fish actually fished. On the other hand, 
lump sum payments seem to place the least administrative burden on the coastal state. 
In actual pr~ctice, licence fees to be paid are specified in a fishery agreement or 
the latter merely refer to the relevant l)ationallegislation of the coastal state388.· Various 
methods of computing the licence fees are applied, including those based on the tonnage of 
fishing vessels389, a fixed sum per vessel390 and a total lump-sum fee covering all fishing 
operations391 . 
2. 2. 2. Conservation and Management Measures 
Most, if not all, coastal states which licence foreign fishing operations provide, at 
least in theory, for obedience of management measures as a condition of licences392. 
These measures are of two types. The first type includes general management measures 
such as fishing seasons, minimum mesh or size and age of species that may be caught. 
These are normally contained in the basic fisheries law and regulations, and are usually 
incorporated by reference as conditions of the foreign fishing vessel licence393. The 
second category contains special measures that are based partly on conservation principles, 
but more commonly on national policies of protecting local and, in particular, local 
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artisanal fisheries from competition with foreign fleets. For instance, the Solomon Islands 
Foreign Fishing Vessels Regulations of 1981 provides that foreign fishing vessels shall 
not fish within the waters contained within the outermost limits of the territorial sea or 
other areas endorsed on the permission394. 
2. 2. 3. Reporting Requirement and Observers 
A number of national legislation relating to EFZs or EEZs make reference to 
reporting requirement and to the placing of observers on board foreign fishing vessels 
allowed to fish in the zone395. The points at which reporting is required, as specified in 
this legislation, tend to be entry into the zone, start of fishing operations, cessation of 
, 
operations and th~ departure from the ~one396. Moreover, in order to assist the ongoing 
process of stock assessment, several states require periodical statistics and other data on 
their catches and efforts. This isin line with Article 62 (4) (e) of the LOS Convention .. 
In addition, .a m~mber of states make provision for observers to' be placed on 
board foreign vessels, very often at the expense of the foreign vessel, and to be given 
food, accommodation as well as the necessary access to vessel's facilities and equipment 
such as radio communications equipment, to achieve their missions397. This is also in 
accord with Article 62 (4) (g) of the LOS Convention. This system of observers appears to 
be most productive where large foreign fishing vessels are involved. 
2. 2. 4. Joint Ventures 
With the exception of the Gambian Fisheries Act No. 17 of 1977398, all other 
national legislation relating to EFZs or EEZs do not refer to any requirement for foreign 
fishing vessels I owners to operate in joint ventures with local interests. A number of 
coastal states, however, have recently started encouraging joint ventures as envisaged in 
Article 62 (4) (i) of the LOS Convention in bilateral agreements. Most of those agreements 
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tend to be couched in general terms, calling for facilitation of cooperation through joint 
ventures and other appropriate means. Useful instances of those agreements are to be 
found in the 1985 agreement between EEC and Seychelles399 and the 1992 agreement 
between Bolivia and Peru4OO. For example, the former stipulates that the EEC was to 
participate in projects connected with the development of fisheries in the Seychelles. 
However, some of those agreements are more specific, in the sense that they refer to such 
• • C h· b . . d k· fi h d 401 Jomt ventures lor catc mg, uymg processmg an mar enng sea IS ery pro ucts . 
2.2.5. Cooperation in Research and Fishery Development Assistance 
Under Article 62 (4) (j), coastal states are also permitted to request the training of . 
personnel and the transfer of fisheries technology, including improvement of their capacity 
to undertake fisheries research. This requirements is found in a number of national 
legislation. The Canadian legislation, for instance, makes it a condition of any licence 
issued in respect of a foreign fishing vessel that the master of the vessel should comply 
with instructions given to him by authorized officials of the flag state in respect of any 
programme of sampling, observation or research requested of the flag state by the 
Minister402. An obligation to conduct specified programmes of fisheries research is also 
one of the possible conditions of foreign fishing vessel licences provided for under the 
national legislation of Fiji and New Zealand403. 
This requirement is also found in bilateral fishery agreements. In this connection, 
several agreements concluded, especially between developed and developing states, 
include provisions to the effect that the developed state will provide the research 
vessel and equipment, and bear the cost of research activities. These agreements include, 
among others, the agreement concluded by the USSR with Gambia in 1975, Guinea 
Bissau 1975, Sierra Leone 1976, Angola 1977, Mauritania 1978, Morocco 1978 and 
Seychelles 1978404. 
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Moreover, in certain other cases, a developed state agrees to give fellowships and 
to accept trainees in its scientific institutions 405. 
2. 2. 6. Other Conditions 
A number of states impose some other conditions not mentioned above. In this 
context, the Bahamas legislation, for example, stipulates that licence allocations can only 
be made to foreign states under a bilateral agreement that specifies, inter alia, that access to 
the markets of that foreign state shall be granted for the fishery resources and fishery 
products harvested by the fishermen of the Bahamas in the EE:t°6. Some other states, 
such as Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa, merely indicate that requirements 
concerning local landings and processing may be a condition of the fishing licence 407. 
Whether local landings are to be encouraged or not appears to dep~nd on the state of the 
local fishing effort and market, and the need .of the processing industry sector. In several 
cases, ~ glut of landingswoi.lld merely depress the local market prices to the detriment of 
local fishermen. This explains the prohibition imposed by certain coastal states on local 
landing by foreign vessels. 
3. Surveillance and Enforcement 
As has been discussed earlier in chapter 2, Article 73 of the LOS Convention 
empowers the coastal state to take enforcement measures in its EEZ, including boarding, 
inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings as may be necessary to ensure compliance with 
its laws and regulations. Arrested vessels and their crews, however, are to be released 
promptly on posting of reasonable bond or other security. Moreover, penalties do not 
include imprisonment in the absence of agreement to the contrary between the states 
concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment. Furthermore, in cases where 
vessels are arrested together with their crews or detained, the coastal state is put under a 
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duty to. nQtify the flag state Qf the actiQn taken and penalties impQsed. 
Generally speaking, similar PQwers Qf stQPping, bQarding, inspectiQn, seizure 
and arrest in the event Qf suspected cQntraventiQns are cQntained in almQst every single 
EFZ Qr EEZ claim, as well as in many agreements. FQr instance, Trinidad and TQbagQ's 
Act No.. 24 Qf 1986408 lists the PQwers to. be taken by the cQmpetent authQrities in relatiQn 
to. any fQreign fishing vessels within the cQuntry's fisheries limits as fQllQWS : 
(a) Stop and board, inspect, seize and detain a foreign fishing craft; 
(b) Seize any fish and equipment found on board the foreign 
fishing craft; 
(c) Arrest the master and crew of any foreign fishing craft... and may 
institute such criminal proceedings against them, as may be necessary 
to ensure complian~e with the Act and the Regulations409. 
These PQwers. are to' be enfQrced by members Qf the Trinidad and TpbagQ coast 
guard; members Qf the PQlice service; fisheries Qfficers; custQms Qfficers, as well as by 
any Qther persQn autbOllzeO·m wilimg by ine "Mullster to. wnQm reSPQnSIDuny 'lQr~lSnenes 
is assigned41O. EnfQrcement Qf these PQwers and similar Qnes in natiQnallegislatiQn Qf 
SQme Qther cQastal states is assigned to. the fisheries authQrities and/Qr members Qf the 
armed fQrces 411. 
NatiQnallegislatiQn Qf a few states have set Qut procedures fQr repQrting fisheries 
Qffences and fQr arresting Qffending fQreign vessels in detail. A gQQd instance Qf them is 
to. be fQund in the Senegalese Maritime Fishing Law No.. 76_89412 which provides fQr 
three different procedures fQr repQrting Qffences and arresting fQreign vessels, depending 
o.n the cQnditiQns and reactiQn Qf the Qffending vessels. The Senegalese procedures alSo. 
authQrize pursuit Qf Qffenders Qver jurisdictiQnal bQundaries provided that such pursuit 
and incursiQns are permitted under agreements with neighbQuring cQuntries413.This raises 
the issue Qf whether Qr no.t cQastal states are allQwed to. undertake hQt pursuit Qf fQreign 
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vessels violating their EFZs or EEZs regulations into another foreign EFZ or EEZ. As 
mentioned earlier, state practice relevant to such situations is extremely scant. In United 
States v. FN Kaiyo Maru, 1974414 a Japanese fishing vessel, the Kaiyo Maru, violated 
the fishery zone of the United States and was pursued by the United States Coast Guard 
into the high seas and arrested. There, a United States court held that Article 24 of the 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, to which the United 
States was a party, is permissive, and the United States could establish a contiguous zone 
for fishery purposes and that hot pursuit could start therefrom. 
The practice of the United Kingdom reflected in some of its policy statements 415 
seems to be that the United Kingdom would undertake hot pursuit of vessels violating its 
EFZ regulations into the high seas but not into a foreign fishing zone. It is not clear 
whether the United Kingdom's policy has been influenced by the fact that Britain relies. on . 
its navy for its enforcement or whether foreign EFZs or EEZs would not be entered even if 
a civilian enforcement unit were in operation. However, there appears to be no legal-
obstacle to hot pursuit of an offending vessel into a foreign EEZ, either in customary law 
or under the LOS Convention416. 
As regards penalties for violating fisheries laws and regulations, the majority, if 
not all, EFZ or EEZ claims provide for fines417. This is also the practice reflected in a 
number of agreements 418. However, the level of fines varies considerably from one state 
to another and according to the seriousness of the offence419. In this connection, the 
Soviet national Law provides that fines for violations of fishing regulations, as well as for 
illegal fishing vary with the seriousness of the violations420. Fines for damaging certain 
species, such as walrus, have been specified in terms of rubles per animal, and fines for 
illegal trade in of certain fish and fish products, such as caviar, have been based on their 
k . 421 mar et pnces . 
In addition to fines, many if not most claims, empower the courts to order 
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forfeiture of fishing gear and boats 422. This practice is reflected also in several bilateral 
agreements423. In several cases, forfeiture of catch and sometimes gear is automatic, even 
on the first offence 424. 
Despite the fact that imprisonment or any other form of corporal punishment is 
excluded by all the texts of UNCLOS III, it has been provided as a possible penalty for 
violations of fisheries regulations and illegal unlicenced fishing in a number of national 
claims425. The national legislation of the Bahamas, for instance, not only envisages 
imprisonment penalties for fishing violations, but also provides for summary 
punishment426. In the case of Cape Verde, the usual penalty would be a financial penalty, 
while imprisonment would be impose~ only in cases of repeated violations427. Such a 
claim exceeds the powers given to coastal states in this field under the LOS Convention. 
However, the few states that had earlier included imprisonment in their national legislation 
, -
appear to he moving gradmilly towards bringing their conduct on this issue into harmony 
with Article 73 paragraph 3 of the LOS Convention. This is evidenced by the fact that a 
number of those states have -recently either eliminated imprisonment penalties in 
subsequent legislation or excluded such penalties in their actual practice. For instance, 
Australia eliminated imprisonment penalties by means of its 1978 amendments428 to the 
1975 Fisheries Act429, while the bilateral agreement concluded by the United States of 
America with Japan in 1977 stipulates that in the case of violation of fishery regulations 
the representative of the US Government will recommend to the court that the penalty not 
include imprisonment or any other form of corporal punishment430. 
Like the provisions of the LOS Convention, a significant number of EFZ and 
EEZ claims now provide for the release of seized fishing vessels and their crews on the 
posting of a satisfactory bond or other form of securitl31 . The bond is in most cases 
held as security for the full payment of any fine or any other penalty ordered by the court. 
Effective surveillance and enforcement depends on the availability of the physical 
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and financial means. Thus, in a number of cases the burden of ensuring compliance with 
the laws and regulations of the coastal state is placed on the foreign flag state. The United 
States legislation, for instance, provides that entrance of any foreign fishing vessel into the 
United States fishery conservation zone for fishery purposes depends on the conclusion of 
an agreement under which the foreign flag state must take on binding commitment, both 
on its own behalf and on behalf of its vessels, to comply with the conditions applicable to 
foreign fishing operations432. Similar provisions are included in the Bahamas 
legislation433. Some states also require that the flag state authorities should assume 
responsibility for ~ompliance with certain aspects of coastal state controls, such as 
ensuring that proper reports are given on authorized fishing operations 434. 
Furthermore, foreign fishing vessels could escape punishment for offences 
. committed due to lack of corroboration required under nationallaw435. Most coastal states 
have Gircumventedsuc.h evidentiary problems by the use of rebuttable presumptions such 
as "all fish found on board a fishing vessel that has been discovered committing an. offence 
in waters under the jurisdiction of the coastal state shall be presumed to have been caught 
in those waters during the commission of the offence,,436. This would exempt a coastal 
state from proving the origins of the fish, a matter which would be difficult to prove after 
the catch, especially when harvested species are mingled with fish caught elsewhere. 
4. State Practice on the Specific Regimes Contained in Articles 63 to 67 of 
the LOS Convention 
As has been said earlier in chapter 2 in more details, Part V of the LOS 
Convention contains specific provisions dealing with certain particular species of fish, 
namely transboundary stocks, marine mammals, anadromous stocks, catadromous 
species, and highly migratory species. It is proposed to examine, hereunder, to what 
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extent these specific regimes have been reflected in state practice. 
4. 1. Resources Located in More than One Zone 
Under Article 63 a coastal states is obliged to cooperate with other states which 
fish for the shared or straddling stocks associated with its EFZ or EEZ. As far as shared 
stocks are concerned, the stated objective is to "seek to agree upon the measures necessary 
to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks", without 
prejudice to the other provisions contained in Part V concerning fisheries. This means that 
cooperation does not infringe on the sovereign rights of the cooperating states. 
Moreover, the form that cooperation should take ac~ording to Article 63 (1) is 
flexible; it may either be direct or throug,h appropriate regional or subregional 
organizations~ If consultations or efforts to achieve cooperation within these frameworks 
fail, coastal states would be free to exercise their sovereign rights. unilaterally. 
The Gambian Fisheries Act of 1977437, the United States FMCA of 1976438 and 
Venezuala's 1978 EEZ Act439 adopted an approach similar to that included in the above 
provision. For instance, the latter provides that the "Republic shall seek, either directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary to coordinate and enforce the conservation and development of the same stock 
or stocks of associated species occuring within the EEZ of the Republic and the EEZs of 
neighbouring states,,440. This is also a practice that can be found in several fisheries 
agreements. Instances of those agreements are to be found in Canada/European 
Community Agreement on Fisheries of 30 December 1981441 , and the Convention 
Relating to Regional Development of Fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea concluded in June 
21, 1984 between Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and 
Zaire 442. For example, Article 4 of the former agreement states in part that "the two parties 
shall cooperate, either bilaterally or through appropriate international organizations, to 
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ensure the proper management and conservation of stocks occuring within the fishery 
zones of both parties and stocks of associated species". 
Moreover, a conduct in line with the provision of Article 63 (1) of the LOS 
Convention is also found in the practice of the Fisheries Commission of the North West 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)443. In all these instances, cooperation has taken 
the fonn of agreeing on T AC for each stock, allocating this between the states concerned, 
and to some extent agreeing on other conservation measures. Unfortunatly, the practice on 
this matter is sti11limitted and it is thus not easy to gauge the positions of omitting states on 
the problem. 
4. 2. Resources Occuring both Within the EEZ and the High Seas 
The provision cont:ained in Article 63 (2) deals with fish stocks that lie across the 
EEZ/high seas boundary line444 ina way similar to Article 63 (1). But, unlike the case of 
shared stocks, cooperation- with a view to adopting the measures necessary for the 
conservation of the fish stocks concerned is required between coastal states and states 
fishing for such stocks in the high seas areas adjacent to the EEZ. Article 4 (1) of the 
Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas also contained this same obligation. 
Moreover, the above provision envisages that conservation measures may be 
adopted directly or through existing appropriate subregional or regional organizations, or 
through appropriate organizations to be established for this purpose. Furthennore, it 
expressly states that the agreed conservation measures relate only to fishing on the high 
seas. Thus, if the search for agreement fails, the coastal state can exercise the rights given 
to it under Articles 56, 61 and 62 of the LOS Convention with respect to those fish 
species when they are found within its EEZ. 
An examination of national claims made by coastal states with regard to EEZs 
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indicates that not even a single claim has made an express reference to the provision 
contained in Article 63 (2) of the LOS Convention concerning stocks which straddle the 
200 miles zone and the high seas. Indeed, certain coastal states have recently indicated 
their desire to further extend their offshore claims to encompass 'EI Mar PresenciaI' or the 
'Presential Sea,44S. 
From the historical standpoint, the concept of the 'Presential Sea' was 
introduced for the first time by Chile in the 1991 amendments to its fisheries law. 
Geographically, the 'Presential Sea' area of interests for Chile has been defined as the high 
seas area beyond and abjacent to the EEZ, surrounded by the South American continent, 
AQtarctica, and Easter Island, in a broad quadrangle of the South Pacific. A similar 
definition is contained in the Chilean fisheri~s law passed in 1991446. 
The 1991 Chilean law provides that conservation measures may be enacted for. 
fish .stocks existing in the EEZ and in the high seas. When straddling stocks are fished in 
the high seas in violation of conservation measures, their landing in Chile may be 
prohibited. Similarly, when there is evidence that fisheries activities in the high seas are 
adversly affecting the resources of their exploitation by Chilean vessels jn the EEZ, the 
landing of catches, the supplying of ships or the provision of other direct or indirect 
services in Chilean ports or other areas of the EEZ and the territorial sea may be 
prohibited447. 
However, according to Article 86 of the LOS Convention, the asserted presential 
sea area constitutes a part of the high seas in which every state enjoys the freedom of 
fishing, subject, of course, to the duty to have due regard to the interests of other states, as 
well as to other duties imposed by international law 448. Moreover, where the same stock 
of species occurs within an EEZ and an adjacent area of the high seas frequented by 
foreign fishermen, the states concerned are, according to Article 63 (2) of the LOS 
Convention and Article 7 (a) of the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the 
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Implementation of the Provisions of the LOS Convention, placed under a duty to 
cooperate in enacting appropriate conservation and management measures. It follows that 
the presential sea claim referred to above is incompatible with current international law. 
The straddling stocks problem has been one of the most contentious issues to 
emerge since the adoption of the LOS Convention449. Various cooperative initiatives 
relating to the conservation and management of these fish species in a way similar to that 
provided for in the LOS Convention have been undertaken by affected states. Instances of 
cooperative efforts, in this field, are to be found in the practice of the Fisheries 
Commission of the· North West Atlantic Fisheries Organization450, the Latin American 
Organization for Fishery Development, which was established in 1982 by Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gu~temala, Peru, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicarag\l.a,and· Panama 451 ,as weli· as in the 1991 Convention on Fisheries Cooperation 
among 22 African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean 452. 
4. 3. Marine Mammals 
Article 65 of the LOS Convention authorizes coastal states or competent 
international organizations to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals 
more strictly than provided for in the other EEZ fisheries provisions. It is, perhaps, worth 
recalling that this article does not apply to the conservation and exploitation of these fish 
species in the EEZ only but, pursuant to Article 120, it also applies to the conservation of 
marine mammals in the high seas. Thus, it envisages a single and uniform management 
regime to be applied both in the EEZ and the high seas. 
Moreover, states are particularly urged to work through appropriate organizations 
for the conservation and management of whales and other cetaceans. But, Article 65, like 
most of the other articles of the LOS Convention, do not define the competent or 
appropriate international organization for which it envisages the power to prohibit or limit 
251 
the exploitation of marine mammals. However, it seems safe to say that the drafters had 
principally in mind the International Whaling Commission (IWC), by far the best known 
international organization dealing with the exploitation of marine mammals 453. 
At the national level, only three national claims contain specific provisions 
relating to conservation and management of marine mammals. These are the claims of 
Senegal, Guinea and the USA 454. Nonetheless, a trend towards international regulation of 
marine mammals in a manner similar to that provided for in the LOS Convention seems to 
be emerging. This trend is particularly reflected in the practice of the IWe whose 
membership has increased lately to no less than 37 states455. This practice has taken the 
. fonn of adopting regulatory measures such as regulating seasons and areas of fishing, 
TAC,~dthe·.ageand size of the species that may be caught456. 
4. 4. Anadrom~us Species 
As has been said earlier in chapter 2, salmon is a well known example of an 
anadromous species. With respect to this species, the state of origin, viz. the state in 
whose rivers anadromous stocks spawn, has the primary interest in and responsibility for 
such stocks457. It may thus establish regulatory measures for fishing in waters landwards 
of the outer limits of its EEZ and, after consultations with all other states interested in 
harvesting these stocks, set a TAC for stocks originating in its rivers458. Furthennore, as 
a general rule, enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous species harvested beyond 
the EEZ requires an agreement betwen the coastal state and other states concerned. 
Exceptionally, the state of origin can enforce laws relating to salmon harvesting on the 
high seas against stateless vessels 459. 
Harvesting of anadromous species is allowed only in waters landwards of the 
outer limits of EEZs. There is, however, a certain exception for cases where the 
prohibition to fish on the high seas would "result in economic dislocation for a state other 
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than the state of origin,,460. Furthermore, there is no requirement that a coastal state needs 
the consent of the state of origin before it harvests the species of its own EEZ. 
A review of national EFZ or EEZ claims reveals that only a few national 
legislation have included specific provisions relating to anadromous species. Prominent 
among these legislations are the United States FMCA of 1976461 and the Japanese Law 
No. 31n7 of 1977462. The United States and Japan have both asserted, in their respective 
laws, exclusive management authority over anadromous species throught their migratory 
range, even if beyond the 200 miles limit, with the exception of zones under the 
jurisdiction of other countries 463. Thus, these two states claim more than what is allowed 
under the LOS Convention, which requires international cooperation in such matters. 
Some furthe'r evidence of the US claim of jurisdiction over anadromous species beyond 
the 200 miles limit js found in the 1988· Agreep1ent with the USSR on ,cooperation in 
fishery matters 464. 
On the other hand, the big majority of EFZ or EEZ claims made up-:to now ke~p 
silent on the matter and do not extend the coastal state's jurisdiction beyond the 200 miles 
limit. It is probable that the restriction of their jurisdiction to a maximum limit of 200 miles 
implies that they consider the high seas regime to be applicable to anadromous species 
beyond the EEZ and that any enforcement of the coastal state's regulations beyond such a 
limit must be effected by agreement between the state in whose rivers these species spawn 
and other interested states. 
However, treaty practice shows that there have been significant developments in 
recent years in cooperation between states with respect to the establishment of effective 
conservation and management measures as recognized by Article 66 of the LOS 
Convention. Both Canada and the United States manage their anadromous stocks on their 
west coasts in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 66. The two states have, 
however, established joint measures on a bilateral basis to facilitate management. In 1985, 
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acting in confonnity with Article 66 (4), they concluded the Pacific Salmon Treat/65.The 
treaty is designed to deal with the interception by each state of salmon originating in the 
rivers of the other state. It establishes a bilateral commission with responsibility for 
conducting research on the state of the stocks and for developing and maintaining 
management plans for the stocks subject to its jurisdiction. 
The problem of enforcement in the zone of each of the contracting states has been 
dealt with jointly by Canada and the United States, which have agreed upon measures to 
allow each state to prosecute its own nationals for illegally fishing in the other state's 200 
miles zone. 
Moreover, in the Northwestern Pacific, Japan and the USSR (now the Russian 
Federation) have concluded in 1985 an agreement on cooperation in fisheries, which refers 
specifically to the adoption of the LOS Convention466. Like the provision contained in 
Article 66 (3) (a), the ~greement prohibited fisheries for anadromous stocks in thehjgh 
seas ex~ept in cases where the prohibition would result in economic dislocation for the 
fishennen from the state other than the state of origin of such stocks. 
In addition, on 11 February 1992, the four states concerned in the North Pacific 
area, i.e. Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America signed 
the Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific 
Ocean467. The Convention prohibits "directed fishing for anadromous fish", including the 
use of large-scale driftnets and, in effect, prohibits fishing for anadromous species in this 
are 
468 
a . 
4. 5. Catadromous Species 
As has been seen earlier in chapter 2, the expression "catadromous species" 
refers to those species which spend part of their life cycle in fresh water rivers and lakes 
but spawn in the open sea469. The eel is a well-known instance of those species. 
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Under the LOS Convention, the states in whose waters these stocks spend the 
greater part of their life cycle have the primary interest in and responsibility for such 
stocks. Moreover, harvesting of these species may take place "only in waters landward of 
the outer limits" of EEZs. Thus, fishing for catadromous species on the high seas is 
categorically prohibited. 
Where the fish migrate through the EEZ of another state, the coastal state and the 
state through whose waters these stocks migrate are, under Article 67 (3), required to 
cooperate in order to enact appropriate conservation and management measures by 
agreement. 
Most EFZ or EEZ claims, if not all, do not make any specific reference to the 
LOS> Convention's provisions on catadromous species. Furthermore, there is no clear 
evidence to suggest that any cooperative arrangements relating to these species exist. 
However, this pheno~enon may be explained by the fact that, comparing these species 
. . , 
with anadromous species, tlleircommercial importance is limited either in terms of tonnage 
al 470 orv ue . 
4. 6. Highly Migratory Species 
As has been said previously in chapter 2, due to their migratory character, HMSs 
are given special attention in Article 64 of the LOS Convention. This provision enjoins the 
coastal state and other states which fish for HMSs to cooperate directly or through 
international organizations to ensure conservation and optimum utilization of such species 
both inside and outside of the EEZ. A regional approach is specifically envisaged with an 
obligation incumbent on concerned states to establish an international organization where 
. 471 Th .. h b' h h . none eXIsts . e same provIsIon, owever, goes on y statmg t at t ese specIes are 
subject to the entire regime of Part 0 72 • It follows that the obligation to cooperate does 
not displace the sovereign rights of the coastal state over HMSs in its EEZ and, should 
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measures of cooperation or prior consultation fail, the coastal state's unilateral action 
would be permissible473. 
At the national level, a great number of EEZ or EFZ legislation provide simply 
that the coastal state's management authority in the EEZ embraces all living resources of 
that zone, without reflecting on Article 64 of the LOS Convention on HMSs474. There are 
also some other legislation which provide specifically for the national management of 
HMSs in the EEZ. For instance, New Zealand's Territorial Sea and and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act of 1977 provides that the Governor General may from time to time 
make regulations for the purpose of specifying particular types of HMSs of fish, as well 
as for regulating fishing for these species within the zone475. The national legislation of 
Cook Islands, Fiji, and Western Samoa have all included similar provisions. Thus; these 
sJates have remained faithful to their position they had taken at UNCLOS IlIon this 
matter476. 
Mrireov~r, some other coastal states have made d~clarations in this sense when 
signing the LOS Convention. This is the case of Costa Rica and Sao Tome and 
Principe 477. In this context the declaration of Costa Rica states that: 
"The Government of Costa Rica declares that the provisions of Costa Rican 
Law under which foreign vessels must pay for licences to fish in its exclusive 
economic zone, shall apply also to fishing for highly migratory species, 
pursuant to the provisions of articles 62 and 64, paragraph 2, of the 
Convention" . 
This declaration reaffirms clearly the right of the Costa Rican state to regulate 
HMSs in its EEZ. 
It is also interesting to note that the United States Proclamation of 10 March 
1983478 asserted jurisdiction with respect to the living resources found in the United 
States EEZ as recognized under the LOS Convention, except for the express exclusion of 
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its jurisdiction over HMSs; it confinned the United States policies concerning "marine 
mammals and fisheries, including highly migratory species of tuna which are not subject 
to United States jurisdiction and require international agreement for effective 
management". Since that time, however, the United States position with respect to HMSs 
gradually began to change in light of the specific problems that have to be addressed in 
practice479. This was initially and indirectly done by means of the 1987 Treaty on 
Fisheries between a group of Pacific Island states and the United States480 under which 
United States vessels were granted licences to fish for tuna within the exclusive economic 
zones of those states; and next in a direct manner in 1991 when the United States amended 
its own legislation to include highly migratory tuna as species of fish under its jurisdiction 
throughout the EEZ. The change, as the aide memoire dated 33 May 1991 of the 
Pennanent Mission of.the United States to .the United Nations provides, is to "make the 
United States position consistent with the overwhelming state practice subsequent to the' 
1982 United Nations L.aw of the Sea Convention, with regard to highly migratory., I 
species ,,481. 
In the case of HMSs, the coastal state and other states whose nationals fish in the 
region for such fish species are required under Article 64 (1) of the LOS Convention to 
cooperate directly or through an international organization in enacting appropriate 
conservation and management measures. The idea of cooperation between affected coastal 
states or between coastal states and other concerned states is almost completely absent 
from coastal states laws regulating the EEZ482. Indeed, two pieces of recent legislation 
have even provided for national regulation ofHMSs in the EEZ and beyond it. The 1991 
Chilean fisheries law 483, for exemple, allows for the enactment of conservation and 
management measures in relation to HMSs in the EEZ and high seas, with the requirement 
of prior consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Penalties are also envisaged in 
this context. Similarly, Argentina's Act of 1991 does not make any reference to 
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cooperation, and asserts the right of the government to extend the application of relevant 
national legislation to the high seas adjacent to the Argentine EEz484. Article 5 of the act 
states: 
"National provisions concerning the conservation of resources shall apply 
beyond the two hundred (200) nautical mile zone in the case of migratory 
species or species which form part of the food chain of species of the 
exclusive economic zone of Argentina". 
Thus, the Chilean and the Argentine claims concerning HMSs both go beyond 
the rights given to states by the LOS Convention. However, the existing inconsistency 
between the provisions of Article 64 of the LOS Convention and the 1991 Argentine Law 
appears to have lost importance as Argentina has since December 1, 1995, become party to 
the LOS. Convention 485 ,and, consequently, .the provisions of the latter will prevail. . 
Despite the fact that the laws regulating the EEZ do not generally make reference 
to the duty of the coastal state and other concerned states to cooperate on a regional basis '" 
for ensuring conservation of HMSs, cooperative measures of one sort or another appear to 
be necessary 486 and are being put into effect among states. Such cooperation has been 
undertaken particularly for tuna in the South Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The 
Treaty on Fisheries signed on 2 April 1987, between the United States and Certain Pacific 
Island States487 provide one example of cooperation in this field. Its preamble starts by 
recognizing the sovereign rights of the coastal state over fishing resources of the EEZ, 
thus putting an end to the longstanding dispute between the United States and the South 
Pacific states. The treaty has established specific mechanisms involving the payment of 
licences, compliance with national legislations related to the EEZ, enforcement of the 
agreement, liability, observers and other matters488. 
Moreover, on 21 July 1989, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru 
concluded the Agreement Establishing the Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishing Organization489. 
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This agreement covers both the areas under national jurisdiction and the high seas and calls 
for the establishment of a total allowable catch for the areas as a whole. Licenses for 
fishing in the areas under national jurisdiction shall be granted by coastal states while those 
for fishing on the high seas shall be granted by the organization. Conservation measures 
can also be adopted by the Council of the Organization490. However, the agreement has 
not entered into force, mainly due to disagreement of distant water fishing states with the 
provisions giving coastal states preferential treatment in the regulatory area beyond 200 
miles. 
As far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, the second Ministerial Conference on 
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Marine Affairs in the Indian Ocean, 
which was. held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania in 1990, adopted on ? September 
1990 an Agreement on the Organization for Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation491 . 
One of the main objectives of the new .established intergovernmental organization is the 
promotion of cooperation between East African states and other states of the Indian Ocean, 
bearing in mind the ocean regime embodied in theWS Convention492. 
Moreover, cooperation particularly in fisheries matters has been pursued through 
the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (IOFC), established by FAO. IOFC's detailed 
study on the conservation and management of Indian Ocean highly migratory tuna has 
resulted in the adoption in November 1993 of an agreement to establish the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission493. The new body to be set up would include the Indian Ocean states 
and other states harvesting tuna in the Indian Ocean and the adjacent seas. 
B. The Specific Regimes Relating to Marine Research, Artificial Islands 
and Installations, and the Protection of the Marine Environment 
As has been said earlier, the EEZ provides coastal states with sovereign rights to 
nonliving resources and certain other jurisdictional rights extending beyond those 
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associated with fishery zones. The latter rights relate to marine scientific research, which is 
stipulated in Part XIII of the LOS Convention, especially Articles 246-254; artificial 
islands; installations and structures, the full regime for which is set out in Article 60; and 
preservation of the EEZ marine environment, which is set out in Articles 208, 211, 214, 
216 and 220 of Part XII. It is proposed to examine, hereunder, the extent and the manner 
in which the specific regimes of the LOS Convention relating to the above-mentioned 
matters are expressed in state practice. 
1. The Regime of the Conduct of Marine Scientific Research (MSR) in the 
EEZ in State Practice 
Most states h~ving claimed an EEZ or an EFz494 assert also their authority to' 
regulate and control marine scientific research activities undertaken in the 200 miles zone. 
It is important tq recall here that the MSR regime est~blished by the LOS Convention 
provides that coastal states have the right to regulate, apthorize, and ,conduct MSR in their 
EEZs. In addition, the carrying out of such research by any other state or individu,al 
requires the consent of the coastal state concerned. A distinction, however, has been made 
between pure MSR and MSR for economic purposes. With respect to the former, the 
coastal state shall, under normal circumstances, grant its consent and it may establish rules 
and procedures necessitating that such consent will not be delayed or denied 
unreasonably495. As regards the latter, the granting or withholding of permits rests with 
the discretion of the coastal state. State practice, however, does not reflect these limitations 
or safeguards imposed by the LOS Convention upon the jurisdictional powers of the 
coastal states. Antigua and Barbuda, for instance, claim "jurisdiction with regard to marine 
scientific research,,496, but do not indicate under what circumstances it would give its 
consent for research projects to be carried out by foreign states within its EEZ. Identical 
provisions have been inserted in numerous claims including, inter alia, the claim of 
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Barbados497, Burma498, Colombia499, Grenada500, India501, Indonesia502, Kenya503, 
Mal . 504 M . 505 S T d Pri . 506 d S . L nk 507 aysla , eXlCO ,ao orne an nClpe an n a a . 
A number of states do not refer to MSR in their claims at a1l508. However, 
provision is made to permit the coastal state authorities to control research. For instance, 
the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act of 1974 of Bangladesh empowers the 
Government to pass rules regulating the conduct of any person in the EEZ509. Perhaps, 
these states believe that the rights to control MSR inside the zone, at least with respect to 
d 1 .. 1· d· h·· 1 h' 510 resources eve opment, IS Imp Ie m t elf assertlOns to contro t e zone s resources . 
Indeed, the matter is often dealt with in separate regulations511 . 
Moreover, only a few national laws, such as, for example, the legislation of 
Iceland and Venezuela5J2, contain ,detailed rules 'on the conduct of MSR in the EEZ. In 
this connection, the 1978 EEZ Act of Venezuela requires that prior consent be given before 
research is carried out in the EEZ513. It further provides that the "Republic will not 
withhold its consent to the conduct of a marine scientific research project" unless the latter 
is related to the circumstances similar to those contained in Article 246 (5) (a), (b), and (c) 
of the LOS Convention514. Thus, this regime is generally in line with the LOS 
Convention's regime. In addition, there are a very few national laws which contain no 
rules on the conduct of MSR in the EEZ, but include reference to international law. 
Reference to international law seems to mean that these states pay due attention to the 
regime on MSR as established by the LOS Convention. 
The position of the United States concerning the conduct of marine scientific 
research in the EEZ attracts particular attention. The President's Proclamation on the 
United States EEZ omits reference to jurisdiction over MSR in the EEZ515. It was 
explained that it is in the interest of the United States to encourage MSR and avoid any 
. . d·· 1 h dl 516 H . h· . h unnecessary Juns lctlona ur es . owever, m IS statement accompanymg t e 
Proclamation, President Reagan affirmed that the US would nevertheless recognize the 
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right of other states to exercise jurisdiction over MSR if done "reasonably in a manner 
consistent with intemationallaw,,517. Thus, although the United States practice deviates 
from the LOS Convention, it does so only in a permissive sense, merely declining to 
assert certain rights but not challenging the validity of those rights if asserted by other 
coastal states. 
More important is that the United States Administration has indicated through the 
Policy Statement which accompanied the EEZ Proclamation creating the United States 
EEZ, and through repeated statements by the United States Department of State, that it 
recognizes MSR provisions contained in the LOS Convention as reflecting the current state 
of customary law regarding MSR within foreign EEZs. In this context, James Malone, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, stated the following: 
"The United States believes that most of the provisions of the treaty, apart 
from the seabed mining text in part XI, fairly balance the interests of all states 
and are fully consistent with norms of customary internationallaw,,518. 
This statement appears to suggest that the detailed provisions on MSR found in 
the LOS Convention constitute a reflection of existing customary law. However, in the 
author's opinion, this view does not seem to be correct. This is because, while it is true 
that under existing state practice relating to the EEZ coastal states are entitled to exercise 
some control over the conduct of MSR in their EEZs, there is not sufficient evidence in 
state practice to suggest that customary international law contains also the convention's 
detailed regime relating to the conduct of MSR in the EEZ. In other words, as Professor 
Burke has correctly pointed out, although customary law may recognize that a coastal state 
has control over MSR within its EEZ, the actual safeguards, conditions and obligations set 
out in the treaty have not yet become an established part of state practice and therefore can 
not be treated as customary law519. It follows that, even if the proper interpretation of a 
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provision is established, which is a problem in itself, it would still be very difficult for the 
United States or any other state to argue that states which will not become party to the LOS 
Convention abide by its detailed provisions concerning MSR. 
2. The Specific Regime Relating to Artificial Islands, Installations and 
Structures in State Practice 
As has been indicated earlier, over sixty-five national laws, decrees and 
proclamations have made reference to the general concept of coastal state jurisdiction with 
regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures520. 
But, there are also some legislation which do not contain any reference to the general 
concept of coastal state jurisdiction in the matter, as it is set forth in Article 56 (1) (b)521 .. 
However, in the author's view, this silence should not be interpreted as indicating that the 
~silent states do .not recognize the coastal state's jurisdiction in the matter, but should be 
regarded in most cases. as a simple omission, because a number of those states have 
become parties to the LOS Convention522, thus signifying their recognition of the coastal 
state jurisdiction in question. 
Unfortunately, EEZ claimant states have generally been reluctant to adopt the 
detailed rules regarding the rights and duties of the coastal state that are enshrined in 
Article 60 of the LOS Convention. Indeed, a number of states have phrased their national 
legislation in a way that possibly goes beyond the powers given to them under Article 56 
(1) (b) in connection with Article 60 of the LOS Convention. It is important to recall, at 
this stage, that Article 60 addresses the question of artificial islands, installations and 
structures in the EEZ by granting the coastal state the 'exclusive right' to construct any 
artificial island itself and authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of 
artificial islands without any limitation. But, in relation to installations and structures, 
coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction and the right to construct, and authorize and 
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regulate the construction, operation and use of such objects only if they serve the 
purposes mentioned in Article 56 (1) (b), viz. economic purposes, marine scientific 
research, and environmental protection purposes523, or if such objects rna y interfere with 
the exercise of the rights of the coastal state in the zone524. Thus, due to the wording of 
the LOS Convention, not all types of installations and structures, e. g., those which serve 
military purposes, come under the jurisdiction of the coastal states. 
An analysis of the laws which do refer to this question reveals that several EEZ 
legislation or I and proclamations have used identical or similar language to that of Article 
56 (1) (b) and 60 (1) of the LOS Convention. Examples of such a practice are to be found 
in the national instruments of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Egypt, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, the United States and 
Venezuela525. The uncertainties of the LOS Convention have, thus, been transmitted to the 
national laws. 
In the laws of a number of states, the formulation of the rights of the coastal 
states to establish and use artificial islands, installations, and structures in the EEZ differs 
from that of the LOS Convention in a manner that suggests the attribution of powers to the 
coastal states wider than those that the LOS Convention intend to assign to them. 
For example, the national legislation of the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Ivory Coast, and Sao Tome and Principe have all referred to the 'exclusive 
rights and jurisdiction' of the coastal state rather than to 'jurisdiction,526. In this context, 
the Law No. 573 of 1977 of the Dominican Republic provides that the Republic "shall 
exercise exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to establishment and utilization of 
artificial islands, installations, and structures within the zone,,527. Identical wording is 
included in the Hondurian Decree No. 921 of 13 June 1980528. 
However, these differences may be explained by the fact that most of this 
legislation was adopted in the 1970s when the elaboration of the texts of Article 56 and 60 
of the LOS Convention was under way and no final draft had been agreed on. Therefore, 
the differences in question appear to be a problem of the past. 
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Moreover, the laws of some other states have specifically claimed jurisdiction not 
only over artificial islands, installations, and structures, but also over the use of all devices 
in the EEZ irrespective of the purposes they would serve. The national legislation of 
Argentina, Burma, India, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka 
and Vanuatu fall in this categoryS29. For instance, according to the Indian Maritime Zones 
Act of 28 May 1976, India would exercise "exclusive rights and jurisdiction for the 
construction, maintenance or operation of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, 
installations and other structures and devices necessary for the exploration and exploitation 
of the resources of the zone or for the convenience of shipping or for any other 
purpose"S30. 
From the above review of state practice, it seems clear that almost all EEZ 
claimant states have asserted exclusive authority over the construction, operation and use, 
and regulation of all types of artificial islands in the zone. The LOS Convention and state 
practice are therefore consistent on this point,and it seems thus reasonable to conclude that 
the provision contained in Article 60 (1) (a) of the LOS Convention reflects the position 
under C\lrrent customary law. 
On the other hand, as far as the construction, use and regulation of installations 
and structures is concerned, it is very evident that the substantive differentiation between 
installations and structures for limited purposes on the one hand, and installations and 
structures for all other purposes, has not been properly reflected in national legislation. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether the consensus on the jurisdiction over installations 
and structures which was reached in the LOS Convention will prevail as part of customary 
law. 
3. The Preservation and Protection of the Marine Environment in the EEZ 
in State Practice 
The protection of the marine environment is one important element asserted by 
EEZ claimant states. In this context, the national legislation of over eighty states has made 
provision for jurisdiction on the protection and preservation of the marine environment in 
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their respective EEZ531. But, few of them have contained detailed provisions designed to 
implement Articles 207 to 222 of the LOS Convention. Moreover, the scope of jurisdiction 
claimed in this matter varies. Some states assert powers to take measures to protect the 
marine environment without setting any limits on their powers. This is true, for instance, 
in respect of Bangladesh, Guyana, India, The Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, 
The Seychelles, Spain and Sri Lanka532, which assert in their EEZs wide-ranging 
authority to take measures which they themselves see appropriate for the purpose of 
preserving and protecting the environment. Pursuant to the Spanish Law No. 15/1978, for 
instance, Spain has "the authority to enact regulations concerning the preservation of, 
exploration for and exploitation of [the EEZ] resources with a view to the protection of the 
marine environment,,533 and "exclusive jurisdiction to enforce all relevant measures"S34. 
It is perhaps. worth recalling at this stage that, while it is true that under the LOS 
Convention the coastal state has the power to enact laws and regulations pertaining to . 
pollution from vessels, it is also true that the ppwergiven to it, in this field, is not 
absolute. In fact, coastal state's rules and regulations are supposed to conform and give 
effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through competent 
. . I .. I d· I . fi 535 Wh h . . I mternatIona orgamzatIon or genera Ip omatIc con erence . ere suc mternatIona 
rules and standards are deemed inadequate to meet special circumstances in clearly defmed 
areas within the EEZ, the coastal state may adopt special mandatory measures for the 
prevention of pollution from vessels for those areas, provided that prior approval by 
international bodies is given536. Moreover, with respect to the EEZ, coastal state rules 
may be enforced only when a foreign vessel is voluntarily in port537 or when the violation 
has resulted in a discharge causing major damage or threat thereof to the coastline or 
related interests of the coastal states or to the resources of the EEZ538. 
No reference is made in the claims mentioned above to generally accepted 
international rules and standards nor to the involvement of competent international 
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organizations, though they are required in several articles of the LOS Convention. The 
fonnulation of the rights of the coastal states concerning the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment in the EEZ in that manner suggests the attribution of powers to 
coastal states wider than those that the LOS Convention intended to assign to them. In 
EEZs governed by those laws, the potential for interference with navigation rights 
exercised by third states will increase. 
Several other coastal states claim jurisdiction in relation to the protection of the 
marine environment following the basic rule contained in Article 56 (1) (b) (iii) ofthe LOS 
Convention. Comoros, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Sao 
Tome and Principe, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela539 are listed in this 
category. But, the national laws of these states do not contain detailed rules on their 
competence .as regards pollution from various sources. Therefore, the exact extent of 
jurisdiction claimed by them in this matter remains \!nclear. 
The Bulgarian540 and Soviet legislation541 are more detailed and clearly inspired 
by the provisions of Part XII of the LOS Con·vention. However, they sometimes deviate 
from these provisions. For example, the Soviet decree on the EEZ of 28 February 1984, 
in providing that the prevention, reduction and control of pollution in the EEZ shall be 
effected in accordance with the legislation of the USSR and with treaties concluded by it, 
does not make any reference to the "generally accepted international rules and standards 
established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic 
conference" mentioned in Article 211 (5) of the LOS Convention. Similarly, Article 13 of 
the same decree, in providing for the authority to establish 'special areas', does not 
provide for the involvement of the 'competent international organization' referred to in 
Article 211 (6) of the LOS Convention. Moreover, the Soviet decree, as well as the 
Russian Environmental Law of March 1992542, do not contain a provision corresponding 
to Article 228 (1) of the LOS Convention, providing for the suspension of proceedings 
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concerning pollution from ships started in the coastal or port state when such proceedings 
are initiated in the flag state. This last remark applies also to the Romanian Decree No. 142 
of 25 April 1986543 and the Bulgarian Law of 8 July 1987544. Article 58 (2) of Bulgaria's 
Law, moreover, provides for the prohibition "to pollute the marine environment in the 
exclusive economic zone in a way that interferes with the interests of the People's 
Republic of Bulgaria", a criterion whose flexibility goes far beyond the provisions of the 
LOS Convention. 
A fourth category of claims provides expressly that the competence of the coastal 
states as. regards environmental protection in the EEZ is to be exercised in accordance with 
international law. The French Law No. 76/655 of July 1976, for instance, states that 
"within the .economic zone ... the French authorities shall exercise the powers recognized 
by international law r~garding the protection of the marine environment,,545. Identical 
provisions have- been included in the natoinallegislation of Cape Verde, Fiji, Norway, 
Portugal and the United States546. The reference by these claims to the rules of 
fntemational1aw seems to imply that the specific limitations imposed by the pertinent 
provisions of the LOS Convention are recognized. Unfortunately, the coastal states 
adhering to this practice constitute a dwindling minority. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE CONCEPT AND REGIME 
OF THE EEZ IN CUSTOMARY LAW 
Introduction 
As the preceding chapter on state practice relating to the EEZ indicates, coastal 
states have been increasingly implementing the LOS Convention's EEZ provisions in their 
relations with the other states. However, the result has been a 'pick and mi-x', selective 
approach to the LOS Convention's EEZ regime in which certain powers and duties have 
been specifically claimed but others ignored; Therefore, the aim of this last chapter is to 
attempt, first; t.o give a short review of the prerequisites for the emergence of a rule of 
international c\lstomary law and apply them to the 200 miles EEZ; secondly, to establish 
with precision the scope of the EEZ .general concept in customary intemationall~wand,; 
thirdly, to determine the specific details of this- general rule, if there are any, that have 
already passed into the general corpus of international law. 
Section I : Prerequisites for the Emergence of a Rule of International 
Custom and their Application to the 200 Miles EEZ 
Introduction 
Authors differ as to the precise definition of the prerequisites for a state practice 
to be recognized as law. There is little agreement both on the relative importance of 
particular elements in the definition and even on the necessity of specific elements1. 
However, the elements which are traditionally viewed as necessary for the creation of 
customary international law have been identified in the decisions of the IC] and by one of 
its former judges, Manley O. Hudson 2 as: (A) generality and uniformity of the practice3; 
(B) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time4; (C) 
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conception that the practice is required by. or consistent with. prevailing international 
lawS; and (D) lack of protest and general acquiescence in the practice by other states 6. 
It must be made clear. however. that the present author has no intention to delve 
into a very detailed discussion of the above mentioned prerequisites. for they have been 
extensively dealt with in legal literature. Therefore. this section will give a brief 
reexamination of these prerequisites in turn. and will attempt to apply them to existing 
coastal states claims to 200 miles EEZ. 
A. Generality and Uniformity of the Practice 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. the ICJ insisted on"a very widespread 
00 
and representative participation; ... state practice. including that of states whose interests 
are especially affected. should have been extensive and virtually uniform"? Judge Lachs 
in his Sep~ate Dissenting Opinion in that case. clarifying theexpressi,on widespreadand 
representativeocharacter. noted that "states' with different political'. economic and legal 
, , 
systems. states of all continents should participate in this process"S. In the Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia v.Libya) Case, Judge D'Arechaga. in his Separate Opinion said that "the 
proclamation by 86 coastal states of economic zones. fishery zones or fishery conservation 
zones ... constitutes a widespread practice of states ... ,,9. According to Kunz. "the practice 
must be general not universal •... the practice must have been applied by the overwhelming 
majority of states which hitherto has an opportunity of applying it"lO. Corbett spoke of 
"general approval" 11. Tunkin referred to general practice that does not necessarily mean 
the practice of all states12. Similarly. Brownlie observed that. "certainly universality is not 
required" 13. 
Uniformity and consistency of the practice is essential14• In this context. in the 
Asylum Case. the ICJ said that "the Colombian Government must prove that the rule 
invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the states in 
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question" 15. According to Lauterpacht, there should be "concordant international 
practice,,16. The essential point is that there should not be much" uncertainty and 
contradiction so much fluctuation and discrepancy" in the practice of states17. A small 
amount of inconsistency does not prevent the establishment of a customary rule. In this 
context, the ICI emphasized in the Nicargua y. United States Case18 that it was not 
necessary that the practice in question had to be "in absolute rigorous conformity" with the 
purported customary rule. The Court went saying that : 
"In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it 
sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such 
rul,es, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should 
general!yhave been treated as breaches ofthat rule, not as indications of the 
recogni,tion.of.anew rule,,19. 
As explained earlier in chapter four, in the period between 1975 and'1978 forty 
seven coastal slates established their own 200 miles jurisdictional zones .with regard to 
fisheries and certain other related matters such as MSR and preservation of the marine 
environment20. Sixteen other EEZ claims were made between 1978 and 198121 bringing 
the total to sixty-three claims. During the same period, some other coastal states 
established their own 200 miles EFZ instead of a full EEZ22. 
It is perhaps worth recalling at this stage that international law publicists who 
have argued against the binding nature of the EEZ under general customary law have 
principally relied upon two main arguments. These arguments are, first, the partial nature 
and the provisional character of certain 200 miles EEZ claims; secondly, the 'package deal' 
as ruling out any selective, e.g. only with respect to the EEZ, application of the LOS 
Convention. 
As far as the first argument is concerned, it has been asserted that the fact that 
some coastal states have claimed a 200 miles EFZ only together with the fact that some of 
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these claims have only a provisional character make the practice on the 200 miles 
jurisdictional zone not uniform. In this connection, Zakharov has said that: 
" If we ... look at state practice and we try to analyze the acts adopted by 
governments, we must come to the conclusion that all of them differ greatly. 
For example, if we look at the act of the USSR, adopted in 1976, we note that 
this act will be in force until the date of the entry into force of the Convention, 
and that it said nothing about establishing the exclusive economic zone. So if 
we analyze all the acts adopted by different states, we find that there is no reason 
to say that we have a generally recognized practice. For this reason, we cannot 
SeW that the exclusive· economic zone is a norm of customary law23". 
However;, in the author's opinion, this argument may ,be refuted by simply 
referring to Jhe fact that the fishery regime is the c~ntral element of the EEZ concept and 
that the desire. to exploit and conserve the fisheries· resourc.es. found in adjacent seas has 
been, since the 1940s, the principal incentive for the e.stablishment bfthe 200 miles EEZ. 
Therefore, any claim which is restricted to an exclusive fishery zone strengthens the 
concept of exclusive economic zone,,24. 
Moreover, it appears plausible to invoke here the argument of gradual 
implementation of the EEZ in state practice as evidenced, for instance, by the approach of 
those coastal states which proclaimed merely exclusive fishery zones. In a long-term 
perspective, it may well be anticipated that the EEZ will replace all existing exclusive 
fishery zones. This appears to be confirmed by the transformation of an existing 200 
miles EFZ into an EEZ which was effected by the United States in 198325, the Soviet 
Union in 198426, Poland in 199127, Sweden28 in 1993 and Australia29 in 1994. 
In so far as the package deal argument is concerned, certain publicists, mostly 
from the former Soviet Union 30, have contended that the fact that UNCLOS III solved all 
the problems of the sea (including the regime of the territorial sea, EEZ, international 
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straits, the high seas, continental shelf and international sea-bed area) in one package has 
an important impact on the future effectiveness of rules and principles included in the LOS 
Convention31 . One of the principal consequences thereof is the acceptance that the LOS 
Convention as a treaty forming a package deal may be a source of customary law only in 
its entirety and not with respect to particular elements of its package, e.g. the EEZ. This 
argument has been advanced by several authors especially in the years following the 
adoption of the LOS Convention as an essential argument against the internationally 
binding nature of the EEZ32. 
However, despite the fact that the package deal argument appears to be attractive 
from the point of view of the manifestation of the important role of the debates and of 
conventional norms, in the present author's view, it remains a feeble argument. This is 
bec(luse it fails toappreciat~ the particular role played by state practice in the elaboration of 
rules Of customary law, 'an aspect which forms a basic principle of international 
law33.This could lead to the extreme stand of numfying the legal effect of customary 1,aw 
by way of this conventional exclusiveness, thus threatening to destabilize international 
34 law . 
Moreover, the majority of authors from Eastern Europe, developing states, and 
Western States do not invoke the 'package deal' argument against the binding character of 
the EEZ35. Indeed, many Western international law publicists consider the 'package deal' 
as only a procedural device designed to further the achievement of consensus by 
UNCLOS III, which as such has no continuing merit whatsoever36. Moreover, they 
regard state practice as the principal test as to whether third states may enjoy rights 
stipulated in treaties. In this context, Lee, for instance, has correctly said: 
"Even if the intent of the negotiators of the law of the sea Convention was 
to limit the benefits of all its provisions to the signatories as parties to a so 
called package deal, non-party states may enjoy the same benefits if the 
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particular provision of the Convention ... has since acquired the status of 
customary rule through widespread acceptance as law and confirmation by 
state practice .. 37. 
Furthennore, a Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of 
Maine Case observed that: 
..... The Chamber notes in the first place that the Convention ... has not yet come 
into force and that a number of States do not appear inclined to ratify it. This, 
however, in no way detracts from the consensus reached on large portions of 
the instrument and, above all, cannot invalidate the observatio.n that certain 
provisions of the Convention, concerning the ... exclusive economic zone, ... 
were adopted without any objections ... In the Chamber's opinion, these 
provisions, even if in some respects they bear the mark of the compromise 
surrounding their adoption, may nevertheless be regarded as consonant at 
present with general international law on the question .. 38. 
Thus, taking into account the number of states that have enacted unilateral 
legislation creating EEZs and EFZs up to a breadth of 200 miles, it seems reasonable to 
say that state practice is extensive and virtually unifonn39. Furthennore, the states whose 
interests are vitally affected, that is the coastal states, participate fully in this regard, have 
inaugurated the process of incorporation almost simultaneously with the fonnulation of the 
concept and its insertion into the early negotiating texts. 
B. Continuation or Repetition of the Practice over a Considerable Period 
of Time 
According to Kelsen, "custom by which a nonn of general international law is 
created" is a "long-established practice of states,,40. Similarly, in a working paper 
concerning Article 24 of the n..C Statute, Hudson required "continuation or repetition of 
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the practice over a considerable period of time,,41. However, while in the classical theory 
the passage of time was held relevant to consolidate practice, this requirement is held to be 
less stringent today. In this context, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ 
pointed out that it is not necessary to prove that the practice has been followed for any 
particular length of time 42. Therefore, the idea of a 'long-established' or 'immemorial' 
practice is no longer required as this would exclude the possibility of creation of new 
customary norms even on the basis of 'a complete uniform .and universal practice,43. 
State practice concerning the 200 miles EEZ has been extremely rapid. This 
phenomenon has prompted Judge ada to remark that "throughout the history of 
international law, scarcely any other major concept has ever stood at the threshhold of 
acceptance within such a short period,,44. 
c. Conc~ption that the Practice is Required by Prevailing Internatonal Law 
(Opinio Juris) 
This criterion also referred to as 'phsychological component' and 'recognition' is 
generally regarded as a necessary element in the formation of a custom45. It refers to the 
belief by the acting state that its conduct comports with internationally accepted principles 
oflaw46. 
Perhaps, the main arena in which opinio juris with regard to the EEZ is to be 
sought is the declarations, draft proposals and statements made at UNCLOS III, in 
particular at the 1974 Caracas Session. At this gathering almost all states spoke in favor of 
the 200 miles EEZ,,47. Other circumstances in which opinio juris on the legal character of 
the EEZ can be inferred or identified include official statements accompanying 
proclamation of national legislation, signature or ratification of the LOS Convention, and 
national legislation, fishing and delimitation agreements with regard to 200 miles zones, 
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and case law48• In all these fields, and through these media, the 200 miles EEZ has been 
well recognized and indeed appears to be the principal area of the negotiations on which 
there was a definitive consensus. 
D. Protest and Acquiescence 
Protest is the opposite of acquiescence49. These two elements are also held 
relevant to determining the existence of a virtually uniform and extensive practice50. Thus, 
when a pattern of state practice is emerging, some states may opt to dissent from such a 
practice preventing it of becoming a general customary rule. One way which a state can 
use to show its dissent is protest51. In this connection, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 
1974, several judges observed that EFZs exceeding 12 miles did not create norms because 
of strong protests by otherstates52. 
However, in certain cases states do nothing vis-a-vis ,a known practice but 
remain silent. In such cases, the preblem to be faced is whether such a silence should be 
understood as indicating the dissatisfaction with the emerging state practice or that the 
silent state have acquiesced in it. When the ICJ was confronted with a similar problem in 
the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, the Court construed the long continued silence on the 
part of Thailand on a boundary line drawn over a map prepared on behalf of Cambodia as 
constituting acquiescence53. The Court further emphasized that acquiescence can be 
construed if there is "a failure to react... on an occasion that called for a reaction in order to 
affirm or preserve [claim] in the face of an obvious rival claim" 54. 
A propos of the EEZ, more than seventy states had established EEZs or EFZs 
between 1974 and 198155. The circumstances required protests from other interested 
states when Mexico first enacted a law based on the RSNT with its date of enforcement 
was fixed for 6 June 197656 one month after the Fifth Session of UNCLOS III ended in 
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New York on 7 May 1976. Neither LLSs and GDSs nor the big maritime states protested 
the EEZ concept. In fact, the former states had merely sought to preserve some rights 
within that concept for themselves57, and the latter states had shown a willingness to 
accept the concept provided that the exercise of non-economic rights within the zone 
would remain open for all states. Perhaps, if there had been a generality of protests, 
Mexico would have abrogated its law. 
Acquiescence cannot be presumed unless a state has an actual knowledge of the 
claim being made. In the prevailing circumstances, it appears unreasonable to say that the 
participating states in the Fifth Session of UNCLOS III knew nothing about the Mexican 
claim. Indeed, the Mexicain action was. soon followed by numerous other coastal states. 
FurthennOFe, protesting states in the very early seventies were principally Japan, West 
Germany .and the United Kingdom. All theses.t/ites have subsequently e.stablished their 
own 200 miles EFts. In the present author's opinion, the cessation of protests by th€?se 
states, combined with the fact that each one of them has .subsequently established its own 
EFZ, represents a modification in the position of these states and provides strong evidence 
of their submission to the new customary rule concerning the 200 miles EEZ. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it seems very safe to conclude that claims to 
200 miles EEZ have satisfied the prerequisites required by international law for state 
practice to be regarded as customary internationllaw. Therefore, the realistic and correct 
view seems to be that, as has been repeatedly expressed in several judicial decisions 
58 
delivered recently by the IC] and arbitration panels ,and has been maintained by many 
59 
international law publicists ,the 200 miles EEZ is without any doubt part of current 
60 61 
general customary law. Consequently, the view held by Iguechi and Zakharov ,as 
well as by several other lawyers against the binding nature of the EEZ under general 
customary law, appears nowadays to be absolutely not founded. 
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Section II : The Scope of the EEZ General Concept in Customary 
International Law 
This section is concerned with the inquiry into the main component parts of the 
EEZ that have been incorporated into customary law. The importance of such inquiry 
stems from the fact that a number of lawyers, especially in Western Europe, have 
expressed strong doubts as to whether the rights of coastal states other than those with 
regard to living resources have also been taken into the new rule of customary law 
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concerning the 200 miles EEZ . In this connection, Professor Fleischer, for instance, has 
saYd: 
"In state practice. it is the right to 200 miles for fisheries which commands 
the largest measure of general international acceptance. while the right to a 
63 
full EEZ under contempory qustomary law may be more questionable" . 
This section, ho.wever, demonstrates that the new established customary rule is 
not confined to the right to assert 200 miles for fisheries, but has taken in the ~ore 
comprehensive concept of the EEZ. The majority of national legislation, proclamations and 
decrees establishing EEZs confirm this verdict. This view is also stressed in the recent 
jurisprudence of the IeJ and expressed with different types of reasoning by many 
international law publicists. 
A. National Practice 
With regard to the component parts of the EEZ, the ideas of UNCLOS III have 
played an extremly important role by being adopted into national instruments in their 
different forms (legislation, proclamations and decrees), and thereby appearing as 
principal elements of the relevant state practice. 
Thus, as has already been explained in more details in chapter 4 of this thesis, 
when EEZ national claims are checked in relation to their general component parts, it is 
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easy to observe the existence of a significant consistency with the EEZ concept enshrined 
in Article 56 of the LOS Convention, or occasionally with some of the negotiating texts 
which led to this eventual fonnulation. 
A propos the assertion of sovereign rights for the purposes of exploration and 
exploitation of the EEZ's living and non-living resources and with regard to other 
economic activities related to the EEZ as cited in Article 56 (1) (a) of the LOS Convention, 
there exists at the national level a consensus which can possibly be described as almost 
absolute. Thus, with the exception of a very few EEZ claims, which omit referring to 
sovereign rigths with regard to other activities related to other economic uses of the EEZ, 
all other EEZ claims have copied the general principle of the sovereign rights of the coastal 
state with respect to the resources of the zone, which is included in Article 56 (1) (a) 
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almost literally . 
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Moreover, with the exception of the small number of EFZ claims and a .very 
few EEZ claims, all the rest of EEZ claims contain a specific assertion relating to the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state over artificial islands, installations and structures and with 
regard to the conduct of MSR within the EEZ, as well as in respect of the protection of the 
marine environment. In this connection, of the 87 claims to the EEZ which are included in 
Smith's compilation, 57 states assert juridiction over artificial islands, installations and 
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structures within the EEZ ; 63 states include jurisdiction over MSR ; and over 80 states 
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assert jurisdiction over environmental protection within their EEZs . While it is true that 
the extent of the jurisdiction claimed in respect of the above activities appears to vary from 
one claim to another, in the author's opinion those variations do not seem to constitute a 
significant discrepancy in relation to the fundamental components of the EEZ concept 
enumerated in Article 56 (1) (b) of LOS Convention, as they more relate to the specific 
regimes governing activities falling under them. 
Furthennore, the EEZ is a package deal entity that comprises the rights of coastal 
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states and their corresponding duties as well as the rights and duties of third states. The 
rights and the duties of each of these groups of states go hand in hand in the EEZ concept. 
As has been dicussed in chapter 4 dealing with state practice, an overwhelming 
majority of EEZ claims have either explicitly or implicitly referred to the basic rights 
contained in Article 58 (1) of the LOS Convention, which belong to third states in the 
EEZ, namely the freedom of navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables 
and pipelines. The intensity with which national practice has been manifested in this field 
has been described by one lawyer in the following terms: 
"As a general rule, the freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines as well as other associated freedoms, are 
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recognized at the conceptual level" . 
Moreover, in its Decision of 10 June 1992 in the Case. Concerning the 
Delimitation ·of the Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic,. the Arbitral 
.. . . - ..' - ,t ~ 
Trib~Iial observed that ",the principle of freedom of navigation·through the 200 mile zone 
is guaranted by Article 58 of the 1982 Convention, a provision that undoubtedly 
represents customary international law as much as the institution of the 200 mile zone 
itself,70 
B. Recent Jurisprudence of the ICJ 
Besides the state practice argument, the recent jurisprudence of the ICJ lends 
further support to the view that the new international custon concerning the 200 miles 
jurisdictional zone has picked up the more comprehensive concept of the EEZ. In this 
context, in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v.Libya) Case. the EEZ was referred to by the 
71 
ICJ as a concept "which may be regarded as part of modern international law" . There, 
Judge ada, in a lengthy dissent largely devoted to the interrelation between the continental 
72 
shelf and the EEZ, came to the same conculusion . As several authors have already 
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indicated, this opinion is similar to the conclusion reached by the ICJ in the 1969 North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, wherein the Court had stated that the legal status of the 
continental shelf had partly become customary law prior to the 1958 Geneva Convention 
73 
on the Continental Shelf . 
Moreover, in its 1984 Judgement concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. USA) Case, the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that the delimitation of a maritime boundary between these two states, by 
which both established their 200 miles zones (Canada-exclusive fishery, and the USA-
economic zone ) : 
[R]elates to a delimitation between the dif,ferent forms of partial 
jurisdiction, i.e. the "sovereign rights" which, under current international 
law, both treaty-law and general law, coastal state are recognized to have 
in the marine and submarin~ areas lying outside the outer limit of their 
74 
r~spective territorial seas, up to, defined limits" . 
In a subsequent paragraph of the Judgement, the Chamber of the Court further 
stated that certain EEZ provisions of the LOS Convention may be regarded "as consonant 
75 
at present with general international law" . 
Finally, one should also refer here to the judgement of the ICJ in the Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahyria v. Malta), according to 
which: 
"It is in the Court's view incontestable that... the institution of the 
exclusive economic zone with its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is 
76 
shown by the practice of states to have become a part of customary law" . 
C. 0 pinions of Publicists 
On the level of the opinions of publicists, it is easy to discern that many publicists 
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have, with different types of reasoning, contended that the basic EEZ concept comprising 
diversified functional competences is now part and parcel of general customary 
international law. In this connection, in his comments on the US Proclamation concerning 
the exclusive economic zone of the United States, Professor Queneudec has correctly 
said: 
"II n'en demeure pas moins que cette Proclamation peut avoir pour eftet de 
renforcer encore davantage I'institution coutumiere de la zone economique 
dans I'ordre international, eu egard a la qualite et la situation des Etats Unies. 
D'autant plus que, en enumerant les droits et pouvoirs revendiques a I'interieur 
de leur zone economique exclusive, la Proclamation Reagan reprend presque 
mot par mot la formulation de fArticle 56 (1). de la Convention de 1982 ..... 77. 
According to ProfessorJennings, "the principle, if not the details of the EEZ, are 
" 78 
new law, assuredly" . 
Professor Vicuna has cOFfectly noted that : 
"BecaLJse the majority of national claims referred in the beginning to the 
exploitation of living resources the doubt arose as to whether only the restricted 
modality of an exclusive fishing zone had been incorporated into customary Law 
or also the broader concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone ... It was national 
practice itself that resolved this doubt in favor of the exclusive economic zone 
concept, since most of the fishing zones have evolved towards this other more 
79 
complete modality..... . 
In the opinion of Professor Kwiatkowska, "under general customary law, every 
coastal state may establish a 200 miles economic zone in which it exercises sovereign 
rights over all natural resources and jurisdiction with regard to scientific research and 
marine pollution, and in which all states enjoy freedom of communication,,80. 
Moreover, Professor Charney has observed that, "while the general internatinal 
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law of the sea has evolved toward the regimes of the LOS Convention, entry into force of 
the Convention with widespread participation will stabilize and clarify a number of 
existing international regimes of the oceans. These regimes include: the twelve - nautical 
mile territorial sea; .. the new 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), giving 
principal legislative authority to the coastal state over living and non-living resources and 
environmental protection in the zone; traditional navigation and overflight freedoms in the 
EEZ; the laying of cables and pipelines ... ,,81 
On the basis of the above discussion, it seems safe to conclude that the new 
customary rule related to the 200 miles jurisdictional zone has taken in the broader concept 
of the EEZ entitling coastal states to exercise djversifiedfunctional competences within the 
200 miles zone. Consequently, the contention that this new rule has been confined to the 
more resmcted concept of the EFZ seems to be, today; not correct. Nonetheless, it must 
be recalled here that, while the EEZ concept encompasses numerous component parts, the 
fisheries component remains the celltral one. Thus, if a coastal state chooses to asseIt only 
a partial jurisdiction, it would be entitled to do so, for the simple reason that a state which 
is entitled to claim jurisdiction with regard to a set of specific aspects, would also be 
allowed to assert jurisdiction in respect of only one of those specific aspects. It ensues that 
the contention that an EFZ concept forms nowadays a part of customary law is also 
absolutely correct. 
Section III : The Situation of the EEZ Specific Regime in Customary 
International Law 
Opinions of publicists who have dealt with the question of the situation of the 
LOS Convention's EEZ specific regime in customary international law are divided. 
According to one point of view, the detailed EEZ regime of the LOS Convention has been 
taken in the new customary rule relating to the EEZ as a whole 82. In another opposite 
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view, the new established custO.mary rule, in this field, has been restricted to' the principal 
elements that characterize the EEZ83. With regard to' the latter view, Judge ada, in his 
dissent in the CO.ntinental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya) Case, fO.r instance, has this to' say: 
"The Court need have no qualms in acknowledging the concept of the EEZ as 
having entered the realm of customary international law". 
He further emphasized that: 
"Quite apart from the treaty-making process, the sui-generis regime of the 
exclusive economic zone is going to require much more careful examination 
before the rules so far adumbrated may be viewed as succeptible of adoption 
84 
into existing international law" .. 
HO.wever, in the authO.r's O.piniO.n, these two. views are nO.t cO.nvincing fO.r they 
do. nO.tappear to' coincide with the actual state O.f state practice relating to' the EEZ. Thus, 
in thissectiO.n, thea~thor suggests that a middle view acknO.wledging the in90.rpO.ration 
into' custO.m O.f certain other provisiO.ns O.f the LOS CO.nv:entiO.n 's EEZ specific regime 
besides the cO.nceptual elements, especially in relatiO.n to' fisheries, seems to' be the view 
that finds sufficient cO.rrO.bO.ratiO.n in state practice as well as in several recent O.piniO.ns O.f 
publicists. 
A. The LOS Convention's EEZ Provisions Concerning Fisheries 
The protectiO.n and ratiO.nal management and utilizatiO.n O.f fisheries reSO.urces 
fO.und in the water cO.lumn O.f adjacent seas was the principal reaSO.n fO.r the institutiO.n O.f 
the 200 miles EEZ. It is, therefO.re, nO.t surprising that the largest part O.f the EEZ specific 
regime included in Part V O.f the LOS CO.nventiO.n CO.ncerns fisheries. Likewise, there is 
no. wO.nder that this specific regime O.ccupies a leading place in state practice. As has been 
discussed in chapter 4, Article 61 O.f the LOS CO.nventiO.n cO.ntains the detailed regime O.n 
cO.nservatiO.n O.f the EEZ living reSO.urces. The specific cO.astal state's cO.nservatiO.n 
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objectives in the EEZ have been identified as: (i) the determination of the T AC of living 
resources; (ii) the prevention of over-exploitation; (iii) the production of the maximum 
substainble yield; and (iv) the maintenance of associated or dependant species above levels 
at which their reproduction becomes seriously threatened. All these objectives acquired 
large support in the early stages of UNCLOS III, and remained intact since their first 
inclusion in the ISNT85 in 1975. This consistency resulted in the emergence of a 
widespread reflection of these objectives, albeit without all the ramifications required86, in 
state practice well before the conclusion of the LOS Convention in 1982. It seems, thus, 
safe to say that the conservation objectives enshrined in Article 61 of the LOS Convention 
have been also taken into custom . 
. Similarly, the coastal state's obligation to secure optimum utilization of the EEZ 
living resources contained in Article62 (l)was fir~t inserted in the ISNT87 and had since 
then suffered .nocrucialchanges. This stability has generated a uniform -and consistent 
practice conforming with the said provision 88. Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that, 
under current international customary law, coastal states are bound to promote the 
optimum utilization of the living resources found in their EEZs. This view finds sufficient 
corroboration in state practice concerning the EEZ and EFZ that has been analysed earlier 
in chapter 4, and also in several opinions of law publicists 89. 
It is to be noted that Professor Burke has asserted that: 
"In particular state practice provides no basiS for inferring general 
acceptance of any customary law concerning the ... determination of 
90 
harvesting capacity, access to a surplus ... " . 
However, it seems difficult to agree with Burke's view. Indeed, it is possible to 
identify a growing trend of coastal states acknowledging access of third states to fish in the 
200 miles EEZ or EFZ. In this connection, Moore correctly described the situation in the 
following terms: 
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"All countries that have extended their jurisdiction to 200 mile, however, 
make provision for foreign fishing in those waters, and establish the 
conditions for such fishing. In general many of these conditions cover at 
least in part, the same ground as the examples set out in Art. 62 (4) of the 
91 
ICNr' . 
Indeed, recognition of the obligation placed upon coastal states to give access to 
the surplus of the TAC of fisheries within their EEZs or EFZs finds further support in a 
large number of agreements or other arrangements entered into by states to allow for 
foreign fishing within the 200 jurisdictional zone. Thus, between 1975 and 1985 alone, 
more than 250 intergovernmental agreements were concluded, enabling access to the 
coastal fisheries by foreign fisherme"n
92
. Some of these fishery agreements have explicitly 
"'referred to the regard given 'to the debates at UNCLOS ill concerning coastal fisheries93. 
"" It is perhaps worth mentioning here that it has been observed that the large 
existing number of rsheries agreements have possibly sprung from reasons of politico-
economical expediency rather than from legal obligation94. While it is probable that certain 
agreements may have resulted from some other considerations, e.g. source of income95, 
there exist evident references in many of these agreements to that due to the institution of 
the 200 miles EEZ or EFZ, there is a duty to allow access to the surplus of the TAC. In 
this context, the Mexican-USA Fisheries Agreement of November 24, 1976 has stated in 
its preamble that, "considering further that the Government of Mexico will promote the 
objective of optimum utilization of the living resouces in the zone ... and shall give access 
to foreign vessels to the surplus ... ". The same words are contained into Mexico/Cuba 
Fishery Agreement of July 26, 1976. Moreover, the preamble of the 1987 Agreement on 
Cooperation in Fisheries Matters between Algeria and Mauritania states that, "conte tenu 
de la Convention des Nations Unies sur Ie Droit de la Mer, notament ses Articles 61,62, 
70 et 71,,96. 
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The point of view that the provision of Article 62 (2) relating to the coastal state 
duty to determine its harvesting capacity and to give other states access to the surplus of 
the T AC has been also taken into custom appears to find strong additional backing in the 
UNCLOS III negotiating history. During the whole period of negotiations at UNCLOS III 
there was a general understanding that the recognition of access to the surplus was vital to 
the widespread recognition of the 200 miles EEZ. Moreover, the provision of Article 62 
(2) appeared ftrst in 1975 ISNT, and has suffered no crucial changes since that time. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it seems fair to conclude that the provision 
of Article 62 (2) of the LOS Convention that casts an obligation upon EEZs claimant states 
to give access to the surplus catch to foreign fishing vessels has passed into the corpus of 
customary law. 
Moreover, the conditions of access adopted in state practice are generally 
concordant with those found in Article 62 (4). On the other hand, state practice concerning 
EEZs and EFZs shows that there is only a very few states which provide for an explicit 
indication of the criteria to be considered in the allocation of quotas of the surplus available 
to foreign fishing. However, the practice of states addressing this matter reveals the 
exclusive coastal state decision-making based on its own interests, and thus confirm the 
view that the order of the criteria of access included in Article 62 (3) of the LOS 
Convention does not constitute a priority list to which the states with a fishery surplus 
must strictly adhere. 
As regards the enforcement provisions contained in Article 73 of the LOS 
Convention, it must be noted that, although Article 73 (3) provides that violations may not 
be punished by imprisonment or any form of corporal punishment, in the absence of 
contrary agreements, some coastal states still provide for imprisonment as a penalty for the 
violation of fishing laws97. However, as already indicated in chapter 4 of this thesis, state 
practice relating to enforcement is generally developing in line with the LOS Convention's 
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provisions. Moreover, the work of the FAO demonstrates that Article 73 provides the 
main basis for the practice of states in the matter of enforcement
98
• It seems, therefore, 
reasonable to conclude that Article 73 has passed into the corpus of customary law. 
Finally, Articles 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67 contain special regimes relating to specific 
species. In short, the LOS Convention calls for international cooperation through 
appropriate international organizations in regard to stocks within the EEZ shared by two or 
more coastal states, stocks occuring within the EEZ and beyond and adjacent to the EEZ, 
HMSs, and marine mammals99. The management and conservation of anadromous and 
catadromous stocks are also provided for in the LOS Convention with the coastal state 
acknowledged as having the primary interest in and the responsibility for establishment of 
appropriate regulatory measures within the EEZ where all fishing with limited exceptions, 
. tak I £ 'h . 100 IS to ,ep.ace lor suc specIes . 
In a very recent article entitled "The Implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and EEZ Management for Bermuda, a Small Midocean Island Commonwealth Territory", 
Kawaley has asserted that "highly migratory species, anadromous species, marine 
mammals, and possibly sedentary species ... are afforded distinct treatment by the LOSC 
and, arguably, under customary internationallaw,,101. However, in the present author's 
opinion, while it is true that the LOS Convention affords distinct treatment to those 
species, with the exception of sedentary species, the contention that current customary law 
also affords distinct treatment to highly migratory species, anadromous species and marine 
mammals seems to be untenable. Indeed, assessment of state practice relating to the LOS 
Convention's specific regimes concerning these species has resulted in the manifestation 
of restrictive opinions in terms of its impact on international custom. Thus, in the opinion 
of Wolfrum,"most states simply assert that their management authority in the exclusive 
economic zone embraces living resources of that zone without reflecting on Article 64 
CLOS on highly magratory species,,102. Professor Fleischer observed that "it may be 
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doubtful whether the specific systems provided for in Article 66 and 67 can be said to 
conform to general, non-conventional law" 103. Professor Burke has arrived at an even 
more evident and comprehensive conclusion with regard to the status of the specifc 
regimes enshrined in Articles 63, 64, 65, and 67. In this connection, he has contended that 
state practice does not provide a basis for inferring general acceptance of any customary 
law with regad to : 
" ... prohibiting the initiation of a high seas fishery on anadromous species, a 
requirement that high seas fishing states recognize or defer to coastal states 
rights, duties, and interests concerning highly migratory species or 
straddling stocks, or a requirement that coastal states cooperate with high 
seas ,fishing states in.utilization and conservation of highly migratory 
species within a coastal state's· ,EEZ. NOJ can one find national legislation 
104 
that recognizesoblig~tions regarding LUGDSs" . 
Thus, it is clear from thes.e opinions that the special regimes relating to the 
specific species contained in Articles 63, 64,65, 66 and 67 of the LOS Convention have 
not been taken into custom, simply because they do not have sufficient backing in state 
practice. The present author's assessment of state practice undertaken in chapter 4 
corroborates this view. 
B. The LOS Convention's Specific Regimes Concerning the Coastal 
State's Non-Economic Rights and Duties in the EEZ 
As has been explained earlier in chapter 2 in detail 105, the other rights that coastal 
states can exercise in the EEZ are purely jurisdictional as opposed to sovereign character. 
They relate to artificial islands, installations and structures, the full regime for which is set 
out in Article 60; MSR which is stipulated in Part XIII of the LOS Convention, especially 
Articles 246-254; and protection of the marine environnement, which is contained in 
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Articles 208, 210, 211, 214, 216 and 220 of Part XII. 
Surveys of national practice from the point of view of the detailed regimes 
relating to the above indicated matters which have been effected so far have led to the 
manifestation of concordant opinions that, beyond the conceptual elements, the relevant 
specific regimes have not been well reflected in the practice of states. In this context, 
Charney has concluded that, if MSR, marine environment, artificial islands, installations 
and structures that are matters in which coastal states can exercise functional jurisdiction 
according to the LOS Convention are examined, it can be seen that beyond conceptual 
elements their specific regimes do not seem to have sufficient support in the practice of 
106 I h .. f K . k k h . b . I d' ... al states . n t e opmIOn 0 wlat ows a, t ere eXIst su stantIa Iscrepancles 10 natIon 
practice relating to the regime of artificial islands, MSR, and protection of the EEZ marine 
environment107. Moreover, Soons has said that "althol,lgh it can be concluded from 
surveys of state practice that the main elements of UNCLOS's regime fo.r marine scientific 
research,. have" be.come part of customary international 'law, certainly not all its detailed 
.. h ,,108 provIsIOns ave . 
It is evident from the above opinions that the details set out in the LOS 
Convention concerning MSR, artificial islands, installations and structures, and protection 
of environment, have not been incorporated into customary international law, since they 
have not yet become an established part of state practice. The present author's analysis of 
national practice contained in chapter 4, section B, confirms this view. 
c. The Provision of Article 59 Concerning Residual Rights 
As has been already said in chapter 3, the provision enshrined in Article 59 
appeared first in the ISNT in 1975109 and has been retained intact in all subsequent texts 
of UNCLOS III. Nonetheless, there has not yet been significant state practice on this 
matter. Moreover, there exist substantial variations in the positions of coastal states which 
have expressly dealt with the subject in their national instruments 110. For instance, upon 
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signature of the LOS Convention, Cape Verde 111 and Uruguay 112 have both asserted that 
residual rights in the EEZ fall within the competence of the coastal state. The Ivory Coast 
asserts residual right with respect specifically to environmental protection in the EEZ113. 
Amongst the developed maritime powers, Italy has stated in its Declaration upon signature 
of the LOS Convention that it does not recognize the residual rights as inhering in the 
coastal state 114. Thus, it remains to be seem whether states will resort, in the future, to 
employ the guidelines enshrined in Article 59 as a basis for resolving disputes concerning 
EEZ residual rights. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The author's research and study of the concept and regime of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) under the Law of the Sea Convention and in state practice has 
resulted in the following conclusions: 
Prior to the Second World War, it was not possible for coastal states to make any 
claim to the seabed lying beneath the high seas or to the living resources found in the high 
seas water column. That was generally viewed as being unlawful. 
The situation changed rapidly after World War II. Soon after the war, it became 
possible to fence the commons and individual coastal states commenced to do so. The 
sedes of a.ssertions and state acts .that led to the development of the theory of the 
continental shelf had put the process of development of the EEZ in motion, but it was the 
1952 Santi~go Declaration on the 200 Maritime Zone made by Peru, Ecuador and Chile 
whose object ·and purpose was to achieve the control of all resources off the coast up to 
200 nautical miles, which laid the embryo of what is known today as the EEZ doctrine. 
UNCLOS I started as an attempt to regulate the shelf jurisdiction and succeded 
despite its partial failure to set a definite outer limit to coastal states jurisdiction over the 
resources of the shelf. Then, UNCLOS II moved to the superjacent waters. However, 
altthough the 200 miles resources zone figured in the outcome of UNCLOS II, it did not 
have sufficient support to make its adoption by the Conference a real possibility. Indeed, 
the Conference did not even agree on the right of coastal states to have contiguous fishing 
zones of more than six miles in width beyond a territorial sea of 6 miles, thereby leaving 
the question of a contiguous fishery zone well within the realm of customary international 
Law. 
The period between UNCLOS II and UNCLOS III witnessed an intensified 
pressure for the recognition of the 200 miles contiguous resources zone, mainly as a result 
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of the political and technological changes that had occured in this era. Nevertheless, until 
the commencement of negotiations at UNCLOS III, the 200 miles resources zone 
remained, principally, a phenomenon of Latin American and African practice in the law of 
the sea. Thus, while a number of Latin American and African states had made claims to 
extend and had effectively extended their fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, the majority of 
independent maritime states, whether developed or developing, distant water or not, 
confined their jurisdiction for fishery purposes to no more than 12 miles. Therefore, it 
seems justified to say that by 1974, it could not be contended objectively that the 200 miles 
resources zone had crystallized as a rule of customary international law since, although 
national practice had started to evolve, it was not marked by uniformity and had not 
satisfied the element of generality required in order to ·become a customary rule, even of 
regional extent. 
However, the notorious progress which it had made in the stage of the 
prepar,atory work of UNCLOS III, the depredation of fishing resources that became 
apparent and accute in the very early seventies and, the desire of developing states to have . 
new economic resources clearly allocated to them by the international community, 
combined together, had rendered the consideration of the 200 miles EEZ by the 
international community a matter of great urgency. UNCLOS ill, aiming at the codification 
and progressive development of the law of the sea, provided the most appropriate forum 
wherein the conceptual content of the 200 miles zone and the detailed regime applicable to 
it were carefully clarified. The results were included in detailed form in UNCLOS III 
negotiating texts, especially the 1977 ICNT. The rules agreed upon in the latter text 
provided a very clear picture of the conventional legal regime that would govern the future 
EEZ. They remained almost intact until their inclusion in the LOS Convention. The 
stability they had enjoyed and the emerging consensus relating to the 200 miles EEZ, 
combined together, encouraged many coastal states to establish EEZs in line with, or 
345 
explicitly based on, the rules agreed upon, thus providing the material for the 200 miles 
EEZ to become a well established fact and rule of customary international law before the 
adoption of the LOS Convention. 
In so far as the scope of the EEZ general concept in customary international law is 
concerned, it must be noted that in the early evolutionary stages of the EEZ concept at 
UNCLOS III, the restricted EFZ concept adhered to, especially by the big maritime states, 
had competed with the broader concept of the EEZ. But, as the work of UNCLOS III 
progressed and national legislation or proclamations relating to the 200 miles functional 
zone developed, the EEZ basic functional approach contained in Article 56 (1) of the LOS 
Convention conprising a series of quite separate types of jurisdictions, albeit related has 
prevailed in state practice. This legal shift has been depicted by Professor Scovazzi as 
follows: 
,io.wing to widespread acceptance" within a few y,~ars the 200 milefi$hery 
zone acquired the status of a customary rule of intellnational law and many 
coastal states, great maritime powers included, comple,ted their shift towards 
extended marine jurisdiction by proclaiming exclusive economic zones. Such 
proclamations were made easier by the fact that the concept of the exclusive 
economic zone, at least as it appears from Part V of the Montego Bay 
Convention, does not encroach upon the traditional freedom of 
navigation"l. 
Thus, current state practice seems to give strong evidence that the right to claim a 
special functional jurisdiction up to a maximum limit of 200 miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured is fIrmly established in international 
customary law. However, if a coastal state chooses to assert an EEZ of less than 200 
miles, its action remains consistent with international law as the precise width under both 
the LOS Convention and customary law is clearly facultative. 
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Moreover, the right in question applies on all parts of the coasts of a state. It is 
not restricted to states where there is a special need for measures to protect the resources 
of the interests of the fishery population, nor to such parts of a coastal state's coastline 
where there is specific evidence of such needs. 
State practice seems also to suggest that, within the asserted 200 miles EEZ, the 
claimant state can invoke and claim all the general functional rights and jurisdictions 
specified in Article 56 (1) (a) and (b) of the LOS Convention. Such rights and jurisdictions 
can be invoked by a state party to the LOS Convention against any other party on the basis 
of treaty law, i. e. the basic rule of pacta sun! servanda applies2, and against non-parties 
on the basis of general customary law. As provided in Acticle 38 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
"Nothing in article 34 to 37 [dealing with the problem of pacta tertis] precludes 
a rule set forth in. a treaty from beqor:ning binding upon a third sta~e as a. v 
customary rule onnternationallaw, re.cognized as such". 
It must, however, be made clear that, if a coastal state opts to assert only one of 
those basic rights, its action remains within the confines of public international law since, 
as one prominent author has correctly observed, states "are not required by international 
law to fully exercise all rights ... they acquire under customary internationallaw,,3. But, 
other states retain the possibilities they have had before the new customary rule relating to 
the 200 miles EEZ came into existence, because under both the LOS Convention and state 
practice the EEZ does not exist ipso facto as does the shelf, but has to be asserted. 
Furthermore, state practice appears also to prove that the basic conventional rights 
of third states of freedom of overflight, of laying cables and pipelines and of navigation 
enshrined in Article 58 (1) of the LOS Convention have been received into the new 
international custom relating to the 200 miles EEZ, thus confirming the functional and 
sui generis character of the zone agreed upon at UNCLOS III. The EEZ has, therefore, 
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been kept in international customary law subject to the same rules, at least to those 
containing the most general principles regarding its essential features such as its sui generis 
nature, its breadth, the main rights of the coastal states, and the main rights of other states. 
Consequently, one of the most serious concerns relating to the EEZ in the post -
UNCLOS III era - that is, the fear of its eventual territorialization by means of state 
practice - has thus far proven unwarranted. 
As far as the status of the EEZ detailed conventional regime in customary 
international law is concerned, it may be said that, despite the existence of a general 
cpmpliance with the EEZ ba,sic provisions of the LOS Convention, in most cases the 
detailed provisions that develop each of the particular regimes are not followed in national 
legislation and practice with the same degree of accuracy. So far, it seems safe to conclude 
that state practice confirms ~hat only the conservation goals of Article 61 and utilization 
princjplesin Article 62, as well as the enforcement proVisions contained in ArtiCle 73, nave, . 
-been accepted as p~ of international customary law. It follows that the contention that all 
the non-seabed provisions of the LOS Convention already reflect norms of customary 
international law is not accurate. 
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Final Conclusions 
Notes and References 
1. T. Scovazzi : "Explaining Exclusive Fishery Jurisdiction", 9 MP, 1985, p. 125; 
see also Dinh and others, op. cit., supra Introduction note 18, p. 994. 
2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties opened for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 26, 
Text in 8 ILM, 1969, p. 679; aslo Anderson, op. cit., supra Introduction note 1, 
pp. 319 - 321. 
3. Soons, op. cit., supra chapter 2 note 28, p. 272. 
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Appendix A 
1 • STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEAlL 
List of signatures. ratifications. accessions and succession 1..1 
State/Entity Date of si2nature J/ 
Date of ratifica1ion/ 
accession iL 
SU~~i!SSiQn bJ 
Afghanistan 18 March 1983 
Algeria 10 December 1982 22 January 1996 
Angola 10 December 1982 5 December 1990 
Antigua and Barbuda 7 February 1983 2 February 1989 
Argentina 5 October 1984 1 December 1995 
Australia 10 December 1982 5 October 1994 
Austria 10 December 1982 14 July 1995 
Bahamas 10 December 1982 29 July 1983 
Bahrain 10 December 1982 30 May 1985 
.. 
Bangladesh 10 Decem.ber 1982 
Barbdos 10 December 1982 12 October 1993 
Belarus 10 December 19812 
Belgium 5 December 1984 
Belize 10 December 1982 13 August 1983 
Benin 30 August 1983 
Bhutan 10 December 1982 
Bolivia 27 november 1984 28 April 1995 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 January 1994 12 January 1994bi 
Botswana 5 December 1984 2 May 1990 
Brazil 10 December 1982 22 December 1988 
Brunei Darussalam 5 December 1984 
Bulgaria 10 December 1982 
Bukina Faso 10 December 1982 
Burundi 10 December 1982 
Cambodia 1 July 1983 
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Dilt~ !If si2niltur~ J/ Dilte !If r~lificl1i!ln/ Stilte/Entity acceSSIOn Su~~~ssiQn lJJ 
Cameroon 10 December 1982 19 November 1985 
Canada 10 December 1982 
Cape Verde 10 December 1982 10 August 1987 
Central African Republic 4 December 1984 
Chad 10 December 1982 
Chile 10 December 1982 
China 10 December 1982 
Colombia 10 December 1982 
Comoros 6 December 1984 21 June 1994 
Congo 19 December 1982 
Cook Islands 10 December 1982 15 February, 1995 
Costa Rica 10 December 1982 21 September 1992 
., 
Croatia 10 December 1982 5 April 1995Q/ 
Ivory Coast 10 December 1982 26 March 1984 
Cuba 10 December 1982 15 August 1984 
Cyprus 10 December 1982 12 Decmber 1988 
Czech Republic 3J 10 December 1982 
Democratic People's Rep. of Korea 10 December 1982 
Denmark 10 December 1982 
Djibouti 10 December 1982 8 October 1991 
Dominica 28 March 1983 24 October 1991 
Dominican Republic 10 December 1982 
Egypt 10 December 1982 26 August 1983 
EI Salvador 5 December 1984 
Equatorial Guinea 30 January 1984 
Ethiopia 10 December 1982 
372 
State/Entity Date of signature J! 
Date of r~tific!fionl 
accessIOn 
511!':!':~55iuD JJJ 
European Economic Community 7 December 1984 
Fiji 10 December 1982 10 December 1982 
Finland 10 December 1982 
France 10 December 1982 
Gabon 10 December 1982 
Gambia 10 December 1982 22 May 1984 
Gennany ~ 14 October 1994Y 
Ghana 10 December 1982 7 June 1983 
Greece 10 December 1982 21 July 1995 
Grenada 10 December 1982 25 April 1991 
: 
Guatemala 8july 1983 
Gui,nea 4 October 1984 .6 September 1985 
. - .--
Guinea-Bissau 10 December 1982 25 August 1986 
Guyana 10 December 1982 16 November 1993 ... 
Haiti 10 December 1982 
Honduras 10 December 1982 5 October 1993 
Hungary 10 December 1982 
Iceland 10 December 1982 21 June 1985 
India 10 December 1982 29 June 1995 
Indonesia 10 December 1982 3 February 1986 
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 10 December 1982 
Irak 10 December 1982 30 July 1985 
Ireland 10 December 1982 
Italy 7 December 1984 13 January 1995 
Jamaica 10 December 1982 21 March 1983 
Japan 7 February 1983 
Jordan 27 November 1995U 
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State/Entity Date of sienature J/ 
Date of ra!ific!1ionL 
accessIOn 
• 12/ SU~~~SSIQn 
Kenya 10 December 1982 2 March 1989 
Kuwait 10 December 1982 2 May 1986 
Laos People's Democratic Republic 10 December 1982 
Lebanon 7 December 1984 ~ January 1995 JJ 
Lesotho 10 December 1982 
Liberia 10 December: 1982 
Libyan Arab Jamahirya 3 December 1984 
Lienchstein 30 November 1984 
Luxembourg 5 December 1984 
Macedonia 19 August 1994 121 
Madagascar 25 February 1983 
Malawi 7 December 1984 
Malaysia 10 December 1982 
Maldives 10 December 1982 
Mali 19 October 1983 16 july 1985 
Malta 10 December 1982 20 May 1993 
Marshall Islands 9 August 1991 fJJ 
Mauritania 10 December 1982 
Mauritius 10 December 1982 4 Novembre 1994 
Mexico 10 December 1982 18 March 1983 
Micronesia (Fed. States of) 29 April 1991 fJJ 
Monaco 10 December 1982 
Mongolia 10 December 1982 
Morocco 10 December 1982 
Mozambique 10 December 1982 
Myanmar 10 December 1982 
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Date of si2nature J! 
Date of r~tific:fionl 
State/Entity as:S:~I:2I:2IQD 
:ZUS:S:~l:2l:2iQD b.l 
Namibia fJJ 10 December 1982 18 April 1983 
Nauru 10 December 1982 
Nepal 10 December 1982 
Netherlands 10 December 1982 
New Zealand 10 December 1982 
Nicaragua 9 December 1984 
Niue 5 December 1984 
Niger 10 December 1982 
Nigeria 10 December 1982 14 August 1986 
~ , 
Norway 10 December 1982 
Oman 1 July 1983 ' 17 AQgust 1989 
Pakistan 10 December 1982 
Panama 10 December 1982 
Papua New Guinea 10 December 1982 
Paraguay 10 December 1982 26 September 1986 
Philippines 10 December 1982 8 May 1984 
Poland 10 December 1982 
Portugal 10 December 1982 
Quatar 27 November 1984 
Republic of Korea 14 March 1983 
Romania 10 December 1982 
Russian Federation 10 December 1982 
Rwanda 10 December 1982 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 7 December 1984 7 January 1993 
Saint Lucia 10 December 1982 27 March 1985 
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State/Entity Date of sia:nature J/ Date of r~tific:1ionl i)~~~SSIQn 
~U~~~~siQn bJ 
Saint Vincent and Grenadines 10 December 1982 1 October 1993 
Samoa 28 September 1984 14 August 
Sao Tome and Principe 13 July 1983 3.November 1987 
Saudi Arabia 7 December 1984 
Senegal 10 December 1982 25 October 1984 
Seychelles 10 December 1982 16 September 1991 
Sierra Leone 10 December 1982 12 Decembre 1994 
Si.ngapore 10 December 1982 17 Novembre 1994 
Sloyinia 16 June 199.sJ21 
Solomon Islands 10 December 1982 
Somalia 10 December 1982 24 July 1989 
Soutli Africa 5 December 1984 
.. 
Spain 4 December 1984 
Sri Lanka 10 December 1982 19 July 1994 
Sudan 10 December 1982 23 January 1985 
Suriname 10 December 1982 
Swaziland 18 January 1984 
Sweden 10 December 1982 
Switzerland 17 October 1984 
Thailand 10 December 1982 
Togo 10 December 1982 16 April 1985 
Tonga 2 August 199~ 
Trinidad and Tobago 10 December 1982 25 April 1986 
Tunisia 10 December 1982 24 April 1985 
Tuvalu 10 December 1982 
Uganda 10 December 1982 9 November 1990 
Ukraine 10 December 1982 
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Dah~ Uf ratifis.:a1iuDL 
Slal~LEDlih: .uBl~ Uf ~il:nBlur~ Jj Bs.:s.:essiun JL 
~ms.:s.:~~~iUD hi 
United Arab Emirates 10 December 1982 
United Republic of Tanzania 10 December 1982 30 September 1985 
,. 
Uruguay 10 December 1982 10 December 1992 
Vanuatu 10 December 1982 
VietNam 10 December 1982 25 July 1994 
Yemen 1J 10 December 1982 21 July 1987 
Yugoslavia 10 December 1982 5 May 1986 
Zaire 22 August 1983 17 February 1989 
... 
.. .. , 
Zambia 10 December 1982 7 March 1983 
... 
Zimbabwe 10 December 1982 24 February 1993 
Notes 
'1/ The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force on 16 November 1994 
inaccerdance with its Article 308. 
2/ On the basis of information available as at January 22, 1996. 
3/ As of 10 December 1984, 159 States or entities had signed the Convention, including the 
(former) German Democratic Republic and (former) Democratic Yemen. 
4/ On 10 December 1992, the Permanent representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
(former Czecheslovakia) informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic ceased to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic will be its successor States. The Czech Republic succeeded to the signature of the 
United Nations Conventions on the the Law of the Sea on the 22 February 1993. 
5/ Through accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany 
with effect from 3 Octeber 1990. the German States united to form one sovereign state. As from 
the date of unification the Federal Republic of Germany acted in the United Nations under the 
designation of "Germany". 
6/ Namibia became an independent States as of 21 March 1990 and a member of the United 
Nations as of 23 April 1990. The instrument of ratification was deposited by the United 
Nations Council of Namibia on behalf of Namibia 18 April 1983. 
7/ On 22 May 1990 People's Democratic Yemen Arab Republic merged to form a single State 
with the name "Yemen". All treaties and agreements concluded beteween either the Yemen Arab 
Republic or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and other States and international 
organisations in accordance with international law which are in force on 22 May 1990 will 
remain in effect. 
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Appendix B 
Table of Claims to Territorial Seas, EEZs and EFZs* 
States Tenitorial sea Exclusive Fishery zone (mm) economic zone (mm) 
(mm) 
Albania 12 
Algeria 12 32 and 521/ 
Angola 20 200 
Antigua and Barbuda 12 200 
Argentina 12 200 
Ausralia 12 200 
Bahamas 3 200 
Bahrain 12 
Bangladesh 12 200 
Barbados 12 200 
Belgium 12 Up to the median line 
Belize 3 200 
with neibouring States 
Benin 200 
Brazil 12 200 
Brunei Darussalam 12 200 
Bulgaria 12 200 
Cambodia 12 200 
Cameroon 50 
Canada. 12 200 
Cape Verde 12 200 
Chile 12 200 
. China 12 
Colombia 12 200 
Comoros 12 200 
Congo 200 
Cookllands 12 200 
Costa Rica 12 200 
Cote d'J voire 12 200 
Cuba 12 200 
Cyprus 12 
Dem. People's Rep. of 
Korea 
12 200 
Denmark 3 200 
Djibouti 12 200 
Dominica 12 200 
Dominican Republic 6 200 
Ecuador 200 
Egypt 12 Limits to be dennine;; 
EI Salvador 200 
Equatorial Guinea 12 200 
* On the basis of infonnation available as at 16 November 1994. 
1/ On 28 May 1994 Algeria established a fishery zone of 32 miles with regard to its western coast and 
52 miles with respect to its eastern coast, to be measured from the baselines. Legislative Decree 
No. 94/13 of 16 June 1994, in JORADP No. 40, 1994, p. 5. 
2/ To be established in accordance with the LOS Convention. 
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Eritreal' 12 
Limits to be detennine~ Estonia 12 
Fiji 12 200 
Finland 4 12 
France 12 200 
Gabon 12 200 
Gambia 12 200 
Gennany~ 3(12; 16)§I 200 
Ghana 12 200 
Greece 6/lOU 
Grenada 12 200 Guatemala 12 200 Guinea 12 200 
. Guinea-Bissau 12 200 Guyana 12 200 
Haiti 12 200 Honduras 12 200 Iceland 12 200 India 12 200 IndoIlesia 12 200 
. han (Islamic Republic of) 12 up.to a line detennined,by. 
agreement or equidistance line ' 
,Iraq 12 
Ireland 12 200 
Isra~l 12 
Ital ,y 12 
Jamaica 12 200 Japan 12 200 
Jordan 3 
Kenya 12 200 
Kiribati 12 200 
Kuwait 12 
Latvia 12 
Lebanon 12 
Liberia 200 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 12 
Lithuania 12 
Madagascar 12 200 
Malaysia 12 200 
3/ Eriteria, which was previously part of Ethiopia, became a member of the United Nations on 28 
May 1993. Ethiopia, is no longer a coastal state. 
4/ Limits to be detennined in accordance with neighbouring states. 
5/ Through accession of the Gennan Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Gennany 
with effect from 3 October 1990, the two Gennan states united to from one sovereign state as 
from the date of unification, the Federal Republic of Gennany has acted in the United Nations 
under the designation "Gennany". 
6/ The 3 miles limit claimed by the fonner Federal Republic of Gennany and the 12 miles limit 
claimed by the Gennan Democratic Republic have not been changed after the unification. At one 
point in the Gennan Bight the Territorial sea extends to 16 miles. 
7/ The 10 miles limit applies for the purpose of regulating civil aviation. 
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Maldives 12 defined by coordinates 
Malta 12 25 
Marchall Islands 12 200 
Mauritania 12 200 
Mauritius 12 200 
Mexico 12 200 
Micronesia (Federated 12 200 
States of) 
Monaco 12 
Morocco 12 200 
Mozambique 12 200 
Myanmar 12 200 
Namibia 12 200 
Nauru 12 200 
Netherlands 12 200 
New~aland 12 200 
Nicaragu~ 200 
Nigeria 30 200 
Niue' 12 200 
Norway 4 200 
Oman' 12 200 
Pakistan 12 200 
Panama 200 
Papua New Guinea 12 200 
Peru 200 
Philippines 200 
Pitcairn, Henderson, 200 
Ducie and Oeno Islands 
Poland 12 Up to a line to be 
detennined by 
agreements 
Portugal 12 200 
Qatar 12 Up to median line or a 
line to be detennined by 
agreements 
Republic of Korea 12 
Romania 12 200 
Russian Federation 12 200 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 12 200 
Saint Lucia 12 200 
Saint Vincent and the 12 200 
Grenadines 
Samoa 12 200 
Sao Tome and Principe 12 200 
Saudi Arabia 12 
Senegal 12 200 
Seychelles 12 200 
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Sierra Leone 200 
Singapore 3 
Soloman Islands 12 200 
Somalia 200 
South Africa 12 200 
South Georgia and the 200 
South Sandwich Islands 
Spain 12 200 
Sri Lanka 12 200 
Sudan 12 
Suriname 12 200 
Sweden 12 Up to equidistance line 
with neighbouring 
states 
Syrian Arab Republic 35 
Thaill,Uld 12 200 
'fogo 30 200 
Tonga 12 200 
Trinidad and Tobago 12 200 
Tunisia 12 
Turkey 6(12)Bi 20021 
Tuvalu 12 200 
Ukraine 12 200 
United Arab Emirates 12 200 
United Kingdom 12 200 
United Republic of 12 200 
Tanzania 
United States of 12 200 
America 
Uruguay 200 
Vanuatu 12 200 
Venezuela 12 200 
VietNam 12 200 
YemenW 12 200 
Yugoslavia 12 
Zaire 12 Limits to be 
detennined by 
agreemnts 
8/ The limit of 12 nautical miles applies in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. 
9/ Claimed in the Black Sea. 
10/ On 22 May 1990, Democratic Yemen and Yemen merged to form a single state. Since that date 
they have been represented at the United Nations as one member with the name "Yemen". 
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Appendix C 
LAND - LOCKED STATES 
AFRICA LATIN AMERICA ASIA EUROPE 
1- Botswana Bolivia Afghanistan Andorra 
2 - Burkina Faso Paraguay Annenia* Austria 
3 - Burundi Azerbaijan* Belarus 
4 - Central African Bhutan Czech Republic** 
Republic 
5 - Chad Kazakhstan * Hungary 
6 - EthiQpia **** Kyrgyzstan* Liechtenstein 
7 - Lesotho** . Lao People's Luxembourg 
Democratic Rep. 
8 - Malawi Mangolia Republic of Macedonia* 
9- Mali Nepal Republic of Moldova* 
10 - Niger Tadjikistan* San Marino*** 
11- Rwanda Turkmenistan* Slovak Republic** 
12 - Swaziland Uzbekistan* Switzerland 
13 - Uganda Vatican City State*** 
14 - Zambia (Holy See) 
15 - Zimbabwe 
15 02 12 13 
* States acceded to independence in 1991 - 1992. 
**/ States acceded to independence in 1993. 
***/ States surrounded entirely by the territory of another state. 
****/ A state which has become land-locked after accession of another state to independence 
(Eritrea, 1993). 
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